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A NOTE FROM INTERIM DIRECTOR
SUZANNE FIEDERLEIN, PH.D.

IN THIS ISSUE:

We are living in uncertain times
as we face an unprecedented
global health crisis. In keeping
with the tradition of adaptation
and creativity in the mine action
community, numerous national
clearance programs and implementing partner organizations
have adjusted operations in order
to continue survey, clearance,
and risk education work in line
with required COVID-19 restrictions. As some places begin to resume a greater range of activity, we recognize the threat presented by
this new virus remains pronounced, and we wish all of you safety in
your daily lives and good health.
The unprecedented challenges we have all faced these past four months
coincided with the start of my new role as CISR interim director. As
part of the JMU community, we all transitioned successfully to working
remotely and continue to do so as we reach mid-year. Fortunately, my
experienced Journal production team continued its work to assemble
another remarkable issue to share with you, finding the editorial
process actually easier as authors remained closer to their computers
and quicker to turn around article versions as they went through
the review process. We shall see what the remainder of 2020 has in
store for us, as the United States not only continues to grapple with
the pandemic but also a long-overdue reckoning with deeply ingrained
systemic racial injustices. We at CISR remain committed to our service
to the global HMA community, as we also work alongside members of
our JMU and local community in these challenging times.
Our spring/summer issue focuses on a variety of topics including the
role of the media in HMA, robotics and remote sensing, environmental
risk mitigation in mine action, a new approach to accessing and
complying with IMAS, as well as developing sustainable national
training capacities and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)
activities. We would normally highlight each of our contributors and
their articles; however, we have such a full spring/summer edition
that in an attempt to save space, I encourage you to review our table of
contents for a full listing of this issue’s featured articles.
In looking toward our fall issue of The Journal, we want to hear from
you and your organization on how the HMA sector is coping with
COVID-19. How have organizations responded to the pandemic and
in what ways have they adapted their operations both in and out of the
field? In what ways have organizations leveraged their in-country assets
to assist regional authorities and local communities? What does the
future look like for HMA operations, what challenges has the sector
faced during the past few months, and how as a community can we
better adapt to these new circumstances? We look forward to hearing
from you.
For more information, please see The Journal’s Calls for Papers at
https://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/cfps.shtml.
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WHITHER HMA POLICY?

LINKING HMA AND DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE
By Lewis Rasmussen, Ph.D. [ Tetra Tech ]

Authors submitting articles to The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction are expected to do so in good faith and are solely responsible for the
content therein. Views expressed in The Journal are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CISR, James Madison University, the U.S.
Department of State, or Tetra Tech.

Supporting the U.S. Department of State remove explosive hazards from a public fuel depot near Mosul, Iraq, which helped restore transportation operations critical
to agricultural activity.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech project photo.

I

n 1999, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines issued a

an integrated approach to removing landmines from the ground

seminal report entitled Landmine Monitor: Toward a Mine-Free

and reducing their disastrous impact on mine-affected communi-

World. How prophetic they were on the one hand, and how unbri-

ties. Nobody knows how many mines there are in the ground, and

dled and unrealistic the Campaign was on the other. Fresh off the 1997

that number is not very relevant, despite the attention given to

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), the report notes a U.S.

the issue. What is relevant is how many people are affected by the

State Department 1998 declaration that removal had surpassed plant-

presence of mines, which are obstacles to post-conflict reconstruc-

ing, and “it appears that we have turned the tide in the battle against

tion and socio-economic re-development.3

mines, and that it is possible to solve the AP [anti-personnel] mine cri-

The campaign’s enthusiasm around rapid resolution of the prob-

sis in years not decades.”1 The report, stating that the past decade has

lem was not misguided; after all, parties to the APMBC agreed to

focused on the threat to innocent civilians, heralds the emergence of

clear their contaminated territory within ten years. Two decades later,

a development assistance oriented approach toward demining, known

however, the international community continues to set new clearance

as humanitarian mine action (HMA), which is

timeframes while providing continued assistance.
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Around the time of the initial 1999 Landmine Monitor report, the
UN held the Millennium Summit in 2000 where member nations
adopted an agreement known as the Millennium Declaration, which
set forth goals and principles geared toward ending underdevelopment and abject poverty, and promoting peace and security. From this
agreement, eight broad goals were issued around social-, economic-,
and health-based objectives known as the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). The goals covered poverty, education, gender equality,
child mortality, maternal health, disease, the environment, and global
partnership, and established twenty-one specific development targets
along with sixty indicators to be achieved by 2015.4 Some states met
some objectives, a few achieved many, while many states achieved few,
if any, objectives.
The 2015 UN Summit was devoted to the next round of development goals, and the international community discussed the range of
challenges and impediments toward lasting development, security,
and stability faced by so many countries. The summit also celebrated
successes, as broadly measured by quality-of-life gains like positive
changes in poverty (those living above the $1.25 per day standard),
access to clean water, literacy improvements, and gender parity in primary education.5 Understanding better the success and shortfalls of
the MDG process (2000–2015) was critical, and the insight gleaned was
valuable for understanding how to meet the new development goals set
for 2015–2030, known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Unfortunately, the relationships between mines and development
were not addressed by policy and programming surrounding the 2000
MDGs, nor during the 1997 establishment of the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) and the United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS). Moreover, while some policy writing around the last millennium did explore the issue, the SDGs of 2015 still did not address
landmines and demining as intermediate variables along the pathway
to development. This lack of connectivity will be addressed further, but
for now, the point is that establishing a relationship between HMA
and global development goals was not done well previously, and

ideology, the use of public revenue to support socioeconomic needs
in other countries is receiving more scrutiny, along with more consistent and wider expectations for demonstrable results, benefitting
both recipient and donor. Additionally, further challenges may yet
arise as the vast amount of donor support is concentrated quite narrowly—both in terms of the percentage of support offered by a handful
of donors as well as the majority of assistance being provided to just a
handful of recipient countries.
According to the 2019 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor,
the three largest mine action donors from 2014 to 2018 (United States,
European Union, and Japan) account for nearly 58 percent of all funding. The top seven donors (adding the United Kingdom, Germany,
Norway, and the Netherlands) accounted for $2.147 billion of the
$2.629 billion in total assistance.
Also according to the 2019 Landmine Monitor, the level of US
funding alone over this time frame, $947.1 million, accounted for 36
percent of total global funding.7 However, the US 2017 HMA funding of $320.6 million was more than double the US 2016 HMA contribution of $152.4 million. Additionally, more than half of the 2017
funds ($169.35 million) went to projects in Iraq and Syria alone.8 In
comparison, these two countries received $17 million more than the
total US 2016 contribution, and of that $152.4 million, $106.55 million went to Iraq.9
Fortunately, US funding has remained strong for years, with consistent bipartisan congressional and presidential support. Despite recent
annual averages of roughly $200 million from the United States alone,
resources fall short compared to need. Overall, while there are approximately sixty contaminated countries, six countries alone received
nearly 52 percent ($1.361 billion) of the total 2014–2018 funding for
mine action assistance.10
With these challenges in mind, a brief look at global development
assistance funding is warranted. As noted in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Table 1, total net
resource flows for global development assistance steadily decreased in

doing so now is critical for the future of HMA.

terms of the percentage of cumulative donor Gross National Income

THE FUNDING DOMAIN

actual dollar amounts of development assistance remained relatively

At a macro level, globalism currently competes with an inward-

(GNI) from 2010 to 2017, with the exception of 2014. Fortunately, the
steady, with upticks in 2016 and 2017.

looking nationalistic populism that is pressing for reduced levels of

In 2018, overseas official development assistance was $149.3 billion,

foreign assistance while demanding greater accountability for any

though “foreign direct investment to developing countries dropped by

overseas investments based on “national interest.” The argument at

around a third from 2016 to 2017, following a 12 percent drop in overall

hand is driven by concern over value for money, return on investment,

external finance from 2013 to 2016.”11 Additionally, recent assistance

and a sustainable, demonstrable impact. Fiscal responsibility is thus

levels were weakened by the significant sums spent on Middle East

the clarion call to which both the global assistance and HMA commu-

refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) costs—for example, the

nities must answer—and with clear substantiation, as both are often

level of donor assistance expenditures focused on refugee costs alone

considered foreign policy tools.6

increased in 2016 by 27.5 percent to $15.4 billion from 2015 costs.12

Donors contribute for varying reasons, depending on amount,

These financial snapshots suggests several takeaways for the HMA

cause, beneficiaries, recipients, and timing. While motives may range

community: (1) overarching development assistance is somewhat

from altruism to legislative mandate (i.e., the United Kingdom), to

unstable, (2) enormous sums, comparatively, flow through development

unabashed self-interest, countries nonetheless expect a return on their

assistance streams, and (3) critical issue areas for Official Development

humanitarian assistance—whether it be increased stability, enhanced

Assistance (ODA) policy include considerations highly connected to

self-sufficiency, improved relationships, future market access for

HMA—namely, humanitarian assistance funding, cost of displaced

the donor’s private sector, or all of the above. Regardless of political

persons, and direct foreign investment and other private funding.
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FLIPPING THE SCRIPT: CHANGING THE ETHOS
FROM CASUALTY REDUCTION TO SUPPORTING
DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES
Much HMA progress over the past two decades has come from a dedicated and consistent higher-order message that was the cornerstone
of the initial campaign: mine action saves innocent lives.14 That said,
however, the horrors of chronic underdevelopment far eclipse damage
caused by mines and munitions when measured in deaths and victims.
The 2019 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor reported 149
square kilometers cleared worldwide in 2016,15 when global victims
totaled 9,439 (the second highest total in over twenty years),16 including approximately 2,100 deaths.17 Typical estimates are that over 80
percent of mine victims are civilian and almost half are children—in
many instances because they are working in fields or picking up scrap
metal to help earn family income. In contrast, an analysis of global
health data indicate that an “innocent victimization” milieu around
children in the developing world in 2016 was considerably worse:
Children in a Central Africa Republic community that Tetra Tech was assisting
under a USAID illegal mining and conflict diamonds project.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech.

•

One in twelve children under the age of five in sub-Saharan
Africa died, and one in twenty-two died in South Asia; the North
American ratio was 1:152 and the European ratio was 1:204.

•

2.78 million children under the age of five in sub-Saharan Africa

Most critical, however, is the need to recognize that the HMA

died, along with another 1.73 million children in South Asia.

community has an important opportunity to better align with, and

This contrasts with 28,000 North American deaths and 43,000

integrate into, global development assistance objectives. Integration

in Europe.19

is imperative at this time when many donor countries face internal

•

Deaths among children aged five to fourteen in sub-Saharan

sociopolitical pressures to focus public spending internally and to bet-

Africa totaled 513, 000, 241,000 in Southern Asia, 10,000 in

ter substantiate returns on their investments made abroad. Two of the

Europe, and 6,000 in North America.20

biggest HMA donors, the United States and the United Kingdom, for

•

407,000 people died from malaria in Africa alone.21

example, are each mired in political consternation about reducing for-

•

525,000 children died from diarrhoeal diseases, with over 1,400
deaths per day.22

eign assistance spending and reorganizing their national foreign assistance institutions and mandates. While global funding for HMA was

•

1.4 million children under the age of five died from acute lower

at an all-time high in 2017 and 2018,13 increased donor fatigue toward

respiratory infection, more than 95 percent of whom were from

HMA and development assistance is a real possibility (particularly

low and middle income countries.23

should donor assistance disproportionately shift toward global health

The main point of these examples is not to suggest the horror and out-

requirements, and even more so should a global recession emerge as

rage associated with munitions contaminants should lessen, but rather

a result of COVID-19), as is the uncertainty associated with chang-

the emphasis on how mines/munitions preclude development outcomes

ing foreign policy and national security priorities related to assisting

should concurrently sharpen. For instance, all of the above mortality

conflict-affected countries, peacekeeping missions, and the larger

categories are considered preventable—if the levels of national devel-

Overseas Contingency Operations (to use a US term). With increased

opment were improved.24 Perhaps the policy orientation of HMA

competition for potentially diminishing funds, strengthening the

needs to include the alignment between mine action and the SDGs,

synergistic HMA-development relationship may help both commu-

and toward the contributory impact mine action success or failure has

nities achieve more with less.

on social, political, and economic well-being.
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Total Official Development
Assistance and Private
Flows*

512,792

504,701

477,702

450,382

587,731

315,651

317,435

422,968

Only Official Development
Assistance **

128,484

135,111

127,030

134,847

137,539

131,563

144,921

147,160

1.25

1.14

1.07

0.99

1.26

0.72

0.71

.89

Total Flows as % of GNI

* This includes bilateral and multilateral institutional assistance, along with other official public investment, as well as all private direct investment and private grants.
** Only governmental bilateral and multilateral institutional assistance is included.
Table 1. OECD Global Development Assistance Trendline (in millions).
Figure courtesy of OECD International Development Statistics, Volume 2018 Issue 1.
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victim assistance and development. Neither demining nor
HMA were associated with the 2000 MDG efforts, or, more
sadly, in the literature and conversations surrounding the
2015 SDGs, including the UN publication Transforming our
World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development). 26
Perhaps more important, however, IMAS Series 14
(Evaluation of Mine Action Programmes 14.10 and 14.20)
makes scarce reference to development. 27 Neither document even raises the idea of exploring measurable connections between HMA activities and development outcomes
and impacts. Although Series 14 is overdue for an update
(all IMAS publications are scheduled for updates every three
years), it is possible that the task and imperative before
us will be better served by a new IMAS series focused on
aligning and measuring the relationship between mine
action and development. At the very least, an IMAS 14.30
should be considered.
Most important though, the November 2019 Oslo Review
Conference does make clear that mine action is a “key
enabler for development, humanitarian action, peace and
security”28 and that the corresponding Action Plan for
With support from the U.S. Department of State and other donors, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic has linked UXO removal to its National Development plan, where female demining
teams play an important role in UXO Lao’s efforts to clear land for economic development.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech project photo.

Although the sine qua non role of mine action in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization countries is generally understood, undertaking more specific causal pathway mapping exercises does not seem
widespread. Much like modelling used to measure the impact of donor
and foreign direct investment on post-war reconstruction to help guide
economic growth, algorithmic models could highlight the potential
impact of appropriate, timely, and sufficient HMA on development
objectives and the corresponding impact on resulting economic growth
forecasting. Likewise, and conversely, models should run the potential
impact of insufficient or non-existent munitions response.

25

This should not be an overly onerous task, given a twenty-plus
year applied policy and programming research base from the Geneva

2020-2024 includes focal points for HMA to further the
achievement of the SDGs. The time is indeed right for HMA
to evolve as a significant component of this development/

security equation—one more widely and publicly seen and understood, and one better articulated in terms of evidence-based input,
with HMA becoming an intervening variable contributing toward a
larger series of ends, namely the SDGs. This evolution will require
demonstrating return on investment in terms of both the technical
aspects of HMA, e.g., monitoring and evaluating current key performance indicators (KPIs), 29 and on a new set of impact analytics that
measure how HMA serves as an intervening variable on a range of
development objectives and outcomes.

INCREASING THE BANG FOR THE BUCK:
DEMONSTRATING VALUE, SUBSTANTIATING
RETURN ON INVESTMENT

International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD, estab-

HMA donor support has tended to be tied more toward a given for-

lished in 1998), The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction,

eign policy or national security platform rather than a development

and the Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) project: Assistance to

assistance agenda. The United States, for example, has provided more

Mine-Affected Communities, which ran from 1999–2009. The United

than $3.7 billion dollars of total conventional weapons destruction

Nations Development Program (UNDP) also works closely with the

assistance to over 100 countries from 1993–2019, making the United

GICHD and PRIO (and others), co-sponsoring events and research,

States the single largest donor by far. However, just under $1.6 billion

and the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action

was spent on only five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia,

(IACG-MA) has long had between twelve and fourteen members

and Vietnam).30 This pattern of linking mine assistance to national

whose mandates include some aspect of mine action as well as devel-

security and foreign policy is consistent with other large donors. The

opment assistance.

point is this approach will have to change if HMA is to play a signifi-

In spite of some efforts to create bridgeheads on each side, the spans

cant contributory role in achieving the global SDGs. A wider country

connecting HMA and development assistance communities have

distribution pattern is one approach; however, integrating HMA more

not been adequately built. For example, no references to economic

widely into development assistance policy and programming ought to

growth and development were made in the original 1999 Maputo

enable more countries to provide more support to HMA efforts.

Declaration nor in the ensuing 2014 Review Conference. Similarly,

Similarly, development assistance is increasingly becoming more of

the 2016 Convention on Cluster Munitions had just one reference to

a foreign policy and/or national security tool. In terms of additional

ISSUE 24.1 @ SPRING/SUMMER 2020
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similarities, the intent of both HMA support and development assis-

•

tance is to lessen suffering, fear, risk, and both physical and economic

iency related to environmental and climate-oriented changes

insecurity, and to improve human and community well-being. Also,
the performance and impact of both communities should be held

Assisting contaminated countries with preparedness and resilthat might increase explosive ordnance hazards

•

Helping define and promote public-private partnerships

accountable. Although both communities ought to be exploring their

The HMA and development assistance relationship should have dif-

relationship more explicitly, perhaps the onus falls on the HMA com-

ferent degrees of connectivity or alignment in different circumstances,

munity to better demonstrate its value to development assistance.

as Gasser noted. 35 There are instances where

31

If mine action is to receive the support needed to accomplish the
larger HMA mission, it will likely need to adopt a value-for-money

1. No formal linkage can or should be made, such as when political
and/or security considerations supersede development efforts.

orientation, defining and operationalizing a performance-based

2. Coordination should be the objective when development priori-

management approach toward development outcomes. The sector

ties focus on jobs and anti-poverty objectives while the political-

must be able to both articulate and substantiate evidenced-based

military imperatives are weapons removal and abatement and

policy, programming, and budgeting capabilities and results.

clearing ground.

Demonstrating value is particularly important as Stanley Brown

3. HMA leads and is an enabler of development assistance when

(U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) recently noted, the “global

munitions prioritization takes precedent and development

need for HMA programs continues to outstrip available resources.”32

activities require clearance a priori before they can begin.

Moreover, in the post-COVID-19 economy, resources for both HMA
and development assistance writ large may be further challenged.

4. Active integrated planning and execution is prioritized, and
HMA efforts and objectives are viewed as part of an overall

Although the HMA community will likely be better served by taking

development strategy—in other words, mine action impact is a

the initiative, defining, tracking, and reporting on development and

formal part of a development impact assessment such that a low-

outcome-based KPIs will require cooperation and collaboration with

priority mine action area might be cleared first to help accom-

the development assistance community. Ideally, both communities

plish development objectives.

will be able to articulate how the presence or absence of HMA affects

In the end, if actionable correlations between HMA and the SDGs

development goals from the immediate to the long-term (including

can be framed, supported, and communicated, the value for money

the policy and programming distinctions between humanitarian

argument becomes easier in terms of attracting resources from both

assistance and longer-term development). Noting that we are already

public and private sources, including increased direct foreign invest-

one-third through the fifteen-year SDG performance period, such an

ment. 36 This alignment and integration of HMA and development will

outcome will require immediate action on the part of both communi-

not only enable more effective and efficient targeting of whatever

ties to increase dialogue in earnest, to better and more fully frame and

resources are available, but will also improve investment risk mitiga-

initiate operational research agendas, to pilot targeted programs, and

tion, which may in turn generate more sustainable post-clearance

to develop and execute a monitoring, evaluation, and learning regi-

investments. As HMA activities are better framed as enablers and cat-

ment focused on HMA-SDG relationships.

alysts for development as opposed to separate precursors to develop-

This process will require widespread recognition of the need for
policy, programming, and budget evolution/maturation associated

ment, the value for money argument is strengthened, further justifying
sustained mine action expenditures.
See endnotes page 68

with mainstreaming HMA into development assistance (see endnote
25). The joint GICHD and UNDP report “Leaving No One Behind”
provides a solid foundation on which to build, as does the 2019 Oslo
Review Conference report. 33 Illustrative areas where over a half century of relevant development assistance expertise can be applied to
existing HMA include:
•

Assistance with improving assessments, monitoring, evaluation, and learning (to include knowledge and data management systems)

•

Enhancing sustainable land management and use—including
strong return on investment estimating to prioritize actions
(including a focus on critical infrastructure and resumption of
economic activity)

•

Institutional strengthening of national mine action authorities—including improving transparency and accountability,
and management/leadership capabilities

•

Helping national authorities develop a whole-of-government orientation, working more effectively with other national ministries,
including integrating HMA into national development plans34
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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THROUGH
MINE ACTION ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA
By Guy Rhodes, Ph.D. [ Geneva Centre for Security Policy ]

on further developing the legal and institutional frameworks for the
sector and the potential role that the international community may
offer in contributing to peace dividends, both by its presence, and its
experience gained elsewhere in the world that may have application
in Korea.

HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR AND THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
In the English-speaking world, the Korean War has been called “The
Forgotten War,” as its memory is often overshadowed by World War
II and the Vietnam War. It was, however, one of the most devastating conflicts of the modern era. It incurred the destruction of virtually all of Korea’s major cities and resulted in approximately 3 million
Handshake between North and South Korean Military at the DMZ, October 2018.
Image courtesy of MND Archives.

T

war fatalities with a larger proportional civilian death toll than either
World War II or the Vietnam War. 3
The conflict was between North Korea (with the support of China

he Korean Peninsula is divided by a strip of land, the

and the Soviet Union) and South Korea (with the support of the UNC,

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which represents the de facto

principally the United States but with combat troops from sixteen

border between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

additional states under a UN Flag). It began on 25 June 1950 and

(DPRK), more commonly known as North Korea, and the Republic of

ended on 27 July 1953 when the UNC and the Chinese-North Korean

Korea (ROK), or South Korea. Contrary to its name, the DMZ is the

Command signed the Korean Armistice Agreement.

most militarized zone on earth, and it delineates a stand-off between
militaries composed of several million professional and reservist soldiers on both sides. It is the “Cold War’s last divide”1 and one of the
most symbolic barriers between two nations. It is also heavily mined
with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines, and contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO) from extensive ground battles and heavy aerial bombardment.
This article explores the nature and extent of explosive ordnance
contamination and the physical environment within the DMZ. It
considers recent changes in the political landscape that have allowed
unprecedented developments within the DMZ to take place—including coordinated demining operations between military forces of
North and South Korea, as well as the beginning of a human remains
recovery program.

Signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
Photo courtesy of File/AP.

The armistice established the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and

Joint demining operations are currently suspended and the political

the DMZ, a 4 km wide and 250 km long fortified buffer zone between

situation remains complex, but mines do not go away. The opportu-

the two Korean nations. After the agreement, a withdrawal of forces

nity that mine action offers to contribute to confidence building on the

and the rapid establishment of the DMZ left thousands of human

Korean Peninsula is without parallel; such potential is explored here.

remains within its boundaries, which are only now being recovered.

In this context and notwithstanding the considerable expertise,

The armistice remains only a cease-fire arrangement between military

resources, and perspectives of the two Koreas and that of the US-led

forces rather than an agreement between governments to normalize

United Nations Command (UNC), 2 this article suggests a vision for the

relations. No formal peace treaty has been signed, and the two nations

architecture of mine action on the peninsula. This includes thoughts

technically remain at war.
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Missile Crisis (1962) and the buildup to
the Seoul Olympics (1988).
Contamination

originating

from

ground battles and aerial bombardment such as grenades, artillery shells,
and mortars is widespread but less well
defined. It is present on the surface of the
ground and at shallow depths, and in the
case of air-delivered bombs, often at considerable depth.
Table 1 details contamination known
in the DMZ and CCZ as reported by
the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The exact
number could be appreciably more, with
Figure 1. Map of the central portion of the Korean Peninsula showing the DMZ and surrounding border areas.
Figure courtesy of Park Eun-Jin et al, 2012.

some sources quoting between 1 and 1.2
million mines in total on the south side.
Far less is known about the mine-laying

BORDER AREA ZONING
The DMZ and surrounding border areas to the south are divided
into three zones: the DMZ itself, the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), and
the Border Area (Figure 1). The DMZ is split 2 km north and 2 km
south of the MDL, with half of the DMZ located in the ROK and half
in the DPRK. The outer limits of the DMZ are termed the Northern
Limit Line (NLL) and Southern Limit Line (SLL). This area was established to safeguard against incidents that may provoke hostilities,4 and

strategies and quantities of mines deployed by North Korean forces.
The numbers of mines are reported to be at least as many as those to
the south of the MDL, with some sources suggesting numbers may be
twice as high.6

THE CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA, 2018–2020

in accordance with the armistice, the jurisdiction for the southern portion of the DMZ falls under the responsibility of the US-led UNC.5
Conversely, the jurisdiction of the CCZ rests with the ROK Army, and
the Border Area under that of the local governments.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE EXPLOSIVE
ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION
Landmines and UXO are present in all three zones of jurisdiction on
the ROK side of the border: the DMZ, the CCZ, and the northern parts of
the Border Area. They are also present around some military installations
and bases elsewhere on the southern portion of the peninsula.
Mined areas in the DMZ, and to some extent the CCZ, are not as
defined as one might expect. While many minefields have records,
mines have also been air-delivered and laid hastily, creating uncertainty in several areas. In addition, variation in statistics may also
be reflective of failures in knowledge management practices over the
past sixty-seven years. Much of the contamination is ageing, although
there have been periods of mine replenishment and reinforcement
during periods of heightened tension—such as during the Cuban

Signing of the CMA by ROK and DPRK Ministers of Defense, September 2018.
Image courtesy of Pyeongyang Press Corps.

Although the political situation has become more complex on the
peninsula since the Hanoi Summit between the United States and
North Korea in February 2019, the developments that occurred in
2018 were ground breaking. On 27 April 2018, the two Koreas held
a summit between South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in and North
Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong Un. This meeting resulted in the two
leaders signing the Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and
Reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Total

Sites

1,308

Mines 828,000

Controlled Protection Zones

Rear
Areas

DMZ

CCZ

786
(15 undocumented)

433
(276 undocumented)

22

67

380,000

389,000

50,000

9,000

Table 1. Status of confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) in South Korea.
Table courtesy of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS).
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The Panmunjom Declaration led to
other bilateral declarations and summits involving South Korea, North
Korea, and the United States. On 19 September 2018, the respective Ministers
of Defense for North and South Korea
signed an unprecedented Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA).

from the CCZ, southern edge of the Civilian
Control Line (CCL), and particularly from sites
around military bases and installations in the
Rear Areas across the ROK.
Since 2018 and under the auspices of the CMA,
clearance activities within the DMZ itself have
been undertaken at the JSA at Panmunjom and at
the formal battle site at Arrowhead Hill.
Demining at the Joint Security Area (Figure 2
Label 4). The Panmunjom JSA is the only portion
of the DMZ where North and South Korean forces
stand face-to-face. The JSA is used for diplomatic
engagements.
Deminers from the 127 ROK Army Engineering
Battalion, supported by the UNC, conducted
operations within the southern portion of the JSA
(shaded blue in Figure 3). The U.S. Army Corps of
Figure 2. Key elements of the Comprehensive Military Agreement.
Figure courtesy of an illustration in Global Asia Vol 14, no. 2, June 2019.

The CMA focused on five areas: (1) suspension of hostile activities,
(2) military measures to transform the DMZ into a peace zone, (3)
establishment of a marine peace zone, (4) military communication and
exchange, and (5) measures to promote military confidence building.
Of particular interest for this article are the two annexes to the CMA
concerning demining operations at the Joint Security Area (JSA) at
Panmunjom, and at the former battle ground at Arrowhead Hill. These
annexes set the scene for collaborative demining operations between
the ROK, DPRK, and the UNC that began on 1 October 2018—a joint
activity that was unimaginable twelve months before. While engagement occurred for a period, subsequent strained relations led to an

First tri-lateral negotiations on the implementation of the CMA, 16 October 2018.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.

effective freeze in confidence-building initiatives, and joint opera-

Engineers and representation from the U.S. Department of State acted

tions did not resume in 2019. This remains the status quo as of June

as observers. In northern zones (shaded yellow), the Korean People’s

2020; however, mines do not disappear, and the political environment

Army (KPA) conducted its own independent clearance operations.7

can change quickly. For the time being, ROK Army demining units,

At times, ROK-UNC teams were in proximity to DPRK teams and

supported by the UNC continue to work unilaterally, but mine action

exchanged cordial greetings and conversations. Both sides focused on

will continue to offer considerable opportunities and powerful optics

areas of suspected mine and UXO contamination with the intent to

for confidence building between the DPRK and ROK when conditions

further demilitarize the JSA and support greater tourist circulation.

again become conducive.

The operations are now complete on the south side and declared complete on the north.
Operations of the ROK Army in the southern sectors between 1 and

DEMINING OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ

19 October cleared 36,461 sq m of land and recovered considerable

Location

Year

Area

Mines Removed

CCZ

2006–2017

14 sites

1,443

Southern CCL/
Border Areas

2005–2017

42 sites

5,405

between 1 and 18 October. The KPA appeared to use detectors, primi-

Rear Areas

1998–2017

76 sites

58,872

the removal and destruction of 636 mines.8

132

65,720

Total

Table 2. Mine clearance status to 2017 from ROK military operations.
Table courtesy of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS).

quantities of metal debris, but no mines were present. To the north, the
KPA were observed conducting demining operations at three localities
tive probes, and pitch-fork-style tools within operations that claimed
An underlying challenge during the JSA clearance task was the lack
of common standards for operations, particularly in quality management procedures for released land. Both the ROK Army and the DPRK

Demining operations in South Korea before 2018 were largely

KPA used different military doctrines for demining, and there was a

restricted to areas away from the DMZ. Table 2 illustrates the clear-

disparity in demining resources and equipment. In the longer term,

ance statistics from 1998–2017. A total of 65,720 mines were cleared

the UNC suggests that joint mine action operations would benefit from
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Figure 3. JSA demining zones.
Figure courtesy of LTC S. Morrow.

ROK-Army deminers at JSA.
Image courtesy of LTC S. Morrow.

being based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)—
adapted to the context and conditions of the DMZ.

The joint operations with the DPRK in 2018 did not continue when
demining by the ROK resumed in the southern half of the DMZ at

Arrowhead Hill demining to support human remains recovery

Arrowhead Hill in April 2019 following a deterioration of relations

(Figure 2 Label 5). Atop of a little-known ridge in the Cheorwon

among parties to the conflict in early 2019. However, the ROK Army

Valley almost seven decades ago, French, South Korean, and American

and UNC made a decision to continue the operation. When clear-

troops fought off waves of mainly Chinese communist forces in a series

ance concluded for the winter in November 2019, 102,688 sq m of land

of trench battles that marked some of the bloodiest days of the Korean

had been released, 455 mines and 5,754 UXO cleared, and 261 sets of

War. Hundreds of the fallen were never recovered. Of the Chinese and

human remains recovered.

South Korean losses alone, it is estimated that 6,700 and 14,332 troops

Future plans for the human remains recovery program. The

fell, respectively. Over a nine-day period, the U.S. Air Force dropped

remains recovery program for 2020 is planned to first be completed at

2,700 bombs, the Chinese fired 55,000 shells, and South Korea fired

Arrowhead Hill. Beyond this site operations are envisaged to continue

185,000 more around Hill 281, also known as Arrowhead Hill.

in the spirit of the CMA on a unilateral basis by demining units of

9

Under the CMA, the first joint remains recovery task in the

the ROK Army supported by the UNC. In conjunction with records

DMZ was conducted at Arrowhead Hill. This included the con-

supplied by the Sending States,10 operations will focus on additional

struction of a 3 km access road (1.7 km from the south side and

battle sites not specified in the CMA that are expected to yield more

1.3 km from the north) to serve mine clearance and joint remains

remains. Possible sites may be drawn from the conflict zones such

recovery operations.

as Bunker Hill, Old Baldy, Iron Triangle, Northern Punchbowl, and
Heartbreak Ridge.

Access route cleared by KPA to Arrowhead Hill to facilitate demining.
Image courtesy of MND Archives.
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Human remains recovery, Arrowhead Hill.
Image courtesy of The Wall Street Journal.

Human remains excavation.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.

Remains are honored.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.

Indeed, since the signing of the armistice in
1953, there has been a revival of wild habitats
in the absence of human activity. According to
the National Institute of Ecology (2018),11 6,168
species of flora and fauna have been documented in the DMZ with 102 species classified
as endangered or vulnerable. These are spread
across varied landscapes of wetlands, plains,
and mountains from the Imjin River Estuary in
the west to the coastal region of the east.
Figure 4. Battle site locations of potential DMZ Remains Recovery and Demining Operations 2020+.
Figure courtesy of a MND/UNC presentation, Geneva, February 2020.

Conducting survey and clearance operations in this wildlife refuge carries a tremendous responsibility and demands the
utmost respect for the environment. By its
very nature, demining is disruptive, but there
are many approaches to mitigate its impact.
IMAS 07.13 Environmental Management in
Mine Action is a good point of departure,
but future National Mine Action Standards
for Korea (yet to be developed) should be
far more comprehensive and prescriptive in
nature. The competing challenges of demining and environmental preservation call on
heightened collaboration between authorities concerned with clearance operations and
those institutions and ministries dealing with
conservation of the natural habitat.
Appropriate demining methods and tools will
need to be considered together with integrated

Figure 5. Biodiversity report of the DMZ Area/MOE-NIE (2016).
Figure courtesy of Ministry of Environment, National Institute of Ecology (2016).

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND BIODIVERSITY
OF THE DMZ

planning and priority-setting approaches that
are responsive to ecological sensitivities. In
some cases, this may be achieved through timing and sequencing of operations that do not conflict with the nesting
and mating cycles of endangered birds and mammals. In others, con-

In his address at the 74th United Nations General Assembly

sideration of the diminishing risk from ageing ordnance may support

(UNGA) in September 2019, ROK President Moon Jae-in described the

a decision that certain areas of particular environmental importance

DMZ as “a colossal green zone…its borders define a tragedy spawned

will not be prioritized, at least not as a starting point. Considering the

by 70 years of military confrontation, but paradoxically, it has become

enormous size of the DMZ and the reality that clearance operations

a pristine ecological treasure trove.”

will take decades to complete, this would appear entirely reasonable,
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especially if the threat from explosive hazards in these areas is low,

crises, peace-keeping frameworks, and in assisted development and

poorly-defined, or deeply-buried. Mine action is about manageing risk

development contexts. Such an international capacity should not be

from explosive ordnance; searching every square meter of the DMZ for

considered as competition to the highly-trained and equipped ROK

explosive devices is unnecessary.

Army demining units but rather a different type of capacity that pres-

Certain conservation areas may be managed by continuing to limit

ents additional opportunities.

or exclude human activity through signage and education. This would

International organizations are committed to assist in the world-

be consistent with some areas contaminated by explosive ordnance

wide clearance of landmines and UXO but are particularly motivated

in Western Europe that remain “out of bounds” to the general pub-

by contexts where mine action can also contribute to a greater goal.

lic, such as the former Soviet military training range at Wittstock,

Nowhere is this potential more evident than on the Korean Peninsula.

Brandenburg, located in the former East Germany.

Although somewhat distant at present, future assistance may also be

POTENTIAL ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION COMMUNITY

channeled through Pyongyang, although the sanction regime and
position of the North Korean government currently render this prospect as fanciful. Demining on the Korean Peninsula, however, should
be considered a long-term prospect.
The DPRK is a more natural partner for international organizations, as the ROK is not a recipient of aid—indeed it is a considerable
international donor itself for mine action. The ROK is an economic
heavyweight with a gross domestic product that exceeds many of
the principal international donors such as Australia, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, and Norway. However, the context on the Korean
Peninsula is not a normal one. In order to maximize peace dividends, a
coordinated approach that draws on national and international capaci-

International Seminar November 2018 – NGO’s Role for Mine Clearance in the
DMZ, including UNMAS, UNDP, ICRC, GICHD, HALO, NPA, APMBC-ISU, GMAP, FSD,
ICBL, JCBL, and PCBL.
Image courtesy of the Peace Sharing Association (PSA).

At the 74th UNGA, President Moon also presented a vision to
transform the DMZ into an international peace zone, “The DMZ has
become a symbolic space steeped in history, which embraces both the
tragedy of division as embodied by the JSA, guard posts and barbed-

ties and skillsets may be more effective.
Importantly, the UNC is unequivocal in its support of President
Moon’s vision of clearing the DMZ of landmines and UXO. This has
been reiterated on several occasions by General Robert Abrams, the
Commander of the UNC and U.S. Forces Korea. Furthermore, the
addition of international expertise and capacity, including international NGOs, is also supported by the UNC.

wire fences as well as the yearning for peace. The DMZ is the common heritage of humankind, and its value must be shared with the
whole world. Once peace is established between the two Koreas, I will
work together with North Korea to inscribe the DMZ as a UNESCO
World Heritage Site.” He went on to say, “Approximately 380,000 antipersonnel mines are laid in the DMZ, and it is expected to take 15 years
for South Korean troops to remove them on their own.”12 However,
cooperation with the international community, including the United
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), will not only guarantee the
transparency and stability of demining operations, but also instantly
turn the DMZ into an area of international cooperation.”13

Mine Action Workshop, January 2019. United Nations Command, US Forces Korea,
Combined Forces Command, 8th Army, ICRC, UNMAS, ROK Ministry of National
Defense, ROK Army, ROK MoFA, US Army Corps of Engineers, The HALO Trust, NPA,
MAG, GICHD, US DoS, Norwegian Embassy, Netherlands Embassy, British Embassy,
Australian Embassy.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.

Notwithstanding security considerations, current legislation
restrictions, and necessary solutions for appropriate funding mechanisms, the addition of the international community working in the
DMZ would serve two principal objectives: (1) it would offer additional capacity, and (2) perhaps more important, it would be a significant step in further demilitarizing the border zone.
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING OF
MINE ACTION FRAMEWORKS ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA
Demining the DMZ is a considerable undertaking, which will take
decades. Whether operations are upscaled soon or in a few years, it

International NGOs and the United Nations strive to uphold the

takes time to establish the legal, institutional, strategic, and opera-

humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and

tional frameworks to support such a considerable task. It is vital that

independence; and could provide an additional “face;” and offer fur-

an appropriate framework is established at an early stage in order to

ther tools and approaches to contribute to the goal of securing sustain-

maintain confidence in the safety, quality, and environmental accept-

able peace. They also come with thirty years of humanitarian demining

ability of survey and clearance operations whether they be delivered by

experience—gained through working in conflict zones, humanitarian

military, commercial, or NGO capacities.
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Institutions. It is important to establish an appropriate legal and
institutional framework to accommodate expanding programs, particularly if a variety of demining operators are to be employed. Such a
framework should define an architecture of regulation, management,
and coordination. More than just a technical activity, demining has
implications across ministries and sectors. This should be reflected in
the governance structure with a view to corresponding architecture
within the North Korean authorities.
There are many variations on institutional frameworks for mine
action programs that have varying degrees of military and civilian representation and authority. In the context of Korea, this will inevitably
be skewed towards the military. In a generic model, the most senior
level—a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), perhaps under the
prime minister—is typically responsible for policy and coordination
across ministries, which include those with implementation responsibilities (Defense and Foreign Affairs), those affected by contamination (Environment and Agriculture), and those with economic roles
(Planning and Finance). The NMAA would normally approve the
overall mine action strategy, national standards, annual workplans,
and priorities. With jurisdiction over the DMZ in the ROK, the UNC
should also be positioned appropriately for decision-making procedures linked to either the NMAA or the Mine Action Centre (MAC).
Below the NMAA, the MAC typically coordinates national and international operators. It manages daily operations that could include mine
risk education and victim assistance, while also monitoring the quality of operations. The MAC would also be responsible for information
management, including the national database, and developing national
mine action standards (NMAS). The Ministry of National Defense
(MND) may serve as a suitable host for such an office and function.
At an operational level, implementers could potentially be national
or international organizations, military units, or non-profit/commercial entities. They operate in accordance with NMAS and are usually
accredited and monitored by teams from the MAC.
Standards. A peace zone is compromised if accidents occur after
demining operations take place or if the safety of the land is in question. Confidence-building measures can be damaged or reversed if
mines remain in the ground and subsequent injury or death occurs.
A common reference framework could have been beneficial during
the 2018–2019 operations at the JSA and Arrowhead Hill. Observations
of the demining that occurred under the CMA, particularly to the

Figure 6. Front cover of the IMAS in Korean.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.

(PSA) to translate the IMAS into Korean. This was completed and provides a comprehensive set of documents from which to draw upon to
develop the National (Korean) Mine Action Standards (KMAS). These
should be adapted to the context of the peninsula while remaining
compliant to the overarching IMAS.
The KMAS will be defined by the ROK authorities. If adopted, the
KMAS would ensure that different organizations deliver a common
and consistent approach to demining, ensuring safety, efficiency and
effectiveness, and confidence that the quality of cleared land is maintained and assured.
Recent developments offer the option to database the Korean version
of the IMAS to facilitate the navigation and interrogation of more than
1,000 pages of technical material. Such an exercise has only recently
been completed for the IMAS in English.14 Bringing the Korean version
into the newly established IMAS database would provide the peninsula
with a tool at the forefront of the global mine action sector.
By databasing the requirements and recommendations of IMAS,
Korea will be able to dynamically filter the standards to create targeted
checklists for self-assessment or external-compliance monitoring purposes. Korea could benefit from the work already done, which would
allow a straightforward review of existing military doctrines against
IMAS, identifying and addressing any gaps that may be present.15

north of the MDL, raised some questions about the reliability of the
procedures and quality management systems in use.
The IMAS are the reference standards for the United Nations and
international community, developed over the course of twenty years by
a wide range of mine action stakeholders. The IMAS are used in over
fifty countries, including by
•

the UK government for clearance operations on the Falkland
Islands,

•

the US Humanitarian Demining Training Center as a basis for
training US forces, and

•

the Chinese military undertaking demining in Peace Keeping
Operations.

In 2019, the MND commissioned the Peace Sharing Association

Figure 7. Relationship between IMAS, NMAS, SOPs, and
training material.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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the means to inform decision makers
and to manage and monitor operations.
Moreover, they record what activities
were completed where, when, and by
whom. This safeguards against duplication, facilitates planning and reporting,
and may be important to address any
future liability considerations.
The information management database stores information on known or suspected areas of contamination together
with other datasets such as access routes,
vegetation cover, topography, land ownership, various war archive data, and
environmental information—ideally in
an integrated system to support planning and priority setting. It should be
designed and developed with the whole
Figure 8. A visual example displaying mine contamination data.
Figure reproduction of a slide used by the author at the DMZ Global Forum in Seoul, November 2019.

DMZ in mind. Understanding that some
data is sensitive, information management
systems can easily be designed to have dif-

The IMAS have a close relationship with international conventions
on disarmament and are the reference point for donors and spon-

ferent levels of access and authority, but it is important to balance
appropriate transparency with security and other considerations.

sors of mine action. International financial support will be important

Research. There are many opportunities to share cross-border

for the future of the peninsula, particularly initiatives in the north.

experiences and knowledge, but one research area stands out when

Funding would be more forthcoming if programs operated within the

considering demining and the importance of the preservation of the

recognized framework of IMAS. When conducive, moving towards

environment. This is the understanding of how risk changes as muni-

a common framework for the entire peninsula has potential to be an

tions age. What are the impacts of changing circumstances and condi-

important process.

tions that surround mines and UXO on the Korean Peninsula? This has

Information Management. For the considerable task of demin-

great implications when making informed decisions on priority setting

ing the DMZ, a state-of-the-art information management system is

and balancing risk from explosive devices with a desire to retain the

essential. Databases and geographic information systems provide

integrity of a fragile environment.

PMD-6 box mine.
Images courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.

Weathered PMD-6 mine.

M16 mine with fuse and weathered M16 without.

The ageing process affects different devices in different ways.
The energy required for arming and initiation of mines is often
supplied by springs. Where springs have corroded, the munition
is incapable of functioning as designed. For instance, the wooden
box mine, which is understood to have been widely used by North
Korean forces, has a case that is prone to disintegrate over time.16
Figure 9. Generic illustration of the ageing process of different components of
a mine.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
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It also has a fuse with a firing chain that can be disrupted by corrosion. In the south, the M16 mine is metallic and rusts over time.
It may become unrecognizable. Other mines such as the M14

anti-personnel mine are more resilient. However, there is some
reassurance that mines will pose a diminishing risk in the long
term, but it is difficult to quantify.

First, adjusting national legislation for mine action to allow nonmilitary capacities to contribute to demining.
Second, ensuring that the institutional and strategic frameworks
for mine action reflect the inter-ministerial nature of the problem and

THE VISION FOR MINE ACTION ON THE
PENINSULA
However fanciful, programs should have a vision. The vision for

support a longer-term goal of a joint mine action architecture for the
entire peninsula. The MND in its appropriate role could also strive to
be more accessible and open for exchange.

the Korean Peninsula is that an architecture for demining the DMZ

Third, further adaptation of operational frameworks such as stan-

is jointly owned by both North and South Korea, and that demining

dards in operations (including quality management systems) of the

operations address shared objectives and priorities and are undertaken

military and alignment with recognized international norms and

in accordance with common practices within a framework of recog-

practices. The development of KMAS based on IMAS offers an early

nized international norms.

and significant opportunity in this respect.
Fourth, pursuit of research and international exchange on pertinent issues of relevance to Korea. For example, the management of
risk concerning ageing explosive ordnance, mitigation approaches
towards environmental impact, advanced prioritization schemes for
operations, and appropriate information management systems and
processes that are fit for purpose.
Fifth, promotion of information sharing and appropriate transparency with the DPRK to inform the process of developing a mine
action machinery that is geared toward peace, not war. Optics are
important. Consideration could be given to having deminers dressed
in a neutral attire rather than military fatigues.
These suggested adjustments to the mine action ethos and architecture in Korea will help ensure the success of operations, where “suc-

Figure 10. A vision of linked institutions, joint mine action strategies,
and operations on the Korean Peninsula.
Figure courtesy of the author.

cess” will be measured in peace dividends that are linked to safety and
confidence of cleared land and the value of activities that mine action
helps to facilitate.

When it eventually comes, the signing of a Peace Agreement will

In the absence of collaboration with the DPRK, a reformed mine

provide an opportunity to establish a more integrated institutional

action sector in the ROK will be beneficial to support unilateral activi-

framework with North Korea to reinforce a unified approach to

ties. It will also ensure that the ROK is well equipped to accommodate

demining the DMZ. This could involve elements of a joint author-

all confidence-building opportunities that mine action can offer, and

ity and steps towards a common MAC. In the meantime, much can

in addition, position itself to support the inevitable upscaling of opera-

be done unilaterally to advance mine action programs, involve the

tions in the future.
See endnotes page 68

international community, and explore further how mine action
activities can be used to build confidence on the Korean Peninsula.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Peace on the Korean Peninsula remains a long process, and while
the climate for confidence-building opportunities is currently at a low
ebb, landmines in the DMZ do not go away. Nor do the opportunities
that mine action offers to contribute to reconciliation and peace.
It takes time to adapt an architecture for mine action outside a
purely military lens, but this is necessary to establish the fundamentals needed to underpin all opportunities for mine action in the future.
President Moon has a vision for a peace zone in the DMZ free from
mines and UXO, and he believes that cooperation with the international community will both guarantee the transparency and stability
of demining operations and help turn the DMZ into an area of international cooperation. This vision is supported by the UNC.
To help prepare for future work, the relevant authorities could
benefit from considering five key recommendations to help achieve
this vision.
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TIME FOR HUMANITARIAN MINE
ACTION TO CATCH UP?
By Roly Evans [ GICHD ] and Andy Duncan

H

umanitarian mine action (HMA) survey and clearance

Directive 2000/60/EC10 and the United States Clean Water Act 197211

operations have always focused on the contamination that

are important reference points. In the United Kingdom, the Water

can be seen. Whether it is anti-personnel (AP) mines, anti-

Resources Act 199112 and the Environmental Protection Act 199013 are

vehicles (AV) mines, or explosive remnants of war (ERW), our efforts

the key pieces of legislation. Beneath the level of legislation, the Inter-

focus on removing items that pose an immediate blast and fragmen-

national Ammunition Technical Guideline (IATG) 10.10 specifies the

tation hazard to humans. However, in certain circumstances, explo-

need for national authorities to set the standards governing environ-

sive ordnance (EO) also poses a significant environmental hazard,

mental protection within national borders,14 but how much this has

not least from the toxicity of its components, such as heavy metals

been applied globally is open to question.15 IMAS 07.13, Environmental

and explosives. The understanding of contamination from EO in air,

Management in Mine Action, does “not enforce specific practical miti-

soil, and water has developed significantly in recent decades.1-4 This

gation measures but is a framework giving the tools for the NMAA to

has mainly been driven by scientists and industry, as well as military

define these.”16

users required to focus on the environmental impact of military training, and led to the development of improved management practices to

THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF HMA

mitigate the associated environmental risk.5-8 In some countries this

HMA damages the environment. A certain level of damage is inevi-

has resulted in significant policy change. Notably the tonnage of muni-

table. Traditionally this damage has been associated with the physical

tions disposed of by open burning open detonation (OBOD) by the

process of clearing land of AP and AV mines. To clear land invariably

United States Department of Defense decreased by 58 percent during

requires most vegetation to be removed, with the possible exception of

the period 1998–2018.9 In comparison, it is not clear that HMA is uni-

trees above a certain size, alongside physical excavation of the topsoil.

versally applying best practice to mitigate the chemical contamination

This damage was, and is, accepted as an inevitable part of the demining

risk from its clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activi-

process. Typically, the damage would not be permanent, and the land

ties. A sector that follows simple principles such as “do no harm” and

re-used relatively quickly. Locals often welcome the clearance on the

ostensibly always seeks to apply “all reasonable effort” might wish to

basis that the land will be easier to cultivate once mine action has not

review and update its current approach.

only removed the mines but also removed much of the vegetation and

HMA often operates in environments where perfection may be
deemed the enemy of good. What is practicable on a military range
in the United Kingdom might not be so in the complex environments
of current HMA operations. Therefore, the task is to develop practical
mitigation methods that have a good chance of being applied, no matter the location. Examples of such methods could range from using an

made the soil easier to work.17 Clearance operations among sand dunes
have required the remediation of the environment, once the clearance
is completed, as was the case in Skallingen up to 2012.18 Aside from the
potential physical damage, mine action organizations also impact the
environment in the same way most human activity does, be it emissions from vehicles or generators, human waste, etc. It is this generic

inexpensive kit to check the pH of soil for a central demolition area, to

impact that has been, to a degree, addressed within IMAS 07.13 and in

more training to recognize and safely dispose of munitions containing

standard operating procedures (SOPs).

heavy metal tungsten alloys (HMTA). A number of practical improve-

The chemical contamination from explosives has often not been rec-

ments are possible. The first step for HMA organizations is to recognize

ognized or understood by clearance operators. Few SOPs include direc-

the issues and then implement better methods accordingly.

tion on how to mitigate the environmental impact of burning small
arms ammunition (SAA), open burning or open detonation of high

LEGISLATION
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explosive natures, destruction of certain types of white phosphorous,

Relevant legislation tends to cover broad principles of pollution

or destruction of armor penetrating ammunition containing HMTA.

rather than specific contamination types such as those from EO. Such

Furthermore, at some point HMA operators will encounter EO con-

international legislation that does exist governs the disposal of muni-

taining insensitive explosive formulations, the inherent environmental

tions that cross international borders and, as an example, preclude the

hazards of which are subject to continuing research. These formula-

dumping of munitions at sea. The European Union’s Water Framework

tions present a potentially different pollution hazard compared with
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traditional munitions. Such contamination is or will be part of HMA’s
environmental impact, and operators are responsible for the contamination that could reasonably have been prevented during clearance
and disposal operations.

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION (SAA)
Most SAA contains lead, along with smaller amounts of alloying
material such as antimony. Lead slag is classified as Toxic Solid UN 6.1
(UN ID 3288).19 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Food and Drug Administration states that in “humans and animals,
exposure to lead may cause neurological, reproductive, developmental,
immune, cardiovascular and renal health effects. In general, sensitivity to lead toxicity is greater when there is exposure in utero and in
children compared to adults.”20
The safe disposal of SAA presents a significant ongoing challenge
to HMA clearance operators. The days when SAA was added to bulk
demolitions are hopefully long in the past. Currently, most SAA is
burnt in some way. Open pit burns used to be one technique used, but
this method is guaranteed to introduce lead contamination directly
into the soil. Organizations have developed improvised or bespoke
burning tanks that, if strong enough, are also used to burn the primers
and boosters within fuzes of a certain size. Military organizations have
increasingly used industrial rotary kilns. The capital expenditure these
require has meant they are yet to be deployed in HMA.
Regardless of the method of burning, the slag residue from SAA is
typically buried. This is potentially a significant risk to the environment, especially if done in large quantities. Burial without knowledge of local soil and water course conditions is a practice that should
cease in HMA. Many operators are unaware of the concept of fate and
transport of lead contamination. In simple terms this follows a sourcepathway-receptor (SPR) model, with lead being the source in this
instance. The pathway would be the means by which the contaminant
moves through the environment; by air, soil, or water. The receptor
is the entity that can be adversely affected by the contaminant.21 The
transport depends on contaminant solubility, which in turn is governed by pH and oxidation. Lead is an amphoteric metal that exhibits
its greatest solubility in acidic (pH < 4) and heavily alkaline (pH > 11)
solutions.22 “Lead corrodes and leaches readily in acidic conditions to
concentrations that can exceed guidelines for human health and controlled waters.”23 Despite this risk, no current HMA SOPs are known to
detail even a basic environmental risk assessment prior to the burial of
SAA slag residue, or even possible mitigation measures.

HEAVY METAL TUNGSTEN ALLOYS
The concern over the alleged carcinogenic effects of depleted uranium (DU) since 1991 lead to the development of tungsten alloys as
an alternative for armor piercing ammunition.24 Unfortunately, tungsten alloys have been the cause of increasing concern for those charged
with mitigating the environmental impact on military firing ranges.
Tungsten alloys have been proven to be carcinogenic during animal
testing.25,26 The main risk for HMA staff and civilians who may come
into contact with HMTA are sintered 27 splinters piercing the skin and

An SAA burn pit. The SAA was burnt in an open pit with a simple metal cover. The
slag residue was subsequently buried. This method is hopefully no longer used
by operators. Burying the slag residue from SAA pit burns concentrates the toxic
waste and is potentially a significant pollution risk.
Image © Private.
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subsequently becoming embedded,

burning. There is now substantial evidence to suggest that both meth-

especially for alloys combining tung-

ods will result in significant levels of energetic residue compared with

sten with nickel or cobalt.28 HMTA

a first order detonation, where the munition fuzing system detonates

ammunition, whether it is from SAA

the main charge as intended after firing. 38,39 Testing of military firing

or long rod penetrators, is far more

ranges over time suggests that contamination tends to stay in the top-

likely to sinter if added inadvertently

soil, approximately the first 30 cm, depending on the soil type.40,41 For

to bulk demolitions. In a worst-

HMA operators the risk is highest in areas where high EO is repeat-

case scenario, whether by means of

edly destroyed by second order demolition, i.e., a central demolition

a single item demolition or as part

site (CDS), a process sometimes referred to as “residue loading.” This

of a bulk demolition, an unknow-

risk is higher in areas with moderate or high levels of precipitation,

ing operator could spread dangerous

a shallow water table, slow moving groundwater, and proximity to a

WNiCo splinters29 into the environ-

water course.42 What measures do HMA operators currently take to

ment posing a risk to themselves,

monitor and limit the explosive residue contamination from second

other humans, and animals.

order demolitions?

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
OF TRADITIONAL
EXPLOSIVE FILLS

INSENSITIVE MUNITION EXPLOSIVE
FORMULATIONS

Most high explosive munitions
contain one or both of Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine

(RDX)

or

Trinitrotoluene (TNT). Munitions
containing RDX invariably contain a
smallpercentageofcyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX) and more
modern shaped charges will often
have HMX as the key energetic ingredient. All three explosives have some
degree of toxicity. 30 The nitro aromatic TNT can undergo degradation
to form the 2,4 Dnitrotoluene (DNT)
isomer, a common biodegradation
product of TNT that displays greater
toxicity. DNT can convert haemoglobin to methaglobin31 at a relatively
low threshold limit of 0.13 mg/L and is therefore listed by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as hazardous waste. 32
DNT is highly toxic to humans. 33,34
The nitramine RDX has been designated a possible human carcinogen (categorization C) by the EPA. The EPA has set drinking
water advisory limits for TNT, RDX, and HMX. 35,36 TNT and DNT
tend to bind to organic matter in the earth and therefore don’t transport as readily as RDX, which has greater potential as a pollutant of
groundwater. 37
These explosives present a particular issue for HMA operators since
much of the EO destroyed by the sector is by means of second order
detonation, i.e., a donor charge is used to shatter the casing and initiate the main charge by means of sympathetic detonation. Some high
explosive munitions, especially thin-cased mines, may be destroyed by
(Above) An inert cutaway of the new HMTA 40 mm telescopic APFS-DS-T round.
Ammunition containing HMTA, especially WNiCo alloys, pose a hazard to humans
if sintered splinters puncture the skin. Are we training HMA EOD operators to correctly identify and dispose of such ammunition?
Image courtesy of Andrew Duncan.
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Many NATO countries are developing insensitive munitions (IM).
Typically, this development concentrates on the high explosive fill,
with traditional formulations such as Composition B (60 percent TNT,
40 percent RDX), being replaced by formulations containing reduced
vulnerability energetic materials. These will have high thermal stability and will to some degree be resistant to shock. Explosives such as
Nitrotriazolone (NTO) and 2,4-Dinitroanisole (DNAN) are key ingredients for the new US insensitive explosives, IMX-101 and IMX-104,
being fielded for gun artillery and mortars respectively. Both NTO43
and DNAN44 are undergoing further study to assess acute and chronic
toxicity on the environment and humans.45 In terms of residue deposited from IM munitions, recent testing has shown that standard methods of high order for single items of high EO leave significantly more
explosive residue.46,47 For example, PAX-21, an insensitive formulation
of RDX, DNAN, and ammonium perchlorate, can deposit residues of
up to 28 percent of the perchlorate, even during first order detonations.48 Ammonium perchlorate residues are also common at firing
points, and it may therefore be assumed in areas where HMA operators
burn propellant, residues will also be high. The US EPA identifies the
chronic exposure to perchlorate, (even at very low levels), as interfering
with the iodine uptake into the thyroid gland.49

WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS CAN BE TAKEN?
The first and main practical step for HMA operators to take is
to ensure that their professional knowledge of explosives remains
current, and to update their procedures accordingly. This requires
developing SOPs detailing how they will minimize the risk of chemical contamination from the disposal of EO including SAA. These
should include direction on the safe disposal of SAA slag residue,
ideally contracted through specialized waste disposal companies.
Since these are invariably not present in many countries, at a minimum, operators should ensure that no slag residue is buried in acidic
soils and should conduct the simple tests to ensure this. (A simple
soil pH testing kit can be purchased for as little as USD$10.) If there
is no other option but to bury SAA slag residue, it should be sealed in
watertight plastic barrels to prevent leaching into the surrounding

a donor charge that is placed on the outer casing will have reduced the confinement before
detonation of the internal explosive occurs.
Alternatively, if the fuze well cannot be utilized,
a shaped charge aimed at the booster is the best
means of minimizing explosive residue. 51,52
Further testing is required to determine if IM
can be effectively destroyed through sympathetic detonation by means of bulk demolition.
For both SAA burning sites and CDS (often
the same location), operators should consider
instituting a soil sampling regime. The time and
the cost might be deemed impractical but ultimately HMA operators need to monitor at-risk
locations in order to manage the potential contamination their disposal activities may create.
In order to mitigate the potential harm from
HMTA, the key action for operators is to ensure
Bulk demolition using binary liquid explosive. How much explosive residue may be deposited by repeat bulk
demolitions at central demolition sites by HMA operators? Are EOD operators aware that such techniques will
need to be adapted for insensitive munitions? Are EOD operators aware of the risks of adding HMTA ammunition to such a demolition?
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.

soil. For destruction of large quantities of SAA associated with a
national stockpile this presents a logistical challenge since large
quantities of barrels will be required.
Large-scale disposal of propellants and pyrotechnics often leaves an
obvious area of contamination on the soil. Most of this contamination
stays on the surface until rainwater washes it into the subsoil. Having
considered the proximity of local water courses, where deemed practical, consideration may be given to the mechanical excavation and
removal of this residue. It can then be treated in the same way as SAA
slag is dealt with. The Canadian military developed a burning table
technique for their artillery units to avoid open burning of excess propellants following live firing exercises50 and it is possible the technique
could be adapted for use in HMA.
In order to mitigate the actual residue deposition from second
order demolition, operators should consider increasing the amount
and quality of donor charge used, especially for repeat bulk demolitions at a CDS. If the fuze well is empty, as might be the case for
destruction of stockpiled ordnance or abandoned explosive ordnance
(AXO), operators are advised to use this for donor charge placement
in order to maximize the chance of a first order detonation. Assuming
some residue is unavoidable, operators should be careful about the

all technical staff can accurately identify EO
containing HMTA, whether it be SAA or a 125
mm long rod penetrator. Such munitions should
not be disposed of through standard OBOD

techniques. HMTA should be handed over to the competent authority
for processing.

CONCLUSION
As research continues, understanding of the actual chemical contamination risk from EO evolves. Even in defense circles, where most
of the funding for this research originates, there is a wide appreciation
that there is plenty more left to learn.53 Nevertheless, those responsible
for mitigating environmental contamination in modern defense organizations are far in advance of HMA on these issues, not least since
they tend to operate within legal frameworks that are becoming ever
more stringent in regard to pollution of the environment.54 Countries
such as Germany and the Netherlands banned domestic use of OBOD
in the 2000s55,56 and elsewhere its use as a demilitarization method is
subject to ever more stringent restrictions.57 OBOD techniques are
“strictly prohibited” within the framework of industrial demilitarization contracts managed by the NATO Support and Procurement
Agency (NSPA), although they are permitted in other contracts.58
HMA operators still have much to do in order to make sure they are
applying all reasonable effort in order to minimize the risk of chemical
contamination from the munitions they clear. HMA is in no position

sites selected for CDS. Again, acidic soil is likely to enable greater

to stop OBOD, and it is in no way appropriate that it should. However,

transport of contaminants and therefore soil at CDS should be tested.

HMA is able to make sure it is done in a way where risks are responsi-

Ideally CDS should be a good distance from water courses and known

bly managed. There are practical measures that can be taken, and these

groundwater locations.

should be integrated into the relevant technical documents, including

Although IM are not yet commonly encountered within HMA,

operator SOPs. Hopefully HMA operators will one day not find them-

operators should understand the impact of their insensitivity dur-

selves in a position where their best intentions of removing EO have

ing disposal. When destroying unfuzed ordnance from stockpiles, a

been undermined by an inadvertent act of pollution that could rea-

donor charge placed in the fuze well should ensure full detonation.

sonably have been avoided. We should actively avoid doing the wrong

This is because the IM requires confinement to fully detonate, and

thing in the wrong place under the wrong conditions. While actual
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A detonation plume from a high explosive ordnance residue test in Alaska. Snow is the perfect medium for measuring the environmental deposition of energetics.
Researchers at the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) used various techniques to simulate low-order detonations with both traditional and
insensitive high explosives fillings.
Image courtesy of Michael Walsh/CRREL.

IMX-104 fill spread after a low-order technique. Second order and low order techniques are prone to leave more residue. Researchers at the CRREL in Alaska have used
various techniques to simulate low-order detonations with insensitive high explosives fillings.
Image courtesy of Michael R. Walsh/CRREL.

explosive hazards have arguably a more immediate significance to the
people we are trying to help, reputational risk to HMA organizations
is real, as of course are the moral and legal risks.
In terms of the environment, it is virtually impossible for HMA
organizations to “do no harm.” Clearing ground of EO, especially
landmines, inevitably has an environmental impact, whether it is vegetation clearance, physical damage to topsoil or contamination of soil
and water by toxic energetics. The key will be to show we are making
“all reasonable effort” to minimize environmental contamination to a
level no more than necessary to remove the immediate blast and fragmentation hazard.
See endnotes page 68
The authors wish to sincerely thank Dr. Tracey Temple at Cranfield
University for her advice during the writing of this article and Dr.
Michael R. Walsh for his kind permission to use his images.
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MEASURING BEHAVIOR CHANGE
RESULTING FROM EORE AND THE
NEED FOR COMPLEMENTARY RISK
REDUCTION ACTIVITIES
By Helaine Boyd [ HALO ], Sebastian Kasack [ MAG ], and Noe Falk Nielsen [ NPA ]

FGD with a mixed community group in Olmun Village, Battambang Province, Cambodia. Good notetaking and facilitation are key.
Photo courtesy of © Sean Sutton/MAG.

R

isk education (RE) in mine action has been around since

of poverty, and/or insufficient clearance/ordnance disposal capacity.

1992.1 However, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)2

These circumstances lead to a lack of choices for persons living in or

operators are still struggling to measure how and whether

near an EO-contaminated environment to adopt safer behavior.

EORE has resulted in positive behavior change.3 Of course, various

This article presents a new approach to measuring behavior change,

monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methods have been pursued in

using a combination of qualitative and quantitative survey methods.

the past, predominantly the use of knowledge, attitude, practice, and
beliefs (KAPB) surveys; simpler pre-/post-EORE session surveys; the
use of proxy indicators such as number of explosive ordnance (EO)
accidents or victims; and number of explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) callouts from the community. However, these methods come
with some limitations in accurately capturing behavior change. For
example, survey questions linked to behavior would normally be prefaced as “what would you do if…” However, this self-reporting of behavior does not necessarily capture actual behaviors; moreover, responses
may be biased toward giving the “correct answer” in order to please

It is centered around conducting focus group discussions (FGDs)
pre-/post-EORE interventions at the community level. The approach
is showing positive results after an initial round of piloting and
implementation in ten countries (Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe)
for the past eighteen months, but it is not without its challenges.

REASONS FOR DEVELOPING THIS METHODOLOGY
The HALO Trust (HALO), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) are partnering together as part of
the UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) second

the organization conducting the survey. Further, research has evalu-

Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP2), which runs from 1 July

ated the limits of EORE in the context of ongoing conflict, high levels

2018 to 31 March 2021 and covers the ten countries listed previously.
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the Partnership felt that we had not
fully utilized FGDs in a comprehensive, rigorous manner to assess behavior change with respect to EORE. Key
questions included: How were we
going to produce a quantitative score
to a qualitative-heavy methodology? How will we capture EO-related
behavior of an entire community? We
realized that rolling out this methodology was not going to be easy and
would require additional training of
our in-country community outreach
teams (COTs)8 in order to capture the
nuance of varying behaviors and the
underlying motives across differing
sub-groups within communities.

DEVELOPING THE
METHODOLOGY
Core parameters were quite clear:
the COTs would conduct FGDs before
HALO staff conducting a focus group discussion with a mine-affected community in Anlong Veng District, Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of The HALO Trust.

While the “Partnership” had agreed on a standardized EORE pre-/
post-survey approach in GMAP1, we realized methods for systematically measuring behavior change, particularly at a community level,
were inadequate.4 Difficulties in measuring behavior change during
GMAP1 led the UK government to recommend the three organizations
to seek improved ways of measuring the effects of EORE. Itad, an external organization contracted to provide monitoring and evaluation of
the Partnership’s work under GMAP, had written a summative evaluation report for GMAP1 that recommended “to really deliver behavioral
change, better analysis is needed that leads to nuanced delivery of MRE.”5
From this, the Partnership developed the following indicator to
measure behavior change for the GMAP2 contract: “Percentage of
impacted communities surveyed reporting an increase in people who
behave in a safer manner (as a consequence of EORE).”
The Partnership began piloting a qualitative approach to measure
behavior change through FGDs as this methodology would (a) allow
for open discussions in small groups between five and twelve people to
ask follow-on questions and explore topics in-depth (b) be more representative of the community’s behavior rather than individual behavior, and (c) allow participants to report observed behaviors of other
community members, which would not be possible from a quantitative
KAPB survey. FGDs allow implementers to draw upon respondents’
attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences, and reactions in a group setting.6,7 By focusing on select age, social, and gender groups, FGDs can
create an atmosphere where people feel free to talk. Further, by having
a specific, thematic focus on behavior towards EO, this also provides a
concise parameter for discussion.
While mine action operators are used to conducting group interviews and FGDs in other areas related to humanitarian mine action,
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the delivery of EORE sessions in a
given community and then again

about three-to-six months after the EORE intervention.
As it was the first time that this outcome indicator was used in
DFID’s GMAP, there was an element of “piloting” M&E for this indicator in the first three months of the project. Following this baseline
phase, a lessons learned document was produced to catalogue all challenges and limitations in order to refine the methodology. The exercise determined that one FGD per community is not enough and if
possible, multiple FGDs should be conducted with distinct groups,
such as local leaders, women, youth, and/or specific risk-takers such as
shepherds. Country contexts are wide-ranging during conflict, postconflict, and in-development; and community acceptance of mine
action activities and participatory approaches can vary widely
depending on these circumstances. The capacity of our COTs also
varied significantly. Too many of our staff were used to asking suggested questions in a script-like fashion, and did not probe deeper; and
most importantly, they asked leading questions and judged participants’ answers. Initially, we had envisioned that the FGD methodology would have a sample size of 20 percent of all communities where
EORE is being conducted under the GMAP2 contract. However, it was
later found that for some countries this was an overwhelming burden
Examples of some of the open-ended questions include:
» What do you consider are safe behaviors towards EO?
» What are unsafe behaviors?
» What do you do when encountering explosive ordnance in
contaminated areas?
» What reasons, if any, prevent you from taking a safer approach
to the explosive ordnance threat?
There are approximately nine to ten questions asked in each FGD,
with the potential for numerous follow-up questions depending on
the responses given.

Scoring Matrix (on a scale of 1–5, 1 being very unsafe to 5 being very safe)
#

The FGD exhibits the following behaviors/overall assessment

Examples

1

FGD participants/community members are knowingly engaging in very unsafe activity/or it is
implied that this activity is still happening, despite no strong reason for economic necessity. (the
Reckless)
FGD participants/community members engage in unsafe behavior because they are mostly not
aware of the threat. Common belief that EO is not dangerous. (the Unaware)
No one, or very few members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively safe
behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)

• Refugees or IDPs in a conflict
affected country moving into
contaminated areas without any
knowledge of RE messaging
• Ex-military or young boys who
are reckless and refuse to believe
EO is dangerous
• Scrap metal collectors/explosive
harvesters

2

FGD participants/community members are aware of the threat, but do not know sufficiently how to
behave more safely. (the Uninformed)
FGD participants/community members knowingly use contaminated land (not applicable for
cluster strike areas) due to economic desperation, but may use well-trodden pathways while doing
so to avoid hazards. (the Forced)
Very few, or at least less than the majority of members in the community/FGD participants are
engaging in actively safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected
dangerous areas)

• Poor communities using the land
for cultivation out of desperation
• Women/vulnerable groups who
are isolated in rural communities
and do not receive adequate RE

3

A majority of FGD participants and other community members do not actively use the contaminated land; they seek safer areas for their livelihoods; unsafe behavior seems to be out of a misunderstanding of key RE messages or lack of trust of clearance response (i.e., moving an item to a tree or
landmark to avoid the item being in the pathway of someone else) (the Misinformed/Forced) or fear
(i.e., when an item is found, it is no longer picked up, but communities may not report to authorities
out of fear of retribution).
Half or a small majority of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively
safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)

4

FGD participants/community members do not report any unsafe behaviors, hazardous areas are
avoided, and people who did unsafe practices in the past have stopped doing so. A large majority
of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively safe behaviors (reporting
to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)

5

FGD participants/community members report mostly safe behaviors, and have actively and consistently reported items to authorities; they warn their children and newcomers about the threat.
All or at least a 90% majority of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in
actively safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous
areas)

• Communities with legacy
contamination who have been
living with mines for a long time
and have a well-established
reporting response mechanism
to authorities

Table 1. Scoring matrix (on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 is very unsafe, 5 is very safe).
Table courtesy of authors.

on COT planning and would threaten the delivery of EORE session

THE METHODOLOGY

targets in some cases. Jeopardizing the humanitarian objective of the

The FGD methodology allows for capturing qualitative information,

project was not an option. The sample size was thus redefined as “up to

which is imperative in measuring behavior change through a quantita-

20 percent of communities” to allow for some flexibility.

tive scoring process. COTs raise with the participants a series of core

Specific and comprehensive guidelines were developed following

topics, each with open-ended and follow-up questions, with the pur-

the lessons learned exercise. Notably, better guidance was needed to

pose of obtaining detailed information on behavior toward EO in the

properly train COTs. For example, finding the exact same participants

community. Examples of some of the open-ended questions include:

for post-EORE FGDs is no longer binding to allow for some flexibility

What do you consider are safe behaviors towards EO? What are unsafe

when gathering participants for the post-EORE FGD, as long as they

behaviors? What do you do when encountering EO in contaminated

had participated in the EORE session in the first place.

areas? What reasons, if any, prevent you from taking a safer approach

Analyzing the results of each FGD and then for the entire commu-

to the EO threat? There are approximately nine to ten questions asked

nity may possibly be the riskiest part of this approach. The reasons for

in each FGD, with the potential for numerous follow-up questions

ranking a community in relation to its behaviors toward EO must be

depending on the responses given.

well explained. The matrix itself along with the guidance will likely
need to be refined over time as more lessons are learned.

From there, the COTs record comprehensive notes of the FGD. These
notes are then immediately analyzed by the facilitator and note taker,
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State/
Region

Teams

FGDs

Shan

1

9

Kayin

2

12

Tanintharyi

2

36

TOTAL

5

57

1st Round Community Safety Score
1
1

2

3

4

3

3

3

2nd Round Community Safety Score
5

1

2

3

4

1

8

1

9

1

1

2

7

2

6

11

19

1

1

2

32

5

1

10

23

23

0

2

3

20

42

0

1.8%

17.5%

40.4%

40.4%

0.0%

3.5%

5.3%

17.5%

73.7%

0.0%

Table 2. MAG FGD analysis in Myanmar. Number and absolute scores of FGDs before and after conducting EORE.

State/
Region

Communities

Lower
Score

Same
Score

Higher
Score

Shan

9

0

3

6

Kayin

12

4

5

3

Tnintharyi

36

3

17

16

engaging in unsafe behaviors (Category 1), there has been a 12.2 per-

TOTAL

57

these communities (see Table 2).
Although there are still two communities that reported knowingly

7

25

25

cent decrease in the number of communities knowingly engaging in

44%

44%

unsafe behavior out of survival imperatives (Category 2), and a 22.9

with non-biased analysis provided by a senior member responsible for
community liaison and EORE. The person responsible for analyzing
the FGD data then produces a summary paragraph explaining the current state of behavior towards EO. This summary may include identifying the risk profiles of a community, with the understanding that
multiple risk profiles may be present in a community at any given time.
Risk profiles are broken down into five categories and can be ascribed
to individuals but also groups, ranging from Unaware, Uninformed,
9

SCORING SYSTEM
The scoring matrix ranks communities on a scale from one to five:
from a very high risk-taking community (#1) to one where a majority of
members in the community conduct safe behaviors related to EO (#5).
It is important to note that this scoring matrix comes with a number
of caveats that are detailed in the overarching FGD guidance document.10
Primarily, scoring of an FGD session should be done with the understanding of whether a majority or minority of community members
carry out safe or unsafe behaviors toward EO. We have termed this the
“none/some/all” approach to scoring. Further, the scoring of the postEORE FGD three-to-six months later should be mindful of the summary
paragraph from the pre-EORE FGD to see if the amount of community
members exhibiting unsafe behaviors has reduced since the EORE session. Without this general quantifying of community members, it will
become difficult to give a realistic score as it is quite likely for a commu-

percent decrease in the number of communities that report examples
of unsafe behavior stemming from ignorance or fear (Category 3). In
the second round of FGDs, 73.7 percent of targeted communities did
not report any unsafe behaviors but did not consistently report items
to authorities (Category 4), a 33.3 percent increase from the first round.
A surprising result showed 12 percent of targeted communities
received a lower score in the post-EORE FGDs than in the pre-EORE
FGD. In three out of seven of these villages, there were incidents
of community members engaging in risky behavior despite having received EORE. In one notable incident, a local pastor who had
received EORE was ploughing a field with a group of young men who
had not received EORE when they encountered an item of unexploded
ordnance (UXO). Instead of sharing key safety messages and warning them to not touch the item, the pastor played with the EO, throwing it to the other men he was with, as was reported in one FGD. The
remaining communities have a lower score in the post-EORE FGDs,
not because the communities are behaving in a more unsafe way
since they attended an EORE session but rather because the participants were not forthcoming in discussing risky behavior when MAG
Community Liaison teams conducted the pre-EORE FGD. A key lesson learned is that the data gathered in the first FGD might not always
be fully representative due to initial lack of trust. However, the FGD
process was invaluable in building relationships with the local communities, particularly in highly-militarized villages,11 and communities often participated more freely in the post-EORE FGDs. Being able
to directly address what the participants have been told in the FGDs
helps to make future EORE more tailored and hopefully for the mes-

nity to exhibit both safe and unsafe behaviors at the same time.

sages to sink in more. The process of having a discussion makes the

OUTCOMES: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

they have different beliefs about what to do. This is helpful because

A positive outcome from using this methodology has been that it has
increased trust between affected groups and mine action operators in
communities, which has been significant in the context of Myanmar,
where conflict sensitivity is paramount.
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in three different States/Regions and post-EORE FGDs in fifty-seven of

12%

Table 3. MAG FGD analysis in Myanmar. Comparison between pre-EORE and postEORE FGD scores.

Misinformed, Reckless, to Forced.

Liaison staff conducted pre-EORE FGDs in eighty-three communities

community address the challenges together and understand whether
if unsafe practices are identified, then the elders can specifically take
ownership over not allowing this to happen in the future.
In Somaliland, seven out of the eight communities who have participated in both a pre-/post-EORE FGD conducted by HALO have

Talking about EO in Myanmar is still a very sensitive subject, even

reported positive behavior change, with only one exhibiting no change

in areas where there has been no fighting for years. MAG Community

in behavior. This particular community who did not exhibit more
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FGD conducted by NPA in the village of Kimunza Nzadi, Angola.
Photo courtesy of NPA.

positive behavior following EORE continued to report identified EO

Overall, the FGD methodology in Somaliland has proven to be

and spread awareness as they had done previously but struggled to

hugely successful. The notes produced from the FGDs illustrate that

convey key messages to nomadic populations. Further, while the FGD

communities have exhibited greater awareness of behavior towards EO

methodology can build trust in certain communities, it can also have

among community members, and that conducting the FGDs allows

the opposite effect in some contexts where communities exhibit survey

COTs to stay a bit longer, build trust, and has resulted in more people

fatigue. In some communities in Somaliland, people have been waiting

reporting items found or stockpiled at home. While the primary objec-

for clearance for almost twenty years and are frustrated that clearance

tive of the FGDs is to understand behavior change, they have proved

has not yet started in their community.

to be great centers of debate, and provide the COTs with valuable, con-

There are several FGDs that HALO in Somaliland did not end up
using for analysis because (a) the data was insufficient or (b) biased

textual information, which has then been used to tailor future EORE
sessions to specific groups and where it is most needed.

answers or leading questions were suspected. In these instances, the

In Cambodia, HALO has conducted 20 complete pre-/post-EORE

information is still used for qualitative purposes and future EORE

FGDs of which eleven communities have reported increased safer

project design, but the statistics are not included when reporting on

behavior. The challenge with ongoing EORE in Cambodia is that

the outcome indicator. As this methodology takes a lot more time

much like other legacy contamination countries, it is understood that

than other types of M&E methods due to the nuance required, it is

behaviors may not have changed for many years as some have adapted

important that all operators conduct continual monitoring and qual-

over time to risky or forced behavior because of the lack of alternative

ity assurance of the COTs to ensure that high-quality qualitative

options to livelihoods.

information is being collected for FGDs or confirm that the information is unusable for scoring.

In Zimbabwe, NPA is working mainly along the border with
Mozambique. The mines emplaced along this border impede the
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HALO FGD Analysis in Cambodia

HALO FGD Analysis in Somalia
Trapeang Ngeu

Qoryaale Bridge

Thnam

Odenle

Ta Thok

Beer

Siem

Libaaxle

Satum

Bisiqa

Samraong Tboung

Luqun Lo’ad

Samraong Cheung
Salang Ti Pir

Goraya Xun Hoose

Robas Mongkol

Ina Afmodoobe

Prey Prum Pir

0

1

2

Post-EORE FGD Score

3

4

Prey Prum Muoy

5

Prey Khlout

Pre-EORE FGD Score

Ngeu Thmei
Nang Krapeu

Figure 1. HALO FGD Analysis in Somalia.

Kantuot
Danghet

access of small scale and commercial farmers as well as timber companies to manage forestry.

Choam Trav
Chhngar Kandal
Anlong Ta Mok

NPA has applied the FGD methodology since 2018 with guarded

Anlong Koub

success. The FGDs have provided NPA with valuable information for

0

understanding the differences in vulnerability, roles, and needs of the
respective age groups, sex, and traits in the communities, allowing the

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Post-EORE FGD Score

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

Pre-EORE FGD Score

Figure 2. HALO FGD Analysis in Cambodia.

program to improve planning and EORE quality accordingly.
Despite the benefits of the approach, NPA has experienced a num-

something beyond mere advice on safer behavior. Structural causes

ber of challenges in the implementation. Large parts of the popula-

must be understood and addressed. As such, it is important to take

tion are seasonal workers, which makes it difficult to keep track of the

note of the lack of fully honest answers and stated answers versus actual

same group of people for between three and six months for the post

behavior change. NPA also noted that the rigidity of the scoring did

EORE FGD. In addition, working adults have shown limited interest

not allow for the program to report on subtle changes in stated behav-

in dedicating the required time for FGDs, making it difficult to ensure

ior resulting from the EORE sessions. As illustrated in Figure 3, three

representational participation.

out of seven communities showed positive changes in pre-/post-EORE

As for the actual discussions, NPA occasionally experienced that the

sessions. The program highlighted that even though the level of under-

community provided COTs with the “correct answers” while continu-

standing of the threat was raised, a majority of people within the com-

ing to practice unsafe behavior, e.g., cultivating crops in contaminated

munity continued to undertake unsafe, forced behavior, leaving the

areas for economic reasons. Thus, the method requires the building of

score unchanged. Thus, without proper explanation, the statistics will

sufficient trust to ensure the community is open to talk about its needs

convey a somewhat incomplete picture of the impact. However, this is

and reasons for undertaking unsafe behavior. Follow-up visits to con-

only a reporting issue. The FGD clearly showed that the program would

taminated areas to verify that the community follows its own stated

have to link in with other sectors to properly address the forced unsafe

behavior may be an option to validate FGD findings.

behavior as EORE in itself would not be a sufficient measure. Broader

Such cases illustrate yet again that the mine action sector needs to
work closely with other sectors, i.e., development NGOs, authorities,

reach of the FGDs, or discussions jointly undertaken with other sectors
could lead to a better understanding of the keys to change behavior.

etc., in order to ensure positive behavior change by offering people

EO RISK EDUCATION AND
EO RISK REDUCTION
People opt for dangerous behav-

Muzuru Village

ior when they see no other choice.

Ratelshoek Estate

For example, when sourcing drink-

Mandadzaka Village

ing water, gathering firewood, or

Mazundu Village

finding areas for hunting, these may

Foroma Village

only be reached by passing through

Marufu Village

a minefield, thereby knowingly putting their lives at risk to sustain

Muzite Village

their livelihoods. Children may not
0

0.5

1

1.5

2
Post

2.5
PRE

Figure 3. NPA FGD Analysis in Zimbabwe.
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3

3.5

4

4.5

5

know or simply forget safe behavior;
for instance when they stray playing
hide and seek, but this is something

that can be more easily addressed through EORE and attention from
well-informed parents, siblings, and friends.

Action point 30: “Prioritise people most at risk by linking mine
risk education and reduction programmes and messages directly

Some groups, like ex-combatants and those designated as “village

to an analysis of available casualty and contamination data, an

deminers” will often deliberately, recklessly take very high risks to

understanding of the affected population’s behaviour, risk pat-

enter hazardous areas to remove EO. They do this to support other

tern and coping mechanisms, and, wherever possible, anticipated

villagers or to make a bit of money. Farmers and shepherds come

population movements.”

across numerous items of EO in certain countries. Often, they decide

As highlighted previously, implementing risk reduction projects

to move the items themselves, motivated by protecting their children

will often be beyond the scope of mine action itself and require an

or their livestock. Why do they not report these EO items to the local

integrated approach. FGDs, as presented in this article, allow opera-

authorities instead of putting themselves at risk? Perhaps because the

tors to gain a better, context-specific understanding of affected com-

response takes too long, or out of fear of reprisal. FGDs help to find

munity’s needs as it relates to risk reduction. The population

answers to these questions and to explore more relevant and realistic

understands better who we are, why we are there, and what we can

suggestions to behavior change—suggestions that are community-

offer. As operators, we can use the information gathered from the

driven and context specific.

FGDs to improve our work by refining targeting, messaging, and

Other behavior proves even more challenging to address. For

identifying risk reduction alternatives.
See endnotes page 68

example when people keep EO with a profit motive in mind: children in Laos have sold cluster munitions so they have money to buy
ice cream; to harvest explosives for blast fishing (a very destructive
practice for the environment)12 or to blow up stones/rocks; to harvest
high-value metals from EO; or simply to use EO as construction material. How can we reduce the risks by persons who are either forced to
continue this behavior or see no reason why they should stop their
reckless behavior, often putting bystanders including family members
at unacceptable risk?
Effective risk reduction13 must go beyond “just” EORE and should
include options for safer alternatives to livelihoods in affected communities. For example, a safe playground may be built to reduce children
playing in unsafe areas, firewood as fuel can be reduced by 50 percent
when using fuel-saving stoves, and drilling a borehole may stop people
from going through the minefield to the river to collect water. These
alternative projects may be best placed in certain communities while
inappropriate in others, so context is key. Some mine action operators
may not have capacity to implement these projects directly, so partnering with wider relief and development organizations may be essential.
For the post-EORE FGD we added a question on why some behavior
did change or did not change for this exact reason.

Helaine Boyd
Partnerships and Evaluation Manager
The HALO Trust
Helaine Boyd is responsible for managing
contract delivery of DFID’s Global Mine
Action Programmes in Angola, Cambodia,
Somalia, and Zimbabwe. Boyd has been
with HALO for almost five years. Before
HALO, she worked in mine action and
monitoring and evaluation in Nepal and
South Sudan. She did her undergraduate
and postgraduate education at the University of British
Columbia. She is also certified to IMAS EOD Level 1 and IMAS
IEDD Level 1.
Sebastian Kasack
Senior Community Liaison Advisor
MAG (Mines Advisory Group)

CONCLUSION
Using FGDs to measure behavior change has worked but has its limits when applied within a short timeframe of three-to-six months after
an intervention. Sustained behavior change will only manifest itself
over time and, therefore, must be planned and implemented beyond
any donor funding cycle.
The Oslo Action Plan, agreed upon at the fourth review conference
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in November 2019, aims to
steer the mine action community for the coming five years. It calls for
risk reduction in the context of EORE:
Action point 28: “Integrate mine risk education activities with
wider humanitarian, development, protection and education efforts,
as well as with ongoing survey, clearance and victim assistance activities to reduce the risk to the affected population and decrease their
need for risk-taking.”14

		

Sebastian Kasack holds a master’s
degree in geography and has been
involved in mine action since 1996, working for international NGOs, UNMAS,
UNICEF, and UNDP. In 2016, he joined
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RAISING THE PROFILE OF MINE ACTION
By Paul McCann [ The HALO Trust ]

Prince Harry (right) walks down a street in Huambo built on cleared ground from minefield H013, visited by Princess Diana in 1997 (left).
All images courtesy of The HALO Trust.

I

n January 1997, Diana, Princess of Wales, travelled to Angola with

considered an unambiguous good. But how can mine clearance orga-

the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). She did not

nizations and others harness this publicity to benefit HMA? How do

travel alone. Around ninety international journalists and a number

you keep mine action in the public eye when such high-profile visits

of TV crews accompanied her. It is unlikely that Angola’s sleepy second

are over? And what issues do HMA organizations need to bear in mind

city of Huambo saw similar numbers of press until September 2019,

when they seek public awareness for their work?

when her son, Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex, walked in her footsteps.

30

Princess Diana had been a patron of the British Red Cross since

The two visits, separated by twenty-two years, produced arguably

the early 1980s, and before 1997, had made foreign visits for the ICRC

the greatest amount of media attention ever achieved by humanitarian

to Nepal and Zimbabwe on non-landmine related issues. In 1995, the

mine action (HMA). Comparable with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban

ICRC launched its public campaign: Landmines must be stopped.

Convention (APMBC) conference in December 1997, such exposure is

The veteran British journalist Bill Deedes and Director General of
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the Red Cross Mike Whitlam were among those who brought the

28 de Maio, and a nearby large Cuban base. The presence of these

issue of landmines to Princess Diana’s attention. The ICRC con-

military positions meant there were extensive minefields in the area.

sidered taking Diana to Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,1 or

Huambo itself had changed hands during the conflict and had occa-

Vietnam, but Angola was ultimately selected to highlight the danger

sionally been under siege.

of landmines to civilians.2

The minefield visited by Princess Diana in January 1997 was named

In 1997, the Lusaka Protocols had produced a fragile pause3 in

H013 by The HALO Trust (HALO), which first began clearing mines

the country’s long civil war, but the country remained a war zone.

in Angola in late 1994. The minefield had been laid to protect a mili-

Significantly, Angola’s landmine contamination was among the worst

tary supply depot known as the Regimento de Abastecimento Militar or

in the world. The full number of landmine casualties in Angola is

“RAM.” Heavy metal contamination meant HALO’s detectors strug-

unknown, with some estimates reaching upwards of 88,000 people.4

gled to isolate landmine signals and complete excavation, and clear-

Diana’s visit to Angola included trips to rehabilitation clinics with

ance of the entire minefield was a slow and painstaking process.

the ICRC in Luanda and Huambo. In Luanda, she was pictured by the

The night before the 1997 visit, Paul Heslop, then HALO’s Angola pro-

press with a young girl, Sandra Tgica, on her lap. Sandra was a land-

gram manager, and now Chief, Programme Planning & Management at

mine survivor who had lost her leg. Diana’s visit was not uncontro-

the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), had a staff member

versial, and she was denounced as a “loose cannon” by a minister in

cut up one of his pillow cases and draw the HALO logo on it in pen so

the UK government. That condemnation only served to generate more

it could be stitched onto the Princess’s body armor. During the visit she

news interest in the visit and made it increasingly political in tone. The

blew up a mine and when requested to repeat her walk through H013 by

main opposition party in the UK meanwhile publicized its policy of

photographers who had missed the shot, she complied.

supporting a mine ban. The most iconic pictures from the Angola trip

The photographs and footage of Diana in Huambo were front-

were taken when the most famous woman in the world donned a pro-

page news and lead items on news bulletins around the world. In

tective apron and visor and walked into a Huambo minefield.

the aftermath of her sudden death seven months later, it became

The San Antonio district of Huambo, to the southwest of the main

one of the most prominent images used to illustrate her life of cam-

square, was then known as the Barrio Militar because of the presence

paigns and compassion. The body armor worn by Diana in Huambo

of several army bases—including a logistics base on what is now Ave.

is now in the collection of the Royal Armouries Museum5 in Leeds

Prince Harry launches the Landmine Free 2025 Campaign in April 2017.
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Prince Harry continued his mother’s advocacy work on landmines, but
initially with a lower level of public
profile. In 2010 and 2013, he visited
minefields in Mozambique and Angola
with HALO. However, both visits were
largely private, with images and footage released to the media afterwards.
On the 20th anniversary of the APMBC
and of his mother’s Angola trip, HALO
and Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
approached Prince Harry to mark
the anniversaries with a public event
in London on International Mines
Awareness Day, 4 April 2017. Before an
audience of donors, supporters, ambassadors, and campaigners, the Duke
movingly invoked his mother’s memA HALO vehicle crosses difficult terrain in order to access remote minefields in Angola.

in Northern England. To this day, HALO staff simply mention the
iconic image of Diana wearing body armor as a cue to remind people
what HALO does.
Princess Diana’s involvement with landmines has been credited
with helping secure the adoption of the APMBC—the most widely
observed arms control treaty in history. In many ways, this is the ultimate example of a humanitarian or development issue harnessing its
moment in the public eye.
For HALO, then a lean and relatively small, publicity-shy organization, the famous photographs of Princess Diana with a pillow
case logo, give it global brand exposure. The recognition was such
that HALO got by without hiring a dedicated communications team
until well into the 21st century.

ory in a speech that was widely carried
by media outlets in the US, UK, and

Europe. At the same event, the UK government’s Department for
International Development announced £100 million ($124 million)
of funding for its Global Mine Action Programme.
The April 2017 event was hosted under the banner of the Landmine
Free 2025 Campaign. Such was its success in garnering mainstream
and social media traction that what began as an isolated event has
grown to become a global advocacy campaign.6 The Campaign’s goal
is to re-energize global support for landmine clearance and ensure
as many countries as possible are landmine free by 2025. Currently,
only 0.4 percent of overseas development assistance (ODA) is spent on
clearing landmines.7 The campaign is calling for a fair share commitment of 0.7 percent of ODA, which would be a game changer for the
sector in reaching a mine free world.
The work that international NGOs
do for development and post-conf lict
issues is not always an easy story to
sell. Media travel budgets and foreign
news coverage have declined, and audiences cannot always empathize with the
plight of people far away. The involvement of Princess Diana and her son
has always made HALO’s approach to
journalists easier, certainly in the UK.
A recognizable face or name gives journalists a shorthand way into a story.
That is why so many international organizations and NGOs turn to celebrity
ambassadors to help reach both media
and audiences.
In 2019, the Angolan government
decided it wanted to develop the economy of the southern Cuando Cubango

Chris Ship recording coverage for ITV.
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Province, one of its most remote

Prince Harry and Valdemar Fernandes in Huambo.

regions, by attracting and protecting wildlife. However, the mine-

On the morning of 27 September 2019, Prince Harry walked into

fields littering the province needed to be cleared first in order to

minefield HKK220 in the Luengue-Luiana National Park near Dirico

ensure people’s safety and to enable wildlife protection measures.

at 6:30 a.m. He was accompanied by HALO regional manager José

Thanks to Angolan government funding, HALO will begin clear-

António, who had accompanied him on his previous Angola visit.

ing the mines in two national parks. However, there are dangerous

Behind them were a selection of travelling journalists who were fly-

minefields across the region, especially in the wider watershed that

ing with the Prince on his African tour and representatives from the

feeds the Okavango Delta in neighboring Botswana. Clearance of

Angolan media. Minefields are no place for massed ranks of photog-

the mines is a key component in the protection of the Kavango–

raphers stepping backward for a better angle. HALO had repeatedly

Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, Africa’s largest wildlife

rehearsed the minefield visit, taking sightlines into account, the angle

protection initiative.

of the sun at 6:30 a.m., and the safety of all concerned. After leaving

In June 2019, Prince Harry agreed to speak at a Chatham House

the minefield, the Prince detonated a mine and made a short speech in

meeting on clearing landmines in the Angolan watershed. Shortly

which he described mines as an “unhealed scar of war.” Much of this

afterwards, Buckingham Palace announced that the Prince would visit

was broadcast live on British television.

minefields in Angola during a September 2019 tour of Africa. Both the

The Prince was then flown, followed by the media, 800 km north

Chatham House event and the Africa tour announcement attracted

to Huambo, where he was escorted to what once had been minefield

widespread media coverage.

H013, visited by his mother over twenty years ago yet is now the bus-

To demonstrate the need for clearance in the Okavango watershed,

tling Ave 28 de Maio. Within the area of the old minefield, there are

HALO set up a demining camp and tents for the media, its royal guest,

now two completed colleges with a third under construction, a small

and other dignitaries near Dirico in the far south of Angola. Moving sup-

furniture factory, homes, and shops. The most-photographed mine-

plies for the camps required repeated road trips, each of which took five

field in the world is a fine example of the development that can take

days because of the deep sand and lack of roads in the area. Mined roads

place once landmines are removed.

had to be avoided. Crocodiles and hippos watched from the rivers as

The Prince was escorted by Valdemar Fernandes, who had been

HALO set up camp in one of the continent’s last remaining wildernesses.

clearing a nearby minefield when the Prince’s mother visited in 1997.
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Following the visit was the challenge of sustaining
momentum. With the issue of landmines in Southern
Africa fresh in the minds of many, a UK-wide fundraising campaign was kicked off in conjunction with the UK
government’s Aid Match scheme. The campaign, Breaking
Boundaries, focused on raising funds for mine clearance
in Zimbabwe. Again, celebrity engagement generated
considerable media attention. Newspapers could cover
the campaign using images of Prince Harry in a HALObranded shirt. In this way, HALO was able to use Prince
Harry’s work in Angola to generate interest and engagement to support landmine clearance in another country
that faces similar challenges.
The involvement of Princess Diana and her son has
benefitted the wider landmine cause and given HALO
greater brand awareness than many similar-sized organizations. Such a profile does carry risk, as any journalist
looking for a story on HALO has a better chance of getting it published by adding “Harry Charity” and a picture
of the Prince in body armor to their piece. Similarly, any
high-profile supporter is likely to have varying levels of
engagement at different times. All charities with celebrity
supporters have to learn to manage both with and without the attention such celebrities bring.
In seeking to boost their public profile by a highprofile supporter, HMA organizations, like any other
non-profit, need to be wary of being eclipsed by the
celebrity of their patron. In Angola, HALO constantly
endeavored to put landmine survivors, hard-working
One of HALO Angola’s all-women teams of deminers prepares for work.

deminers, and all beneficiaries of mine action firmly
into the ambit of the media.
In 1997, a royal visit and dozens of journalists effectively fell into

He also met hundreds of schoolchildren who had no idea the area had

HALO’s lap. In 2019, months of work, planning, and a herculean

once been lethal. The third leg of the busy day was a reception at the

logistics effort in a remote part of Africa was needed to pull off a

British Embassy in Luanda, where Sandra Tgica, the landmine survivor

similar level of exposure. By focusing on landmine clearance, ben-

who as a young girl met Princess Diana twenty years earlier, was one

eficiaries, and the transformation that takes place when mines are

of the guests.

cleared, HALO was able to get its message through amid the

Ensuring that the celebrity of the visitor does not take precedence

cacophony of cameras.

over the issue itself is a challenge with high-profile visits. To combat

See endnotes page 69

this, visiting journalists were sent on prearranged visits to Angolan
minefields, so that documentaries could be aired on ITV in the UK and
on CNN and ABC in the United States. Feature writers spent the night
in camps with women deminers in another part of Angola. Interviews
were set up with landmine victims injured by the minefields in Huambo.
The aim was to expand what could have remained a royal story into one
with a wider focus on landmines and their pernicious effect on ordinary
people’s lives. As a result, a wide array of stories emerged after the visits. As expected, Prince Harry remained the draw, but audiences also
learned about deminers, survivors, and the major impact of contamination on communities across Angola.
Both the Dirico and Huambo visits earned tens of thousands of media
“hits” around the globe on mainstream and social media. HALO’s website
received 3,500 percent more visitors than on a normal day in September.
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A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING,
ACHIEVING, AND DEMONSTRATING
IMAS COMPLIANCE
By David Hewitson [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]

M

ine action organizations routinely state that they are “IMAS
compliant,” but it isn’t clear exactly what that means, how
anyone knows with confidence whether they are compliant

or not, or who is authorized to make such statements. This article draws
on recent work by Fenix Insight Ltd. to database the requirements and
recommendations found in IMAS, setting out a rigorous, evidencebased approach to answering key questions about the compliance status of mine action organizations. It suggests methods for determining
which requirements are relevant to which organizations, what different

WHAT DOES COMPLIANCE MEAN IN OTHER
STANDARDS REGIMES?

levels of compliance there might be, and how to integrate compliance

The IMAS system has always sought to reflect the principles,

checking into established approaches to tendering, accreditation, and

approaches, and the language found in the International Organization

organizational monitoring processes. The article describes the freely

for Standardization (ISO) system. The first thing to note is that no one

available Fenix IMAS compliance database tool.

says “we’re ISO compliant.” Instead they are more likely to say we are

WHAT IS IMAS COMPLIANCE?
Mine action organizations (MAOs) like to say “we’re IMAS compliant,” but what does that mean, how does anyone know for sure, and is
it appropriate for organizations to “self-declare” on such a significant
matter? The question is one that may sometimes be addressed within
the narrow confines of a specific activity, but to a great extent the sector
has chosen to set the question to one side.
The reality is that no organization, whether national authority, mine
action center (MAC), or operator needs to satisfy every requirement
in IMAS. Some requirements are clearly focused on specific levels of
actors, such as the responsibilities of a national mine action authority
(NMAA), while others relate to activities that some organizations don’t
engage in (programs that do not use animal detection systems need not
seek to comply with those IMAS).
There is also the fundamental question of what constitutes a requirement in IMAS. Each IMAS includes an explanation of how the words
shall, should, and may are used. Shall indicates “requirements, methods or specifications which are to be applied in order to conform to the
standard.” Should indicates “the preferred requirements, methods or
specifications.” May indicates “a possible method or course of action.”
The language suggests that only shall statements must be complied with
in order to “conform to the standard.” Should statements are preferred,
but as such appear to constitute recommendations. In quality management terms, a failure to satisfy a shall statement would represent a nonconformity, but the status of a failure to satisfy a should statement is
less clear.1
Extracting a concise set of applicable requirements and recommendations from the substantial body of documentation that is IMAS is
difficult to do. That difficulty brings uncertainty among operators,
monitors, accreditors, clients, and authorities as to exactly what IMAS
compliance means.

“ISO-9001 certified,” or “we are an ISO 14001 organization.” The question of ISO compliance is one that focuses on specific standards rather
than the generality of the overall system—not surprising when ISO
has published 23,098 standards to date focusing on specific industries
including food safety, agriculture, and technology as well as the widely
applicable quality, environmental, and safety management standards
that are more familiar to the mine action sector.2
The ISO approach to confirming compliance consists of three operational levels. The main burden of determining compliance is placed upon
those organizations seeking to gain and maintain certification against
the various standards.3 Internal auditing processes, applied by the certified organizations themselves, are central to concepts of ISO compliance.
The next tier of compliance management comes with the certification
bodies: the organizations that have been accredited to inspect and monitor applicant organizations and issue certificates of compliance. In addition to conducting standard-specific certification and recertification
inspections (every three years), certifying bodies also engage in ongoing
compliance monitoring through annual surveillance inspections. Above
the certification bodies lie the accreditation bodies, of which there is only
one per ISO member country.4 The accreditation bodies confirm the
competence of the certification bodies.
Many MAOs have chosen to adopt ISO standards: most commonly
ISO 9001 (the quality management systems standard) but increasingly
ISO 14001 (for environmental management systems) and ISO 45001
(for occupational health and safety management systems). As such they
will have engaged a certification body to inspect their system and check
for evidence that it is being applied. Most MAOs do not need to have
direct contact with an ISO accreditation body.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
There are parallels and some important differences between the
ISO approach to compliance and that associated with IMAS. The

Figure 1. Direction on communicating ISO certification status (including the applicable edition of the standard).
Figure courtesy of www.iso.org/certification.
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most obvious potential parallel is that of standard-specific compliance.
Different mine action actors engage in different activities. It makes
sense for them to seek and declare compliance with only those parts of
the IMAS system that are directly relevant to what they do.
One important difference between an IMAS and an ISO-standard
is that an organization typically adopts an ISO standard in its entirety.
Different elements of the standard demand different responses from different parts of the organization (such as senior management, designers,
workers, etc.), but the whole standard applies to the organization using it.
An IMAS is different, imposing different requirements on different organizations, such as NMAAs, MACs, MAOs, and occasionally specialist
function providers such as monitors. With an ISO standard, an organization knows it must embrace the standard entirely, even if it needs to think
about implications for different parts of its own structures. When a mine
action actor seeks to adopt an IMAS it must first disentangle which parts
are applicable to its own roles and responsibilities.

“permission.” Similarly, there are occasions when words and phrases
such as “must” or “it is required that” are used in IMAS strongly implying a shall statement without explicitly using the word shall.
The other important parallel is the emphasis on a rolling program
of self-assessment as the core method for an organization to maintain
compliance. External checking (whether by an ISO certification body
or a mine action monitoring agency) plays its part, but its primary role
is to confirm that internal compliance management is comprehensive,
rigorous, and effective.
IMAS also includes a more substantial body of background explanations, guidance, educational material, and advice than is found in the
ISO system. ISO tends to separate standards that only contain specific
requirements from supporting or guidance documents, which provide
advice on how to satisfy those standards.10

A “FILTERED” APPROACH TO IMAS COMPLIANCE

There are also similarities and differences in the use of language to

Bringing confidence to operators, monitors, and authorities about

communicate the degree of compliance. Both IMAS and ISOs identify

IMAS compliance requires the ability to apply the different “filters”

important verbal forms and describe how they are to be interpreted;

described previously:

ISO identifies the following:

•

filtering by activity, only selecting those standards that are rel-

•

shall indicates a requirement

•

should indicates a recommendation6

•

may indicates a permission

relevant IMAS that are applicable to the roles and responsibilities

•

can indicates a possibility or a capability7

of the organizations

evant to the organization’s activities

5

ISO documents almost exclusively use shall within the main body
of normative text found in standards. Should is generally confined to
informative annexes or guidance documents.8 IMAS adopts a similar

•

•

filtering by “‘stakeholder,” identifying only those aspects of the

identifying the degree of compliance that the organization wishes
to assess against, i.e., “shall” requirements alone, or “should” recommendations and “may” permissions as well?

terminology structure (although without the use of can), but it contains

The first step in the filtering process is relatively easy. A review

a greater mix of shall and should statements than is the case in compa-

of the list of applicable IMAS allows an organization’s managers to

rable ISO documents.9

identify those that are relevant, although even here bringing a more

While there is no doubt that any organization seeking to comply

considered approach to the idea of standard-specific compliance

with IMAS must satisfy every shall statement, the status of should state-

may raise questions within some organizations. Many MAOs will

ments is not quite so clear, but it is reasonable to expect that any orga-

identify the core operational IMAS—surrounding practical survey

nization serious about its professional commitment, performance, and

and clearance work—as being relevant to what they do. Most will

reputation would embrace should statements as well. The role of may is

also wish to show that they comply with the standards relating to

sometimes also uncertain, primarily because it often appears in IMAS

quality, safety, and environmental management. It is not so clear

with its other English-language meaning of “possibility” rather than

whether MAOs will also feel it necessary to demonstrate compliance
with some of the supporting standards. By thoroughly considering
the actual requirements of different IMAS afresh, organizations
will be able to more carefully decide with which standards they will
declare compliance.
The other two filtering steps (stakeholder level and degree of compliance) are harder to complete. Extracting only those requirements
that are relevant to a specific level of stakeholder can be done but is a
burdensome task. Similarly, identifying different levels of compliance
requires searches within each standard, a process that may be necessary
to do again whenever the range of activities an organization engages in
changes.

DATABASING IMAS
To make the process of filtering relevant requirements and recommendations easier, Fenix has incorporated normative elements of IMAS
Figure 2. The scale of the task: IMAS in full, printed out in hard copy.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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into a database available for free at www.mineaction.net.

That means this tool is not a substitute for the documented standards
themselves, available through the IMAS website at www.mineactionstandards.org. It is still important that anyone serious about compliance with IMAS have some familiarity with the full body of relevant
text. Similarly, the range of publications and training packages offered
by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and
other institutions, addressing the expectations and meanings of core
concepts in IMAS, remain as important as ever. This simple tool can
potentially transform the way that mine action actors engage with,
understand, and demonstrate compliance with IMAS.

WHERE NEXT?
The mineaction.net team is already looking into bringing other material into the system. Obvious candidates include IMAS in other languages (one possible project is already under consideration), National
Mine Action Standards (NMAS), Technical Notes for Mine Action
(TNMA), and relevant parts of the informative Annexes in IMAS.12
Selected standards from the International Ammunition Technical
Guidelines (IATGs), which use the same language of shall, should, and

Figure 3. Mineaction.net main search page filtered for one IMAS and two stakeholder options.
Figure courtesy of the author.

may have already been incorporated into the database to investigate

The result is a simple tool that can be used in multiple ways. The data-

investigation is under way into the potential benefits of adopting a

base was designed to make it easy to develop focused checklists that allow

similar databasing approach to the main instruments of international

mine action managers to identify only those requirements and recom-

humanitarian law that apply to the mine action sector.

any adjustments that may be necessary to accommodate them. Further

mendations specifically applicable to their own organization’s activi-

The team is also working to extend the compliance management

ties, roles, and responsibilities. The extensive, hard-to-define, and often

functionality available through the site to include (1) the ability to save

uncertain topic of “IMAS compliance” is turned into bite-sized chunks

and maintain multiple check lists, e.g., for different country programs,

that contain only the specific text extracts relating to compliance.

projects, and contracts; (2) list sharing, i.e., so that checklist “owners”

Targeted checklists help managers assess their own organization or

can share selected lists with monitors, accreditors, authorities, clients,

project’s degree of compliance quickly and comprehensively. However,

donors, and other members of their own teams; (3) documentation of

checklists are also intended to make it easier for monitors, whether

compliance evidence; and (4) the idea of “smart updates” when users

internal or external, to include questions of IMAS compliance in their

would be automatically notified whenever changes in new editions or

ongoing inspection schedules. Possible extensions of the same appli-

amendments to an IMAS affect any of their saved compliance check

cations to accreditation and contracting processes are clear and have

lists. Fenix hopes to be able to make these additional features available

already been identified by larger potential institutional users and

later this year.
See endnotes page 69

national authorities.
The database approach also allows a user to select a keyword, search
the system, identify relevant entries in IMAS, and then do so again
seconds later for another topic of immediate interest or importance.
Users can approach the entirety of IMAS on a cross-cutting basis from
a thematic perspective. This system has transformed early users’ ability
to interact with IMAS. During meetings, questions along the lines of
“what does IMAS say about…” can now be answered immediately and
follow-on questions about other topics can be addressed just as quickly.
Making it easier to engage with IMAS in practical terms may encourage authorities, operators, and clients to define more clearly what they
mean by IMAS compliance and what they expect from those organizations that wish or are required to demonstrate compliance.
The database is just a tool, albeit a useful tool. As such it has limitations. Firstly, it only contains normative text, so none of the explanatory
or advisory information that makes up much of the material in IMAS is
included.11 Secondly, the system does not provide any guidance (at least
at this stage) on how to demonstrate compliance.

David Hewitson
Fenix Insight Ltd.

David Hewitson has been working in mine
action for almost thirty years. He conducted practical clearance of landmines
in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and
Mozambique establishing and managing
field programs. In 1995, he founded a
commercial demining company and
employed more than 3,000 people in
projects all over the world. He was an early adopter of the ISO
9000 quality management system and has driven implementation of associated environmental and safety management standards. He has drafted IMAS for Land Release, Non-technical
and Technical Survey, Quality Management, and Risk
Management and Monitoring of mine action organizations. As a
director of Fenix, he engages in technical field operations as
well as wider governmental and institutional advisory work.
Before joining the mine action sector, he served in surface
ships and submarines in the Royal Navy. He has a degree in
Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering.
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RE-CONCEPTUALIZING IED CLEARANCE
PLANNING AND DELIVERY IN IRAQ
By Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq ]

E

38

xplosive hazard (EH) clearance comes at a cost and, logically,

EXTENT. Despite the progress made in removing EH from areas

with accountability expected as a quid pro quo both for those

liberated from ISIS after 2017,4 Iraq still remains one of the world’s

conducting and those funding clearance activities.1

most contaminated countries by area 5,6,7 based on its more than 2,500

Today’s accountability problem arguably begins with the recogni-

square kilometers of contaminated land. To place this in perspective,

tion that EH clearance, particularly in complex environments contam-

the International Campaign to Ban Landmines classifies contamina-

inated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), differs radically from

tion in excess of 100 square kilometers as “massive.”8 Add on to this

conventional mine action operations of the past, introducing various

estimate the fact that an estimated 130,000 residential homes in liber-

new factors that influence costs and cost-effectiveness. This, in turn,

ated areas are reported as damaged or destroyed,9 and many of these

begs two questions: “What factors?” and “How are they measured?”

are assessed as likely to contain explosive remnants of war (ERW) or

Hence, before the mine action community can evaluate cost-

IEDs and the true scale of the problem is immense.10 Further, the over-

effectiveness leading to accountability, it must first re-conceptualize

all impact of the level of EH contamination across all economic sectors

clearance itself based on well-documented, current clearance opera-

has yet to be measured. For example, in Ninewa Governate alone, of

tions such as derived from the UNMAS experience in Iraq.

a total of 100 confirmed and suspected hazardous areas (SHA) iden-

Traditional metrics for the measurement of EH generally utilize the

tified in al-Hamdaniya, Baashiqa, and Tilkaif districts, the majority

relationship between square meters of land cleared and items of EH

of SHAs were located in agricultural areas.11 As of 2019, agricultural

removed/rendered safe in the process, irrespective of other factors. The

capacity, the second most important sector of the Iraqi economy after

exclusion of these other factors understates both the complexity of the

oil, remains down 40 percent from pre-ISIS levels.12

clearance problem itself as well as the associated factors that drive costs.

ENVIRONMENT. Within Iraq’s recorded contaminated areas,

This article looks at additional factors, suggesting how the sector might

two types of environments bracket the clearance landscape extremes.

determine their relative value in the scheme of EH clearance costs.

The first concerns the comparatively simple rural environment defined

FACTORS. Based on experience in Iraq, clearance arguably is a

by predictability and consistency. These can comprise IEDs of similar

function of six factors, each contributing to a cost matrix: (1) events

design laid in linear patterns with even spacing to defend a position

leading to contamination; (2) extent of contamination; (3) environ-

from an assault, either surface or sub-surface, in open land typically

ment type; (4) exposure of operators based on device and/or its design;

visible to the naked eye, easily detected with standard gear, and often

(5) experience such as skills and assets appropriate for clearance and

free from unexploded ordnance (UXO), other battle debris, and scrap

safe removal of threats as assessed; and, given that ISIS elements con-

metal.13 Conversely, the second involves the highly-complex urban

tinue to engage in asymmetric attacks on both civilians and security

environment defined by ingenuity and random occurrence. Complex

forces throughout Iraq’s so-called liberated areas, (6) disruption that

environments include a diverse range of IEDs of varied and innovative

adds delay to the cost of operations. The common denominator across

designs, well-concealed with a vertical dimension added, combined

the matrix is the contribution of each factor to time-on-task for those

with high concentrations of UXO, often mixed with debris and within

clearance assets deployed.

collapsed buildings that limit access and maneuverability.14

EVENTS. Given that the mix, amount, location, and concentra-

EXPOSURE. As with the two types of environments, hazards

tion of EH in contaminated areas correspond with conflict phases,

removed and rendered safe in each suggest comparatively low and high

“informed” non-technical surveys (iNTS) as currently conducted

exposure threat levels for operators based on factors such as device type,

by UNMAS Iraq effectively “look back in time” to data collected on

design, condition, amount, as well as potential biological and chemical

design, manufacture, and deployment of weapons consistent with con-

hazards. In simple environments, variants of a single type of crudely

ventional and non-conventional combat tactics, and documentation of

but effectively designed, victim-operated IED (VOIED) predominate,

hostilities, concluding with the present, on-going insurgency.2,3 With

making clearance repetitive. These VOIEDs consist of a 6-10 kg main

this in-depth study of the pre-, event, and post-event phases of con-

charge connected by a detonating cord to one or more high-metal pres-

flict as a guide, UNMAS Iraq works toward an initial “best estimate”

sure plates, and are occasionally fitted with anti-lift devices, a 9-volt

of threat environments by preparing for clearance tasks and required

battery, and a commercially manufactured electrical detonator.15 This

skill sets and mechanical assets.

simple environment reduces the exposure threat to a comparatively
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A Local National Search team clears empty .50 caliber cartridge cases from an area inside the al-Shifa Hospital Complex in West Mosul. This is a ‘Complex 3 Dimensional
Urban Environment.’ Even simple activities like this require a high level of training and oversight to ensure safe conduct and delivery.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.

low level. Conversely, in complex environments, multiple variants of

include air-dropped munitions filled with ammonium nitrate-based

sophisticated, time-, victim-, and command-operated IEDs differ not

explosives, modified 23 mm high-explosive incendiary projectiles for

only by type of initiation but by their design, components, layout, fab-

use as hand thrown and drone dropped weapons, and rockets impro-

rication, charge size, and delivery method, making clearance a bespoke

vised and fitted with chemical warheads sometimes containing low-

task, thereby raising the exposure threat to a high level.

grade mustard gas.18

For example, variants of command-operated IEDs (COIED) can

EXPERIENCE. In response to conditions in Iraq, UNMAS

include both wire and remote-controlled systems, the latter typically

reconstituted its clearance teams into light and heavy versions. Light,

integrating modified, low-cost mobile telephones as arming mecha-

nationally staffed teams are small, highly mobile, lightly-equipped,

nisms, including some with passive infrared (PIR) technology. In one

self-supported, and specialize in spot tasks, and high-risk search

instance, a variant included as many as twenty-two 9-volt batteries

and disposal conducted to international and UN IEDD standards,

to extend the IED’s “life.”16 Other victim-operated designs use nearly

capable of deploying anywhere in the country within 24 hours notice

invisible fishing twine as a trip wire connected to a syringe or toggle

and remaining on site, self-contained for 48 hours, supported by a

switch functioning as triggering devices to close circuits after force is

geographic information system (GIS) and telephone link to off-site

applied. These switches often indiscriminately target, but some anec-

international staff. Heavy teams are area-focused, traditionally larger,

dotal evidence suggests a clear intent on the part of ISIS to target explo-

usually equipped with mechanical assets but have reduced dependence

sive ordnance disposal (EOD) and IED disposal (IEDD) personnel

on international staff. This “new business model” focuses on skill

conducting clearance operations through their placement in the prox-

set development, increased reliance on national staff, and leveraging

imity of other, often more obvious, EH. In addition, the threat level in

international staff as knowledge “multipliers” to maintain standards

complex environments is elevated due to exposure to deceased victims

and reduce costs.19

wearing suicide belts still buried by the hundreds in urban debris, posing biologic as well as explosive threats.17

ELEMENTS. Given that known or suspected contaminated areas
are, by definition, inaccessible until cleared, they remain, de facto,

Concentrations of conventional UXO in both environments

part of an effective ISIS “de-stabilization” strategy, 20 posing a con-

obviously map to the intensity and progression of the fighting and

stant threat to disrupt clearance operations, contaminate new areas,

tactics used by both sides. Conventional UXO threats include ISIS-

and to re-contaminate areas already cleared. Recovery delays work to

manufactured mortars, rockets, projectiles, and grenades comparable

ISIS advantage by perpetuating economic hardship, political unrest,

in quality to ordnance used by coalition forces. Enhanced UXO threats

social strife, and individual anxiety. In one recent, typical month, one
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MEASUREMENT. Traditional measurement of humanitarian mine action (HMA) focuses nearly exclusively on extent
as a factor (i.e., square meters of land physically cleared), with
additional metrics such as the amount, location, and concentration of EH removed/rendered safe in the process routinely
used to supplement report.28 However, this like-for-like comparison between contaminated areas fails to account for those
other factors that contribute to time-on-task: environment
type, exposure of operators to threats by device type and/or
its design, skills, and assets appropriate for clearance and safe
removal of threats as assessed, and security as a function of ISIS
element activity. How then to evaluate cost-effective, efficient,
safe, and timely clearance for Iraq’s varying threat conditions
and complexities?
INDEX. Logically, the more hazardous the EH task, the
more time required for safe clearance, removal, and disposal of
hazards. Hence, the need to calculate the relative “hazardousness” or the potential for a task to cause death, serious harm,

Figure 1. Number of incidents by governorate according to month.
Figure courtesy of Carol Cleary, based on UNDSS data, 1 January - 15 April 2020,
inclusive.
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missions as a direct consequence of “day of ” security reassessments
or authorities’ denial of access to sites attributable to potential ISIS
threats in its areas of operations, thereby adding to overall costs.21
As of early 2020, intelligence agencies see incident trends increasing
(see Figure 1) in the governorates comprising the “disputed areas.” For
example, Ninewa and Salah al-Din show slight decreases for the first fifteen days of April 2020 when compared with the first quarter monthly
averages, while other governorates show an increase. As of January
2020, various intelligence services estimate ISIS strength increasing
over the past 12 months ranging from a low of 5,00022,23 to 10,000 split
between field and sleeper cell elements, 24 to a high of 18,000, 25 highly
concentrated in the so-called liberated or disputed areas (see Figure
2 and Figure 3).26 ISIS’s own data from Nada, the ISIS digital weekly
report, typically trend lower than open-source compilations released
by intelligence and government agencies;27 clearly, contaminated areas

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

compiled for Iraq’s environmental conditions and technical
complexity. Variables impinge upon cost-effective, safe, and
timely EH clearance conducted to IMAS standards. If reliable, such data, when analyzed and indexed, can aid decision
making relating to clearance team composition, structure,
training, and deployment (i.e., assigning teams appropriately
trained for each task) with a net gain of increased team efficiency, team member protection, and better value for money
for the donor.
DATA. To develop its lethality index, 29 UNMAS began
with clearance data from two IED areas: (1) more than 500
IED clearance tasks in Fallujah and environs, indicative of a

of three UNMAS clearance teams deployed had to abort 66 percent of

40

atic measurement of evidence-based threat data, in this case

20 * 36 = 720

Table 1.
All tables courtesy of the author.

work to their advantage as they wage a “war of attrition.”

or damage. Calculating this lethality starts with the system-

simple environment 30 and (2) more than 1,000 IED clearance
tasks in Mosul, indicative of a complex environment, and then

added both the concept of (3) two-dimensional and three-dimensional
search; and then, finally, (4) definitions of urban and rural landscapes
from census methodologies. 31 Through this combination and permutation of the various derived environmental and technical factors (see
Table 2), UNMAS could assign scores consistently for IED locations as
indicated along with their lethality index scoring.
UNMAS next evaluated IEDs recovered in Iraq for impact of their
technical complexities on actual render safe procedures. Scores are
either evidence-based or assessed depending upon whether the lethality index is being used as a predictive or descriptive tool.
PHASES. As stated, time-on-task is a function of clearance conditions and these are directly related to lethality. Based on historical
data for Iraq, the “more lethal” tasks tend to take priority because, in a
post-event environment, clearance of urban sites (which are followed
by rural sites) directly leads to stabilization, reconstruction, and development. 32 While this gives a useful indication of the progression of
likely task types as time progresses in such post-event environments,
it does not describe the actual clearance achieved through those transitioning time periods.

activities in urban areas prioritized;
(2) more open and rural areas often
based on incomplete or inaccurate
hazard data; and (3) open and rural
areas based on a more up-to-date
and accurate hazard database with
the following observations related
to impact of time on clearance: 33
In phase 1, thorough iNTS reports
had already confirmed the presence
of EH prior to teams’ deployment to
task locations. Due to the condition
of many of these sites, including the
presence of collapsed buildings and
rubble, a requirement to use highrisk search teams meant that areas
cleared were relatively small, though
the quantities of EH recovered were
relatively high.
In phases 2 and 3, a shift to more
rural areas saw a rapidly increasing
area of land cleared with an accompanying decrease in items of EH recovered. This again raises the issue of
whether area cleared is an indicator
of efficiency when the data to the contrary indicates clearance environment

Figure 2. ISIL Operational Sectors in Iraq.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Joint Analysis Unit, Iraq.

and complexity as likely drivers. 34
Over time, as the main focus of
clearance activities transitions from
complex urban environments to rural
simple environments and the concentration of contamination decreases,
larger areas searched yield fewer IEDs
rendered safe, suggesting a different set of parameters influences the
devices present. This may specifically
relate to tactical requirements at different stages of hostilities, including
whether used for offense or defense.
Particularly notable when used as a
predictor for the lethality index, data
compiled shows little-to-no evidence
of device degradation over time.
UTILITY. Accepting the evidence
presented thus far, the lethality index
arguably has utility both as a

Figure 3. UNMAS Data from IMSMA and SMART System for 2019.
Figure courtesy of UNMAS Iraq Information Management Unit.

• Descriptor. Given detailed information for a specific clearance

UNMAS analyzed field data for square meters searched as a

location (for example through iNTS reports or previous clearance

function of time to locate and render safe/remove EH for three

activities), the index can generate an evidence-based metric as a

phases of clearance task types: (1) heavily contaminated sites,

basis to manage safety and efficiency by ensuring the most appro-

largely in populated areas and often in support of stabilization

priate assets for the task.
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An improvised directional main charge inal-Shifa Hospital, West Mosul. Similar items were found daisy chained together with detonating cord and connected to victimoperated switches. These types of devices with variable and complex emplacements are typical of ‘Complex 3 Dimensional Urban’ environments.
Image courtesy of UNMAS.

• Predictor. In the preparation of future
Environmental Factors Description

clearance contracts, or prior to moving

Designation

clearance capabilities to new areas, the

Classification

Lethality Index Score

EH landscapes in Iraq may be characterized as:
Rural – Normally open, flat areas which may or may not be cultivated.
Normally free of large quantities of waste or foreign objects. Low
population density.
Urban – Normally developed areas, featuring high concentrations of
buildings, infrastructure and support services. Generally cluttered and
may contain large quantities of waste and/or foreign objects. High
population density.
EH environments in Iraq may be classified by dimension and technical
sophistication:
2-Dimensional (2-D) – EH environments requiring clearance across
surface and depth (sub-surface) planes.
3-Dimensional (3-D) – EH environments requiring clearance across
surface, depth (sub-surface), and vertical (walls) planes.
Simple – Consistent IED placement, location, pattern, relatively easy
to detect; IEDs relatively simple in design in relation to render safe
procedures required. Consequences of accidental initiation during
render safe procedures are manageable.
Complex – Inconsistent IED placement, location, pattern, relatively
difficult to detect; IEDs relatively complex in design in relation to
render safe procedures. Consequences of accidental initiation during
render safe procedures are significant.
A number assigned to denote lethality relative to referent environmental factors, their influence on render safe procedures and associated risk. Scores range from 0 (no lethality) to 10 (extreme lethality).

Table 2.
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lethality index can give a metric to guide the
selection of the most appropriately trained,
structured, and equipped clearance team
based on the expected lethality of the task
location.
PRACTICALITY.

Whether used as a

descriptor or predictor, the lethality index is
computed the same way: the environmental
score is multiplied by the overall total for the
technical factors resulting in a highest possible
score of 720 to reflect the most complex combinations of environmental and technical factors, with a lowest score of thirty-five reflecting
the simplest possible combination of environmental and technical factors. The three following examples drawn from completed UNMAS
IED clearance tasks represent different environments and geographical locations, types,
and quantities of IEDs. A lethality index score
is given based upon a likely predictive score

(see Tables 4–6, predictive scores shown in

Classification

Lethality Index Score

Rural: Open uncultivated land

2-D, simple

1, 2 = 2

Rural: Open cultivated land

2-D, simple

1, 2 = 2

Rural: Open with isolated dwellings

2-D, complex

1, 4 = 4

Urban: Open space

2-D, complex

1, 8 = 8

Urban: Village

3-D, complex

2, 8 = 16

Urban: Fringe of town or city

3-D, complex

2, 8 = 16

Al-Shifa hospital was an ISIS headquar-

Urban: Town or City

3-D, complex

2, 10 = 20

ters, weapons store, and weapon manufac-

italics, shaded column, far right) prior to
the task commencing and a descriptive score
based on the physical evidence gathered during that task.
Example One: al-Shifa Hospital,
West Mosul

turing facility in West Mosul. Close to the
scene of some of the most violent fighting
4,762.49

during the battle to reclaim Mosul. UXO and
IED contamination was extensive, and device
complexity varied from simple to complex
throughout the site.
Example Two: al-Shuhada District,

545.53

676.39

1,049.86

72.97

0.00

185.06

14.50

4,223.25

9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0

al-Maedan district, the hospital also was the
5,962.63

M2/EH Item

7,807.21

Table 3. * The index does not currently consider residential clearance activities.
8,302.42

Environmental Factor

Fallujah
ISIS made significant use of IED obstacle

Jul-18 Aug-18 Sep-18 Oct-18 Nov-18 Dec-18 Jan-19 Feb-19 Mar-19 Apr-19 May-19 Jun-19
Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Figure 4. Square meters searched versus items of EH recovered between Jul 18 and Jun 19.
Figure courtesy of Nathan Williams, Operations Planning Officer, UNMAS Iraq.

belts around the city of Fallujah to defend
against the most likely directional advance
of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in any attempt
to retake the city. IEDs were laid in uniform patterns in many areas—including

Technical
Factor
Switch Type

Description
•
•
•

Design

Distribution

Clutter
Access

Ranges from
• Simple (single switch, single power source, simple main
charge) to
• Intermediate (simple plus anti-handling) to
• Complex (multiple switches, multiple main charges,
remoted power sources, complex anti-handling)

n/a
5

dling devices were located during clearance

Wire = 5
RC = 6
PIR = 10
Simple = 1
Intermediate = 5
Complex = 10

1
2

•

Location freely and easily accessible to search teams and
IED Operator. Clearance site simple to mark and access
control (civilian) is possible
Location congested, severely constrains search
planning and direction, access control is not possible.

1

Clear evidence of aging/weathering of the task location.
Devices likely in place in excess of 12 months
No evidence of aging/weathering of the task location.
Devices in place less than 12 months or may have been
protected

1

IED location obvious, often visible by eye, easily
confirmed with detector
IED location not apparent, not visible by eye, difficult to
locate with detectors

1

•

Table 4. * The index does not currently consider residential clearance activities.

Example Three: Rawa’h, West Anbar
A single suspected IED near a track previously used by ISF on security patrols was
successfully rendered safe after an UNMAS
search team located a suspicious wire. The IED

tional main charges. While the device type

Area free of metallic, other contamination
Area littered, including with metallic objects

•

(approximately 10 percent of total devices).

armed PIR switch connected to two direc-

•
•

•

dard device design. Occasional anti-han-

operator rendered safe a remote-controlled

1
2
3

•

Ease to
locate
Visual

al-Shuhada—almost always using a stan-

IEDs distribution/distributed
• Facilitates easy identification of components
• As part of a defensive belt
• Randomly across an area with no obvious pattern

•
Degradation

Time (not recovered as complete IED)
Victim Operated (most commonly High Metal
Content Pressure Plate)
Command (including wire, RC armed PIR) [for multiple IED,
use highest score]

Lethality Index
Score

3

3

5

was complex, the environment and other technical factors proved “less lethal” as reflected in
the cumulative Lethality Index Score.
Although useful as “stand-alone” metrics,
as cumulative scores paired with IMAS IEDD
skill levels (see Table 7), they become a useful tool to assist in assigning appropriately
trained IEDD operators based upon environmental and technical complexity.
MULTIPLIER. Given the trend in Iraq
toward employment of local national clearance capabilities as a cost-saving strategy, the
index serves as a multiplier by allowing for
assignment of locally staffed teams appropriate for tasks to work independently with the
option of technical oversight and referral via
a telephone thereby (1) leveraging limited
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20

20

Environmental
Factor

Urban: Town or City
3D – complex

Switch Type

5

5

Technical Factor

Design

5

1

Distribution

2

Clutter

1

Access
Exposure/Degradation

Environmental
Factor

Urban: Town or City
3D – complex

Technical Factor

Lethality
Index Score

Ease to Locate
Lethality
Index Score
Cumulative Lethality Index Score

20

20

Switch Type

10

5

Design

10

5

2

Distribution

1

1

1

Clutter

1

1

1

1

Access

1

1

1

1

Exposure/Degradation

3

3

1

1

Ease to Locate

5

5

16

12

31

21

8 * 16 = 128

8 * 12 = 96

Table 5.

Lethality
Index Score

Lethality
Index Score
Cumulative Lethality Index Score

2 * 31 = 62

2 * 21 = 42

Table 6.

Lethality Index Score
0

100

200

300

400

IMAS IEDD Level 3

500

600

700

IMAS IEDD Level 3+ (Advanced)

Qualification & Experience
Table 7.

international technical advisers on a task basis; and, longer term, (2)

such as IMAS IEDD skill levels and related costs, could offer the mine

reducing reliance on international advisors as local team expertise

action community a useful conceptual basis to continue to refine and

develops also on a task basis; and, (3) contributing to an earlier “phas-

develop meaningful and metric based tools that are able to respond to

ing out” of expensive international heavy clearance teams.

the fundamental donor question, “How much should clearance cost?”

BENEFITS. So what does the lethality index offer EH clearance
actors?
First, a clear basis for identifying appropriately trained and equipped
teams for clearance tasks.

for a given environment in a manner more reflective of the true range
of factors affecting clearance.
In response to return on investment, the mine action community in
Iraq still has a need for an economically derived baseline to measure

Second, a tool to identify cost savings early in the procurement

“opportunity cost,” or economic and social gains either conveyed or

cycle particularly related to clearance teams tailored for requirements

deferred as a function of clearance completed versus not completed.

as opposed to technical proposals often written by commercial com-

Arguably, this is the true value of clearance and a separate subject for

panies often based on large EH teams dominated by international

another time.

personnel and a less-than-transparent process sometimes viewed pri-

See endnotes page 70

vately as “less-than-educated guesswork.”
Third, support for the nationalization and development of local
clearance teams by rationalizing the process of training design, training delivery, on-the-job training, and continuing professional development, linking the transition of search and IEDD activities from taught
mechanistic drills to more intuitive skills.
CONCLUSION. Although the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) recognize the need for EH clearance as an
enabler of broader socioeconomic development, funding depends upon
strong arguments supported by data to respond to legitimate donor
concerns related to both value for money and return on investment.
In response to the value for money concern, UNMAS has evaluated
the IED threat in Iraq focusing on a composite measurement of those
environmental and technical factors affecting cost-effective, safe,
timely, optimized clearance done to IMAS standards while considering each as a variable contributing to overall task lethality as a lead
factor determining time-on-task and overall efficiency. Although not
a sine qua non, the lethality index, when coupled with other factors
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SEVENTH MINE ACTION
TECHNOLOGY WORKSHOP

A SPACE FOR INNOVATION
By Arsen Khanyan and Inna Cruz [ GICHD ]

In HMA, UAS are currently used as one of many tools to support
operations to tackle the most important challenge—human safety.
Numerous presentations given during the workshop were testament
to the fact that information gathered from the use of UAS in HMA
adds value across a wide range of different applications in planning,
implementing, and impact-assessing activities.

LESSONS FROM THE FIELD
During the workshop, mine action operators, technology developers, and researchers showed examples of how UAS can support mine
action operations in the field. They presented innovative applications
for close inspection, direct and indirect evidence detection, ground
penetrating radar (GPR) potential, and the use of multispectral and
Attendees listen to presentations at the Seventh Mine Action Technology Workshop in Basel, Switzerland.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.

T

he 7th edition of the Mine Action Technology Workshop,
a biennial event organized by the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), took place

from 7 to 8 November 2019 in Basel, Switzerland. Titled Remote
Sensing and Robotics in Mine Action, the workshop welcomed 165
participants from forty-nine countries, representing eighty-five
organizations.1 It offered a platform to discuss and share ideas and
experiences that promote the efficient use of innovation and technology in humanitarian mine action (HMA).
This unique event is aimed at bringing together mine action professionals, manufacturers, national authorities, operators, and representatives from the United Nations as well as other international
organizations. It focuses on the vital role technological innova-

hyperspectral sensors for evidence records. The workshop also illustrated how HMA organizations are currently using or testing UAS in
their operations.
The HALO Trust presented several case studies where UAS
were being used in mine-affected countries and territories
(Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR,
Somaliland, Sri Lanka, and the West Bank) to support various
mine action activities, such as pre-deployment planning, remote
monitoring of operations, terrain inspection, and impact assessment. The evidence for using UAS in operational planning was also
presented by (MAG) Mines Advisory Group, who have used UAS in
northeast and northwest Cambodia. High-resolution images were
used by MAG for terrain and vegetation analysis to plan task sites
prior to clearance and to provide a better overview for deploying
various mine clearance assets (mechanical, animal, and manual
detection systems).

tion plays in increasing efficiency and effectiveness in emergency
response, humanitarian aid, and development.

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION RESHAPES HMA
Innovation is reshaping HMA, bringing about fundamentally new
and potentially much more efficient approaches to our work. The
changes represent a real opportunity for the mine action sector to
learn about new, more effective, and safer ways of working. For example, remote sensing is now used in mine action, not only to assist in
planning, monitoring, and evaluating clearance operations, but also
to support the land release process and help measure impact.
Initially developed for military purposes, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have rapidly gained traction in civilian sectors, and
increasingly so in humanitarian aid and development assistance.

John Fardoulis of Mobility Robotics and Humanity and Inclusion presents on
drone trials in Chad.
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CATEGORY
Non-Technical
Survey

EXAMPLES
Confirm visible (direct or indirect) evidence of mines,
explosive ordnance or other evidence to identify a suspected hazardous area (SHA)
Confirm evidence of land use to contribute to all reasonable effort for area cancellation
Conduct an assessment of soil, topography, and other
environmental characteristics of SHAs and confirmed
hazardous areas (CHAs)

Operational
Oversight

Other

color and thermal cameras to assist in drawing more precise boundaries of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and assess the environmental
characteristics of SHAs. UAS are also able to more accurately locate evidence that was previously found using other techniques.
The presentation made by the GICHD covered several aspects of
UAS use in mine action and described the UAS module available on

Quality control of data and information

the GICHD e-learning platform. The platform contains case studies

Task planning

that explore how UAS imagery enhances land release activities as well

Mapping of demolition sites/effects and mine lines

as how UAS provide practical advice and guidance on UAS operations.

Cordon enforcement

Post-Clearance

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has been testing UAS in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and in Montenegro since 2018, using red-green-blue (RGB)

Mobility Robotics and Humanity and Inclusion (HI) presented on

Demolition monitoring

the Odyssey 2025 project and discussed their trials in Chad. This proj-

Mapping progress and completion

ect further demonstrated how UAS and remote sensing could be used

Accident investigation

in pre-deployment planning, cartography, and operational research.

Monitoring and evaluation of clearance impact

In particular, it has been demonstrated that an infrared camera was

External communications

able to geolocate anti-vehicle mines buried in sandy soil, thus facilitat-

Damage assessment after unplanned explosions at
munitions sites

ing manual demining activities.
UAS pose multiple challenges for HMA operators, who cite legal

Analysis of current and planned ammunition storage
areas

and regulatory issues as the most common, particularly individual

High-resolution mapping

main challenges are listed in Figure 2.

countries’ UAS regulations and importation/customs restrictions. The

Further spatial analyses
Task prioritization
Figure 1. The demonstrated use of UAS.

Several organizations and research institutions presented their work
on integrated remote sensing technologies:
The project SAFEDRONE, presented by the Counter Improvised

CATEGORY

CHALLENGE/OBSTACLE/RISK

Political

Perception of drones and their usage by criminals
(e.g., ISIS in Iraq)

Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED COE), aims to

Economic

High cost of some of the larger drones

(IED) detection using a high-resolution GPR mounted on board an

Cost of failure

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that is being developed in cooperation

Cost of logistics and support

with the University of Oviedo (Spain). The methodology is based on

Technophobia

a synthetic aperture radar technique, high positioning accuracy (< 2

Local capacity

cm), and a deep and broad processing of signals by means of groups of

Staff turnover within mine action programs (skills/
knowledge loss in programs)

coherent algorithms and artificial intelligence. Field tests of the sys-

Social

Technological

Lack of spare parts in country
Lack of repair facilities
Short flight duration

Legal/
Regulatory

Environmental

develop and test an enhanced system for improvised explosive device

tem are planned to begin in October 2020.
In their presentation on the development and tests of the SeaTerra
unexploded ordnance (UXO) survey drone system, UXO survey and
clearance company SeaTerra summarized the different criteria to keep

Understanding aviation regulations in each country,
which include:
• Import/export permissions;
• Permission for use from local government and
local communities;
• Flight consent from the airspace controlling
authority;
• Awareness of limitations with regards to forbidden areas, maximum altitude levels;
• Licenses and additional permissions required,
depending on each country’s regulations.

in mind when deciding to purchase and use drones; these included price,

Privacy and data protection laws

German universities, to develop a UAV-based system for mine detec-

Lack of technological and operational standards to
guide safe and consistent performance of UAVs in HMA
Soil conditions (which dictate choice of sensors)
Depth of mines and explosive ordnance
Figure 2. Risks and challenges of using UAS in HMA.
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weight/payload, data, stability, sensors, positioning, and battery life.
Cobham Aerospace Connectivity presented their product, Amulet
UAS, a medium-sized UAV that carries a GPR capable of searching for
explosive ordnance (EO) in areas that would otherwise be too highrisk or inaccessible for human deminers.
The Urs Endress Foundation presented on the FindMine project,
which has been running since 2016, in collaboration with Swiss and
tion. The system consists of a multirotor UAV with a ground penetrating synthetic aperture radar2 as its prime sensor for mine localization.
The system will be further developed by integrating additional sensors
and by increasing f lying capabilities in suspect buildings, dense forests, and jungles.

SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLABORATION AND
KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE
Feedback from workshop participants during and after the event
indicate that the Mine Action Technology Workshop will continue
to be crucial for the sector. Workshop attendees emphasized that the
full potential of remote-sensing technologies can only be achieved
through close collaboration between national operators and research
institutions by exactly defining field needs, adapting technology to
field conditions, and testing in the field. One of the main benefits of
such an event is to provide a platform for product developers and
end users to meet and exchange experiences and opinions. This
serves to provide insight into the practicality, limitations, and
A panel discussion on remote sensing and IMAS.

achievements of the various technologies that are being developed
and used to enhance HMA. This is not only on an operational level
but also from an information management, planning, and decision-

Exploration for Humanity, together with Mobile Geophysical
Technologies (MGT), presented the MGT DroneMag5 Landmine
Detection System “Penta Mag” using eight rotors, a coaxial configuration multirotor UAV used for ordnance detection with magnetic

making perspective.
If you have any comments or questions, please contact the GICHD
technology team at technology@gichd.org.
See endnotes page 70

sensors. The Penta Mag system contains five fluxgate sensors3 in horizontal alignment and is particularly developed for use on a multirotor.
RPS Energy Ltd. presented an overview of their remote aerial
multidiscipline survey system that consists of a small unmanned
aircraft fitted with various payloads to collect geodetic, remote sensing, and instrument data sets to aid in the identification of EO. To
assist in the data processing phase, RPS has developed bespoke artificial intelligence software programs that can quickly analyze large
data sets and present their findings as a level-of-certainty percentile.
Ukrainian Multirotor Technologies (UMT) presented the results
of a field study to remotely detect and identify the most common
rocket-launched ordnance, relying on rapid, wide-area scanning by
a UAV-based, microfabricated, atomic magnetometer mounted on a
UMT Cicada-M hybrid-powered UAS platform.
SENSYS presented the MagDrone R4, an ultralight-weight magnetometer survey kit with multiple sensors to allow either large area coverage per flight time or high-resolution area scans. Due to its reduced
weight of less than 4 kg and unique folding mechanisms, SENSYS suggested that it could be used with inexpensive commercial drones/UAVs.

UNIQUE CHALLENGES: URBAN AREAS
The participants of the technology workshop also discussed the
significance of technological innovation in urban areas. Due to
changes in the characteristics and nature of conf licts and widespread use of IEDs in urban areas, traditional clearing operations
have become increasingly difficult in cities. UAS have been used to
check roofs and inside buildings. In this context, the consulting and
engineering firm Tetra Tech presented on the use of UAS in urban
environments and presented UAS trials to address passive infrared
threats in Syrian and Iraqi cities. To help assess the threat inside
the IED-suspected buildings, Tetra Tech employs relatively small
drones that are commonly used in urban areas. Numerous mine
action operators are investigating the use of UAS platforms and sensors during technical survey for IED clearance in urban areas.

Arsen Khanyan
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GICHD
Arsen Khanyan joined the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in 2018. He is currently
working as Programme Officer on
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UNDERSTANDING THE LOGIC
OF REBEL RESTRAINT ON
LANDMINE USE1
By Henrique Garbino [ Uppsala University ]

N

on-state armed groups (NSAGs)2 have become the most

This article aims to enhance the understanding of different incen-

frequent users of landmines and the main drivers of new

tives and dynamics at play on rebel behavior. Insights on this field

landmine contamination. Often portrayed as the “perfect

could inform government authorities, civil-society organizations, and

soldier” due to their low cost, easy availability, and high lethality,

advocacy groups when engaging with NSAGs.

landmines have become the weapon of choice of many rebel groups.
An initial assessment by Geneva Call reported that, in 2005, at least
sixty rebel groups in twenty-four countries had used mines.

In

Previous scholarship has addressed the logic of violence and restraint
for different patterns of violence against civilians, such as indiscrimi-

tives to comply with existing humanitarian norms.6 Engaging them

nate violence, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and gender-based and

in restricting or renouncing the use of landmines remains one of the

sexual violence.12 Similarly, scholars have concentrated on explaining

most pressing practical obstacles toward a mine-free world.

compliance to humanitarian norms, with a focus on child soldiering

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of landmines and other

and the protection of prisoners of war, aid workers, and other catego-

explosive devices varies significantly in the level of restraint exercised

ries of non-combatants. While some scholars have developed theo-

by NSAGs. Some rebel groups indiscriminately lay mines irrespective

retical frameworks that could be generalized to other contexts, only

of potential collateral damage,4 some directly target civilians,7 and

a small number of authors have developed theoretical explanations of

others restrict themselves to command-detonated devices against gov-

rebel restraint on landmine use.13,14 However, meaningfully contribut-

ernment forces.8 Still, some NSAGs have committed to the total ban

ing to the scarce literature on this topic, these authors adopt a rather

on landmines and others engage in mine action activities in one way

narrow measure of restraint as commitment and compliance to a total

or another.9 This wide difference in behavior raises the question: What

ban on landmines.

explains variation in rebel restraint on landmine use?

Inherently indiscriminate weapons, anti-personnel landmines aim

Restraint on landmine use can be divided into two components.

not to kill but maim the enemy, so that the wounded and agonizing sol-

First, landmine use reflects the different categories in which landmines

dier would further consume the enemy’s resources and decrease their

are employed, namely in strategy, type of device, trigger mechanism,

morale. Coupled with its secretive and unpredictable nature, land-

location, frequency, and information-sharing. Second, restraint entails

mines are highly effective in creating a permanent condition of uncer-

the deliberate behavior to restrict the use of violence. Civilians are vic-

tainty and fear. Whether they are placed to directly target civilians or

timized by unrestrained violence either by direct one-sided violence or

are left as remnants of war, landmines can cause significant harm to

by collateral damage from the conflict. Therefore, landmine use should

civilians and disrupt the social fabric of affected communities. In addi-

vary depending on a given NSAG’s restraint behavior.

tion to the physical harm leading to death and permanent disabilities

Significant academic attention has been devoted to the causes and

to survivors, psychological trauma, fear, and stress are widespread in

dynamics of violence against civilians. However, scholars have given

mine-affected populations. Communities also suffer collectively by

much less emphasis on explaining the cases when violence does

restricted access to livelihoods, key infrastructure, water sources, and

not happen, i.e., cases of restraint and compliance to humanitar-

are either forced to move or impeded to return to their homes.15

ian norms. Throughout this article, restraint is defined as deliber-

Given its nature, landmine use considerably differs from other

ate actions limiting the use of violence,11 while compliance takes the

forms of violence against civilians, such as indiscriminate or sexual

meaning of adherence to humanitarian norms, more specifically to

violence. First, landmine use entails significant logistic and coordi-

International Humanitarian Law (IHL).6 Because IHL explicitly calls

nation capabilities. It follows that landmine use should reflect some

for restraint in the use of violence, it is often hard to distinguish the

strategic, rather than opportunistic, reasoning. Second, due to their

two concepts both in practice and in theory. Even though the literature

static nature, landmines bring about geographically localized effects,

on both concepts will be addressed in this section, it is worth noting

meaning that landmines are more likely to affect specific groups

that restraint can be exercised without compliance to humanitarian

depending on where they are placed. Third, most landmines remain

norms, such as when it is addressed only to specific groups.

active long after conflicts have ended, when virtually all mine victims

10
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contrast with state governments, rebels have considerably less incen-
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Variable

Indicators

strategy

type of device
trigger
mechanism
Restraint on
landmine use

location

frequency
markings

direct restraint

Variation

Violence against
civilians

Collateral damage

Level of restraint

nuisance

direct

accepted

low

economic gain

direct

accepted

low

defensive

indirect

accepted

moderate

offensive

indirect

avoided

high

booby-trap

direct

accepted

low

anti-personnel mine

indirect

accepted

moderate

anti-vehicle mine

indirect

avoided

high

victim-activated

indirect

accepted

moderate

command-detonated

indirect

avoided

high

civilian targets

direct

accepted

low

populated areas

indirect

accepted

moderate

military targets

indirect

avoided

high

unpopulated areas

indirect

avoided

high

frequent

indirect

accepted

moderate

sporadic

indirect

avoided

high

unmarked minefields

indirect

accepted

moderate

marked minefields

indirect

avoided

high

terror tactics

direct

accepted

low

no restraint policy

indirect

accepted

moderate

restraint policy

indirect

avoided

high

Table 1. Conceptualization of rebel restraint on landmine use.
All graphics courtesy of the author.

are non-combatants. Accounting for this longstanding and usually

often laid to protect an important source of revenue such as coca crops

delayed effect on civilians requires long-term perspective and strategic

in Latin America or diamond and gold mines in sub-Saharan Africa.

thinking. Fourth, civilians may be either the direct target of mines or

However, in some cases, NSAGs may use landmines to directly extract

the collateral damage of the fighting; however, even in the latter case,

revenues from the population, such as charging road tolls.4 Other

armed groups should have accepted the risk of civilians falling victims

types of mine use that serve no direct military or economic purpose

of their mines.

are sometimes labelled nuisance mining. This strategy has been used

Having said that, existing theories need to be adapted or reframed

to disrupt access to key infrastructure. Landmine use that is aimed

when examining landmine use; but it is first necessary to conceptual-

deliberately at civilians in order to empty territories, deny use of basic

ize what restraint on landmine use is and how it can vary.

facilities, displace communities, isolate regions, or simply spread ter-

Strategy. Factors such as the level of power asymmetry, the phase

ror also falls under this category.4

of the conflict, the extent of territorial control, the availability of land-

Type of device. Landmines may serve different purposes depend-

mines, and the knowledge in producing improvised explosive devices

ing on their main target. The most common types of landmine are

(IEDs) may all influence the strategy behind the use of landmines.

anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, which are respectively designed to

A Geneva Call report identified four main strategies guiding mine

detonate by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.

use, namely defensive, offensive, economic gain, and nuisance mining.4

Although not considered landmines, the so-called booby traps are

In defensive strategies, landmines aim to deter an enemy attack and

explosive devices disguised as otherwise harmless objects. Although

restrict access to particular areas or routes of military value. Among

other types of mines exist, this study is restricted to anti-personnel

NSAGs, landmines are used for defensive purposes or for slowing

and anti-vehicle mines, and booby traps, which are the focus of the

down the movement of enemy troops. Mines may also be laid follow-

main treaties and are arguably more disruptive to civilian life than

ing a defensive rationale for the protection of the group’s constitu-

other types of explosive devices. In this regard, it is implied that rebel

ency, family members, or key individuals.4 Landmines also serve an

groups demonstrate different levels of restraint, depending on which

offensive strategy when their goal is to kill or maim the opposing

type of device is mostly used. The use of anti-vehicle landmines implies

force, such as to block escape routes during ambushes and counter-

a higher level of restraint, while the use of anti-personnel landmines

attacks, or in direct targeting of government forces or individuals.4

and booby traps implies lower levels of restraint.

When employed under an economic gain strategy, mines do not serve

Trigger mechanisms. Mines and other explosive devices can be

any direct military purpose but economic interests. Landmines are

activated by a wide variety of trigger mechanisms, such as pressure,
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pull, tension release, or pressure release.16 In relation to civilian harm,

Taking into account how landmine use relates to violence against

however, what matters most is whether the explosive device is victim-

civilians, and, thus, restraint, Table 1 summarizes the conceptualiza-

activated or command-detonated. Regardless of the exact type of trig-

tion of rebel restraint on landmine use.

ger mechanism, civilians face significantly more risk if the device is
victim-activated, that is, if the device is designed to detonate by the victim only, without any external action. Command-detonated explosive
devices, conversely, are monitored and set off by an operator at a chosen moment, thus avoiding unnecessary collateral damage.16 This does
not mean that command-detonated devices present no risk whatsoever
to civilians, as they can be used to directly target civilians, and, in case
of failing to detonate, they are left as explosive hazards threatening
the population.17 Regarding the use of landmines and other explosives
devices, restraint is thus higher for command-detonated devices and
lower for victim-activated devices.
Location. The location of landmines depends mostly on their
strategic use. However, in comparison with government forces,
NSAGs often have less capacity to lay large quantities of mines,
and, instead of large and coherent minefields, NSAGs tend to place
mines in smaller, more precise locations.18 Rebel groups are also
more likely to deploy landmines more indiscriminately and near
civilian-dense areas.19 It follows that whether landmines are laid in
areas with higher or lower risk to civilians can thus indicate different levels of restraint by rebel groups.
Frequency. The frequency in the use of landmines varies significantly among NSAGs. While some employ mines as their weapon of
choice, others use them only sporadically, given a specific “need” or
context in the conflict.4 Again, frequency may also be subject not to
a specific strategy or policy, but to contextual factors, such as group
capacity, access to landmines, conflict dynamics, among others.
Nonetheless, restraint on landmine use can also be demonstrated by
the frequency that rebel groups lay mines or other explosive devices.
It follows that, without considering other contextual factors, the lower
the frequency of use, the higher the level of restraint.
Information-sharing. When compared to professional militaries,
NSAGs are less likely to follow international marking standards20 for
their minefields.9 For civilians, this means increased risk of inadvertently walking through minefields and increased costs in future mine
clearance. Likewise, rebel minefields usually do not follow conventional patterns.18,19 In 2006, at least thirty NSAGs had engaged in some

EXPLAINING VARIATION IN RESTRAINT ON
LANDMINE USE
Current theories on restraint range from rationalist to sociological
approaches. In one instance, restraint may be the product of a rational
examination of different economic, political, and military interests.
Armed groups consider factors such as reputation with their constituency and other stakeholders (e.g., international community), as well
as the military advantage of having certain weapons or employing
tactics.23 Alternatively, restraint may be influenced by organizational
factors, such as military culture, and both formal and informal socialization mechanisms.24 Recent research found that NSAGs’ behavior
towards violence or restraint is the product of their sources of authority, beliefs, traditions, and the group members themselves.11 Finally,
contextual factors could lead to a lesser exercise of violence but not
necessarily mean genuine restraint. Because this study is ultimately
intended to understand the reasons of restraint, it is important to point
to what restraint is not.

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Not all NSAGs are able to employ landmines, and reduction in landmine use does not mean genuine restraint was employed. A common
example is the seasonal use of landmines, which are only seldom laid
during winter due to frozen soil and heavy snowfall.25 The systematic
use of landmines requires significant logistic capability and group
cohesion; therefore, an NSAG with decreased group capacity could
display reduced use of landmines.11 Likewise, decreased access to landmines and other explosive components, as well as technical expertise
in production of handmade mines or IEDs, will limit landmine use.
Finally, landmine use may be reduced due to evolving conflict dynamics, as NSAGs experiencing major victories are more likely to reduce
landmine use.4 Unrestrained behavior may also be subject to other
dynamics, even if the rebel leadership is committed to limit the use
of violence. Reasons for unrestrained behavior and noncompliance
include conflicting military training and doctrine, 26 absence of political
training, 27–30 and problems in leadership and command and control.31

kind of information-sharing or mine risk education to affected communities.9 Therefore, restraint on landmine use is reflected by whether

procurement

minefields and mined areas are marked, and on how information
about them is recorded and shared.

manufacture

Direct restraint. In addition to restraint in relation to the use of

logistics

landmines, direct forms of restraint can also be found on the non-use
of landmines. Direct restraint can be exercised by rebel groups in codes

transportation

of conduct, internal policies, trainings, and doctrines, as well as in unilateral declarations and ceasefire or peace agreements. For example,

technical expertise
weather

mentions the duty to inform civilians of the location of mined areas.

group cohesion

Conversely, some rebel groups might not formally restrict their use of
landmines but do so in practice. Other groups, however, might use
landmines and other explosive devices in a virtually unrestrained way.

50

contextual factors

the Colombian National Liberation Army’s code of conduct explicitly
21,22
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storage

conflict dynamics
Figure 1. Contextual factors influencing reduction in landmine use.

STRATEGIC INCENTIVES
Although seemingly counterintuitive, landmine use may inflict significant military and economic costs on rebels. First, rebels are constantly victimized by their own mines, either during the production of
improvised devices, when laying landmines, or unwillingly activating
them after they have been laid. NSAGs largely underreport their own
casualties due to the rebels’ interests in portraying the image of a professional and cohesive group. However, the National Democratic Front
in Myanmar stated that up to 80 percent of its handmade mine manufacturers died when assembling improvised landmines. 32 Likewise, the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s Army (SPLM/A) is believed to
have suffered significant casualties from their own mines. 33 In these
cases, exercising restraint on landmine use is a matter of safety and
morale for the rebel group’s own ranks, continuity of operations, and
the group’s very survival.
Second, particularly in the cases where NSAGs hold control of
territory, using landmines in the land rebels are fighting for entails
an inherent contradiction, as mine contamination and future mine
clearance might be excessively costly. 34 Furthermore, NSAGs may be
economically dependent on the revenues of the land, in which case
denying access to it with landmines would decrease their revenues.
Thus, it is expected that rebels would avoid contaminating productive
land in their own territory.
A second category of strategic incentives of restraint are political
and reputational costs. Landmine use can influence how NSAGs are

Likewise, compliance with IHL may ensure practical and legal securities to rebels, in particular to the leadership, such as granting the
legal status of combatants and reciprocity in treatment by government
forces.6 Accordingly, a recent study led by Gleditsch shows that decisions to commit to a landmine ban, by both governments and NSAGs,
are mutually dependent.13 Likewise, Fazal and Kovaev have demonstrated that militarily strong groups seeking international recognition are more likely to commit to a landmine ban.14,43 Their argument
focuses on reputation costs and benefits of compliance to international
norms in comparison to the military utility of landmines and other
methods of war.
Similarly, rebel leaders may fear criminal indictment for ordering
the use of anti-personnel landmines. A report has found that rebel
groups are more likely to exert restraint on landmine use in countries
where the use of landmines and other similar victim-activated explosive devices has been criminalized by domestic law.4 The effectiveness
of criminal justice in fostering compliance, however, is still debated.44
It is worth noting that the aforementioned strategic incentives
are interconnected. Political and reputational costs may have direct
impact on material support from both the rebel group’s constituency
and domestic and international audiences, thus compounding to military and economic costs. Similarly, decreased military efficiency could
lead to decreased political support.

MORAL INCENTIVES

perceived by their constituency and other domestic and international

Restraint may also derive from genuine commitment to humanitar-

audiences. Civilian support has long been considered a central deter-

ian principles, whether they are based on humanitarian norms or the

minant of civil war outcomes, 35 as civilians provide recruits, food,

group’s own values, beliefs, and traditions.

information, and safe hiding places. It follows that dependence on

Indiscriminate violence is condemned in virtually all cultures,

civilian support creates restraint on the level of one-sided violence, 36

so it is expected that armed groups should avoid unnecessary civil-

as well as incentives to protect the armed group’s constituency. 37

ian casualties, unless otherwise justified. Moral obligation has been

Under a similar logic, de la Calle38 argues that civilian victimization

found to influence decision-making even over material costs and stra-

is driven by rebel strength, in the sense that weaker rebels would seek

tegic interests.45

civilian support.

Sanín and Wood explore the ideology of shaping rebel violence

Furthermore, local communities are particularly vulnerable to

and restraint,46 and find that specific ideological and religious moti-

landmines and other explosive devices. An NSAG in Myanmar, for

vations can further influence increased restraint and compliance to

instance, has allegedly changed their mine use policy after realizing

humanitarian norms.47 The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (com-

that up to 30 percent of mine victims came from the rebels’ own eth-

monly referred to as the Taliban), for instance, officially considered

nic group. 32 As a direct consequence of victimization by landmines,

the use of landmines “an un-Islamic and anti-human act,” which

local communities could decrease support to the armed group. 34 It is

“would be punished in accordance with Islamic Law.”48 Similarly, the

possible that the affected communities would demand the NSAGs to

Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Buncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB)

restrict their use of landmines and demine certain areas, as observed

and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party of the Philippines issued a joint

in Colombia 39 and Senegal.40

statement renouncing the use of landmines on ideological grounds.49

Civilian victimization also entails significant reputational costs

Restraint may also be driven by interaction with potential victims.

to other domestic and international audiences, particularly towards

In Colombia, rebel groups oftentimes voluntarily marked mine areas

human rights-conscious audiences.6 Abiding to a shared legal frame-

or engaged in mine clearance to preserve the communities where they

work—such as international law—plays in favor of rebel groups’ per-

operated. Arguably, genuine interest in protecting civilians from the

ceived political legitimacy. Exercising restraint on landmine use,

effects of landmines comes from ethnic and family ties, as well as con-

therefore, entails compliance to international (and sometimes domes-

tinued interaction with the communities. 39

tic) law

and could increase the likelihood of external support,

Knowledge and acceptance of IHL may also genuinely lead to

political participation, and leverage in negotiations. As an example,

restraint on landmine use. Practitioners have found that sustained

Herr found that SPLM/A adhered to the landmine ban due to transna-

engagement with NSAGs, in particular through education and

tional pressure and fear of legitimacy loss.

awareness of humanitarian norms, constitutes an important step

6,19,41

42
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during manufacture

own casualties
economic and military costs

during operations and movements
future clearance costs

land use

dependence on agriculture

strategic incentives

status of combatants

legal securities

expectation of reciprocity
possibility of criminal indictment

political and reputational costs

constituency

restraint on
landmine use

decreased legitimacy

domestic audiences
international audiences

respect to humanitarian norms

moral incentives

knowledge and acceptance of international humanitarian law
respect for human life

values, beliefs, and traditions

religion
ideology

Figure 2. Influencing factors for restraint on landmine use.

towards restraint on landmine use. 50 State and non-state armed
actors alike often lack long-term perspective on the humanitarian
consequences of their own actions, hence the change in behavior
after engaging with human rights and humanitarian norms advocates. 51 In Myanmar, for instance, the Karen National Union, a rebel
group and landmine user, agreed to cooperate with mine action
organizations after a series of meetings conveying the relevance of
international humanitarian law. 50

FUTURE RESEARCH
In recent years, rebels have been the most prolific users of landmines; however, little has been studied on what drives NSAGs to exercise restraint on landmine use. This study has sought to identify and
map possible explanations for this variation. Future research should
measure this variable in different conflict contexts and focus on indepth case studies and process tracing analyses in order to identify the
mechanisms at play in each case. Likewise, future propositions should
account for interaction effects between the different influencing factors
of restraint on landmine use.
Although this article offers no conclusive answer on how to engage
rebels in the landmine ban, it has highlighted possible influencing
factors leading to restraint. Relevant to policymakers and practitioners, it offers potential entry points and avenues for future dialogue. It remains the task of researchers, policymakers, and practitioners alike to enhance the understanding of rebel motivations to stop
using landmines, and, most importantly, act upon them.
See endnotes page 70
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DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE
NATIONAL TRAINING CAPACITY:
NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY
TRAINING IN COLOMBIA
By Marc Bonnet, Helen Gray, and Giulia Matassa [ GICHD ]

I

n January of 2014, the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted its first nontechnical survey (NTS) training course in Colombia with the

objective of enabling participants to plan and conduct NTS. At the

done in NTS,” as stipulated by IMAS. The scope of the work was set by
the assumptions and knowledge that
•

out by the Humanitarian Demining Battalion9 (BIDES at the

time, however, Colombia had the second highest number of landmine
accidents in the world,1 with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) producing explosive ordnance (EO) “mostly in the form of victim-activated
improvised explosive devices.”2 Descontamina,3 the National Mine
Action Authority (NMAA), planned for fulfilling its Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) commitments, and national dialogue
was initiated on a Plan de Choque, “a plan of action” (i.e., 2014-2016
Humanitarian Demining Action Plan) that would highlight the role of
NTS in assessing the contamination of high-priority areas, which at the
time were determined through analysis conducted by the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).4
In its 2014-2016 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan, the
Colombian government presented5 NTS as the initial step in
Colombia’s humanitarian demining efforts.6 Descontamina, also
backed by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
Colombia,7 argued that NTS as an initial “intervention” would not
only inform technical survey (TS) and clearance but also bring clarity in determining the extent of the country’s mine contamination.
The 2014-2016 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan also called
for national ownership through increased national investment of
humanitarian demining activities, as well as cooperation as part of a
collective project to strengthen national capacities.
In line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Land
Release 07.11, Colombia’s National Mine Action Standards (NMAS)
had recently been updated.8 Moreover, a growing number of civilian
organizations had been accredited and were beginning operations,
while an increased number of requests for additional international
support were being issued. With the increased need and demand for
high quality land release, it became apparent that NTS required invest-

Humanitarian demining activities in 2014 were largely carried
time, now BRDEH).

•

Civilian organizations were being accredited and starting their
operations, requiring training for newly-recruited staff.

•

Over half of the clearance tasks were completed with no identified EO; thus improving NTS was identified as a priority.

Colombia’s expressed need for NTS training was reflected in the
2014-2016 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan, specifically addressing the need to increase national capacity (understood as the capacity
of the BRDEH10) and expand humanitarian demining operations by
civilian organizations.11
Having set the scope and aims of the NTS trainings, informed by
national needs, and requests from Descontamina, the GICHD conducted five courses between January 2014 and December 2016. A
Colombia-specific Spanish NTS package was developed and adapted
from the annual GICHD Global NTS course package. The courses
sought to engage mine action personnel to not only promote good
practices but also create a space for the sharing of experience and
transfer of knowledge. The curriculum for these initial Colombian
NTS courses also introduced the train-the-trainer (TTT) component
in order to sustain capacity over the long term.

THE NTS TRAINING PROJECT: DEVELOPING A
SUSTAINABLE CAPACITY
By the end of 2016, Colombia entered a new political phase with
the government signing a peace agreement12 with the FARC-EP13 after
five decades of internal conflict. Colombian humanitarian demining entities—sixteen civilian organizations14 and BRDEH—faced a
unique opportunity both to reinitiate discussions at the national level
on how to address Colombia’s aspiration to build a group of national

ment through training.

trainers and also to empower national NTS staff to positively contrib-

THE START OF THE NTS TRAINING PROJECT

sector. This was led by Descontamina, which re-emphasized its com-

ute to the development of the Colombian humanitarian demining

At Descontamina’s request, GICHD initiated the NTS training proj-

mitment to “build a technical and organizational capacity in humani-

ect. The initial stages of the training project, between 2014 and 2016,

tarian demining to allow an adequate response and promote Land

aimed to lay the foundations for increased NTS knowledge, focusing

Release”15 in its 2016 Action Plan. Similarly, in its 2016-2021 Strategic

on closing the gap between “what is done in NTS” and “what should be

Plan, Descontamina acknowledged the need to apply “all reasonable
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effort to identify, define and remove any contamination or suspicion
of APM and UXO.”16
In answer to solicitations from Descontamina, a preliminary process was drawn up that would not only focus on increasing NTS
national capacity but also build a group of national trainers that could
lead future national NTS trainings. The development of a sustainable
national capacity would allow “National actors [to] take control and
command over project/programme activities and … translate [policy]
commitment[s] into effective actions”17 without long-term international and GICHD support.
To promote national ownership and sustainability, the GICHD
invested time and effort to ensure course participation across organizations. By proactively enforcing quotas for all organizations,
dialogue was ensured among national stakeholders on NTS good
practices, requiring gender balance and diversity of experiences
and backgrounds, and ensuring Descontamina’s involvement in the
training itself. Moreover, pre-course tests were used to assess the

mit knowledge that can generate high public recall).
In November 2018, the five national trainers, comprising one
woman and four men, led the first fully nationally-led NTS course
with the support of a GICHD advisor for internal monitoring.
Descontamina’s NMAS advisor and the Colombian expert organization conducted external monitoring to assess the trainers’ ability to
pass on knowledge. Twenty-two participants attended the course—
seven women and fifteen men—all of whom successfully passed. In
November 2019, the five national trainers independently conducted
another NTS course with fifteen participants, comprising four women
and eleven men, at the CCCM training grounds in Algeciras, Huila,
Colombia, where GICHD involvement was limited to observing the
final part of the training.

VALUE OF THE NTS TRAINING PROJECT AND
NEXT STEPS

understanding of NTS and set baselines to, as stipulated in IMAS

In Colombia, NTS courses have been opportunities to promote

06:10 Management of training, “establish objectives for the train-

good practices and encourage the development of Colombia’s national

ing…design session plans; and decide on a method for evaluating and

capacity by gradually decreasing external support and increasing

testing the training.” At the start of the course, trainers and train-

Colombian participation in the training process. Six years from the

ees set objectives. These objectives were also used at the end of the

start of initial NTS courses in Colombia, a new generation of NTS

course to promote “an after-project vision on how results [could] be

surveyors emerged, collectively working to gather high-quality data

sustained”19 and how impact could be measured. Underlining this

for efficient and effective land release operations, and strengthening

was the principle that training did not end once the certificates were

national capacities through the training of new personnel and retrain-

handed over but was part of building a “conversation” on good prac-

ing of existing personnel.

18

tices across the sector.

As many trainees become national trainers and trainers within

This renewed Colombian national capacity project began with the

their own organizations, their understanding of NTS increases and

2014–2016 courses as a means of supporting Colombia’s initial need for

is reinforced. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the sum of the number

high-quality land release through effective survey, which truly started

of NTS conducted between 2014 and 2018 varied, and this can be

in October 2017 with GICHD organizing an NTS course that included

attested to changes in the internal security situation affecting access

all organization and operators. This course was the first to be co-led

to various Colombian departments, the implementation of activities,

by a Colombian national trainer with extensive survey experience and

and the change in the number of accredited operators. Nevertheless,

promoted rapid learning; continual improvement; and the transfer

the steady decrease in the ratio of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)

of knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSA) required to carry out NTS.

registered during NTS is of particular interest as it reaches an all-

With twenty-six participants, including nine women and seventeen

time low of eight percent in 2018. The percentage of reported SHAs

men, representing eleven national and international operators and

from NTS tasks could result from several factors: an improving NTS

organizations working in Colombia, the foundations were laid for a

methodology due to a higher confidence in identifying evidence that

new cohort of mine action practitioners with the potential of imple-

would result in an SHA designation; or the cancellation of previously-

menting high-quality NTS.

reported SHAs, which may be the product of the collaborative NTS

To build on the 2017 NTS course, a NTS course with a TTT compo-
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necessary verbal and non-verbal communication to effectively trans-

project that occurred over the past few years.

nent was conducted in July 2018 in Villavicencio, Meta, Colombia. The

As a promoter of cooperation at the national level, the NTS training

course participants focused on building KSA to deliver a NTS course,

project has informally created a sense of cooperation in a sector that has

by designing, developing, and preparing lesson plans and practical

at times worked in silos. In the most recent NTS course, many partici-

exercises. Of the eleven participants, five students from five different

pants claimed that “the only difference between each one of us is the color

organizations, including the BRDEH, The HALO Trust, the Colombian

of our uniform,” and regardless of organization, the purpose of each par-

Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), Humanity and Inclusion (HI),

ticipant’s work is the same: to work toward a Colombia free from mines.

and Danish Demining Group (DDG), were selected as national trainers.

Increased informal cooperation and dialogue between the trainers and

In an effort to qualify the national trainers, a Colombian exter-

trainees has translated to increased inter-organizational communica-

nal expert organization specializing in adult learning was hired to

tion, which should also involve Descontamina, as the promoter, regula-

strengthen their abilities in transferring the TTT and KSA for NTS. It

tor, and coordinator of mine action activities within the country.

is worth noting that the TTT component builds on strengthening hard

The five national trainers will require the utmost support from

skills (technical knowledge) and soft skills (the ability to develop the

Descontamina. As an international center, the GICHD has invested
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Figure 1. Overview of reported SHAs from NTS tasks from 2011 to 2018. 20
Figure courtesy of Descontamina and GICHD.

time and expertise in strengthening the individual capacity of the five
national trainers and the seventy-five participants (twenty-five women
and fifty men), who have been trained since 2017.
GICHD’s role will now be to engage with Descontamina to first
formalize the NTS national trainers’ group by directly engaging in a
dialogue with the trainers, and second, to promote them as a new set
of national specialists and stakeholders who can contribute to national
discussions on NTS. It is key to recognize national trainers at a national
level and to develop a joint plan and timeline to define roles, responsibilities, and capacity needs in the handover of the NTS training
project. These steps will help ensure that this investment remains longstanding, sustainable, and impactful for the Colombian mine action
community. This would in parallel support Colombia’s commitment in
its 2016-2021 Strategic Plan for “all reasonable effort to identify, define
and remove any contamination or suspicion of APM and UXO.”21
Having gained the experience of implementing such a project in
Colombia over the past six years, it is GICHD’s—and by extension
the mine action community’s—responsibility to promote such TTT
projects in other countries and regions, so that national specialists
emerge as training and national capacity is developed. This project
is also relevant across other subject matters to promote good practices, address national needs, and ensure effective and efficient land
release operations.
See endnotes page 71
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U

nguided Multiple Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) systems

contamination occurs over a wide area, the dimensions of which are

are limited-accuracy, high-impact artillery systems meant

determined by the ballistic trajectory of the MBRL barrage.

to deliver barrages of explosive warheads across a wide area

Electromagnetic induction (EMI) and magnetometry surveys

of attack. High rates of failure of MBRL rockets on impact and their

remain robust and widely applied tools of landmine and UXO muni-

wide area of ballistic dispersion result in a long-term unexploded ord-

tions detection and classification in humanitarian demining work.

nance (UXO) concern across large areas where these systems have been

Landmine clearance protocols adapted by demining NGOs and vari-

deployed. We field tested a newly-developed UAV (unmanned aerial

ous state demining services largely rely on EMI instruments, which

vehicle)-based aeromagnetic platform to remotely detect and iden-

have demonstrated high effectiveness in the detection of large metallic

tify unexploded 122 mm rockets of the widely-used BM-21 MBRL.

landmines and shallowly-buried UXO.5 Despite their high sensitivity,

We developed an algorithm that allows near real-time analysis, map-

traditional EMI surveys are known to be less effective against deeply-

ping, and interpretations of magnetic datasets in the field and, as a

buried UXO objects, both in wide-area surveys, and in the presence

result, rapid identification of anomalies associated with both surfaced

of metallic debris.6 Recently, low-altitude total field magnetometer

and buried MBRL items of UXO. We tested a number of sensor con-

(TFM) surveys conducted from helicopters demonstrated significant

figurations and calibrated the system for optimal signal-to-noise data

potential in their ability to successfully detect areas of landmine and

acquisition over varying site types and in varying environmental con-

UXO concentrations.7 Early versions of these systems were composed

ditions. The use of automated surveying allowed us to significantly

of three cesium vapors magnetometers with 6 m spacing mounted on

constrain the search area for UXO removal or in-place destruction.

one forward and two lateral booms, and carried by a Bell 206 Long

The results of our field trials conclusively demonstrated that imple-

Ranger helicopter platform.8 While demonstrating encouraging results

mentation of this geophysical system significantly reduces labor and

in wide-area UXO detection, an inherent limitation of a helicopter-

time costs associated with technical assessment of UXO-contaminated

based system is its high cost of operation and electromagnetic noise

sites in post-conflict regions.

from the rotor of the aircraft.9

INTRODUCTION

wide-area assessment of UXO presence is particularly important.

Self-propelled MBRL systems have become a familiar sight on the
modern battlefields since their widespread use and adaptation during the Second World War. Their ability to deliver a massive barrage
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In the specific scenario of MBRL-generated UXO, the need for rapid
Traditional methods of UXO detection and remediation are largely
inapplicable. Demining surveys based on electromagnetic principles
can easily locate the largely metallic MBRL UXO, yet the costs of

of high-explosive rockets over a wide target area and quickly change

these surveys over wide areas are largely prohibitive in post-conflict

firing position to avoid counter-battery fire has largely driven their

developing countries. Additionally, MBRL rounds may impact the

continued use across conflict regions.1 Perhaps the most widely rec-

soil at a high angle, penetrating the ground and burying the UXO at

ognized MBRL is the Soviet-designed BM-21 Grad (Hail), capable of

a depth beyond the effective range of EMI systems, further complicat-

firing forty 122 mm rockets in less than a minute (Figure 1A). Since

ing their detection and identification. Finally, because contaminated

its introduction into service nearly five decades ago, this system has

areas inherently contain a mix of MBRL UXO items and fragments

become the most widely used artillery system in the world.2 Despite

of exploded MBRL rounds, large amounts of small metallic debris

their widespread use and perceived effectiveness as a weapon of war,

greatly increase the rate of false flags and further slow the process of

the BM-21 and similar systems are notorious for their relatively low

wide-area UXO remediation. Attempts to complement or substitute

accuracy and high rates of ammunition failure on impact. Specifically,

terrestrial time-domain electromagnetics (TDEM) and TFM surveys

available estimates suggest that MBRL rounds fail to detonate at a rate

with other geophysical methods targeting wide-area UXO detection

of about 15 percent,3 and, depending on the state of ammunition and

and classification had limited success. Seismic and acoustic methods,

soil characteristics of the impact site, the “dud rate” may exceed 30 per-

as well as surveys focused on gravimetry have had limited applicability

cent.4 A combination of MBRL systems’ high failure rate and large tar-

and have largely been discarded as viable methodologies of landmine/

get areas generates a particularly difficult UXO scenario, where UXO

UXO detection and classification.10 Likewise, ground penetrating
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Figure 1. (A) BM-21 MBRL on a truck platform. (B) UMT Cicada-M hybrid UAV hexacopter platform equipped with a suspended Geometrics MFAM magnetometer in a
UMT MagPike protective case. (C) BM-21 122 mm rocket with indicated length dimension in red.

radar (GPR) surveys have found limited use in large-area UXO surveys, with direct applicability only in small-scale UXO discrimination
and identification surveys.

11

We present results of a proof-of-concept study focused on developing and field testing a wide-area, UAV-based aeromagnetic survey system to detect unexploded BM-21 122 mm rockets that could be applied
to similar and larger-caliber MBRL UXO. Our results indicate that
characteristic magnetic anomalies associated with the 122 mm metal
casing of the BM-21 MBRL rounds (Figure 1B) register considerably
above background levels, both at the surface and up to 10 m aboveground elevation. We further determine that a detection altitude of 3 m
is optimal in terms of avoiding low vegetation interference, naturally filtering out clutter noise, while recording meaningful magnetic
data at an optimal signal-to-noise ratio. Finally, we demonstrate that
this method allows us to distinguish between exploded and unexploded BM-21 rounds, allowing us to direct and prioritize UXO

field being measured. Atomic precession frequency and, by extension,
the magnetic field may be determined to very high precision and sensitivity (pT). Critically, TFMs, such as the recently-released MicroFabricated Atomic Magnetometer (MFAM) by Geometrics, record
magnetic field magnitude and, unlike vector magnetometers, provide
measurements largely insensitive to orientation and vibration. This
allows TFMs to be used in aerial geophysical object search surveys,
and their small mass allows them to be mounted on commerciallyavailable multirotor UAV platforms.14
In parallel with magnetometer sensor miniaturization, commercial multirotor UAVs have become a common sight in recent years.
However, most multirotor UAVs remain powered by lithium-ion (LiI)
and lithium-polymer (LiPo) batteries, which—due to their weight—
provide a restriction on both payload and flight time. Currently, the
average flight time for a commercially available hexacopter, with a
payload of less than 3 kg, ranges from 15 to 25 minutes, and this time

clearance efforts.

further drops in colder temperatures of operation. This flight dura-

UAV-BASED MAGNETIC SURVEY SYSTEM

or coarse scanning over a wide area,16 is prohibitive when wide-area,

tion, while largely acceptable for dense surveying of a confined area,15

Advances in UAV technology coupled with successful efforts to min-

high-precision scanning is required. Critically, in applications related

iaturize TFMs allow for a unique opportunity to test a UAV-mounted

to landmine/UXO detection, densely-spaced, low-altitude magnetic

system for wide-area, high-resolution magnetic surveys targeting

surveys are needed to provide sufficient sampling to allow for analysis

UXO detection. Driving this development is the recent commercial

of relatively small metallic objects.

availability of lightweight, low-power consumption, laser-pumped

One solution to extend UAV survey time is the use of a hybrid

atomic TFMs,12,13 which record the precession frequency of atoms in

UAV power module with a gas-powered engine powering an electric

a magnetic field. An atom’s magnetic moment processes around the

generator that provides uninterrupted electric power to the UAV.

magnetic field vector, with a frequency proportional to the magnetic

For this study, we relied on the hybrid gas-electric UMT Cicada-M
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Figure 2. Design (A) and results (B) of a vertical magnetic sensitivity test.

hexacopter (Figure 1C), manufactured by Ukrainian Multirotor
Technologies. Due to the combined 2 kW power module, this UAV
is able to stay in the air considerably longer compared to traditional
electric drones powered by LiI and LiPo batteries. With a payload of
3 kg, the Cicada-M remains in the air for a maximum flight time of 150
minutes, significantly extending useful survey time needed for highresolution magnetic acquisition. Critically, the Сicada-M is equipped
with RTK GPS modules allowing autonomous, low-altitude data collection along densely-spaced grid lines. Increased instrument sensitivity, coupled with low flight altitudes, higher survey density, and
extended flight times offered by the hybrid UAV platform allow identification of anthropogenic targets previously only identifiable in ground
magnetometer surveys.
We designed an experimental program to address four central questions, all meant to assess the overall viability of using a hybrid UAVMFAM platform to conduct wide-area magnetic surveying:
1. Is the MFAM impacted by the magnetic field generated by the
hybrid engine or UAV rotor operation?
2. What is the vertical sensitivity of the MFAM to a magnetic
anomaly generated by an unexploded BM-21 122 mm rocket and
what are the optimal survey parameters for wide-area scanning
for this type of UXO?
3. How does the spatial orientation the BM-21 UXO and its depth
of burial impact its resolvable magnetic signature?
4. Can an intact, unexploded BM-21 122 mm rocket be discerned
from metal debris resulting from the detonation of the same
projectile in a blind field trial?
We designed a controlled experiment to address each of these ques-

generated by the operation of the gas-powered engine and powerful
electric rotors of the Cicada-M UAV. We proceeded to measure the
minimal vertical separation of the MFAM unit, encased in a protective UMT MagPike ballistic foam case, from the UAV base. For this
experiment, as well as all subsequent surveys, sensors of the MFAM
were oriented in opposing north-south alternating directions, recording the magnetic field gradient to allow for faster in-field processing
of the datasets. We determined that depending on the throttle of the
engine, magnetic interference from the engine dissipated beyond the
limit of detection at vertical separation of 1.7–2.4 m, with 1.7 m correlating to the lowest engine RPM and 2.4 m correlating to the highest RPM allowed by the engine. For all subsequent trials, we used a
vertical separation of 4 m, suspending the MFAM acquisition system
using three soft non-magnetic cords attached to the propeller beams
of the UMT Cicada-M (Figure 2). In all subsequent trials, we did not
witness detectable magnetic interference correlating to engine or rotor
operations (regardless of throttle levels), allowing us to conclude that
a properly-configured hybrid Cicada-M UAV platform is suitable for
accurate magnetic surveying.
In the second experiment, we sought to establish the vertical sensitivity of the UAV-mounted MFAM unit to a magnetic anomaly
generated by a single, unexploded BM-21 rocket and define optimal
surveying parameters to target this type of UXO. For this experiment,
we used a 3-m concrete-filled pipe, similar in mass, length, and metal
content to a composite BM-21 122 mm rocket, commonly consisting
of the projectile and a metal fragmentation coil wrapped onto the
inner wall of the round (Figure 2A). The simulated UXO was oriented

tions and present our results in the next section.

east-west on a concrete pad away from other similarly-sized metallic

CONTROLLED SITE TRIALS

ally guided to the center of the simulated UXO and proceeded to rise

Prior to beginning targeted surveying, it was necessary to establish
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the sensitivity of the MFAM unit to the magnetic interference fields
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objects. The UAV system carrying the attached MFAM unit was manuvertically at a rate of 1 m/s to a total altitude of 34 m above ground. We

Figure 3. Magnetic intensity map of inert simulated UXO in a controlled field trial site with letters on the map matching the position and type of the planted object.
These inert munitions included a BM-21 MBRL 122 mm rocket (A), a SA 22 type anti-aircraft missile (B), and a solid metal core 152 mm artillery shell (C).

present results of the second experiment in Figure 2B, where the horizontal axis represents time and the vertical axis records total magnetic
intensity. As anticipated, the magnetic anomaly was most pronounced
directly above the simulated UXO, and its intensity dissipated at a
geometric progression until fully disappearing at an altitude of about
20 m above ground level (AGL).

traverse spacing, and 3-m/s acquisition speed. The speed of acquisition
can be further increased up to 10 m/s if the GPS timestamp frequency
is increased to match that of MFAM sampling density.

CONTROLLED FIELD TRIALS
Following controlled site testing and optimization of UAV survey

Following the vertical sensitivity test, we proceeded to conduct a

parameters in a relatively small contained area, we proceeded to con-

number of additional UAV flights over a controlled area, seeking to

duct a series of field trials to determine if automated UAV aeromag-

determine optimal survey parameters that allow us to highlight the

netic surveys over larger areas would successfully detect inert MBRL

presence of the simulated BM-21 UXO, while filtering out magnetic

UXO. We conducted initial controlled field trials on the grounds of

noise from metallic debris. Experimentally, we determined that at a

Chernihiv Airfield installation in northern Ukraine, where a series of

tethered sensor altitude of 3 m AGL and flight altitude of 7 m AGL,

inert training UXO were placed at about 25 m intervals along a linear

we could achieve the optimal balance between our ability to resolve

east-west transect. We tested three types of inert munitions: (a) BM-21

a simulated BM-21 UXO and limiting false flags from metallic clutter

MBRL 122 mm rocket, (b) SA 22 type anti-aircraft missile, and (c) solid

smaller than the test object. Similarly, we determined that survey spac-

metal core 152 mm artillery shell. From this configuration, we sought

ing of 3 m allows us to consistently identify magnetic anomalies asso-

to determine if we could not only effectively detect but also discrimi-

ciated with the targeted UXO type. Finally, we identified an optimal

nate MBRL UXO items from similarly sized and shaped non-magnetic

traverse speed of 3 m/s, which allows us to both provide high sampling

UXO items and highly-magnetic but significantly smaller 152 mm

density (MFAM samples at 1,000 samples per second, while the GPS

artillery projectiles. The setup is presented in Figure 3.

time stamp is placed only every second) and aerodynamic stabilization

UAV surveys were conducted north-south, perpendicular to the

of the MagPike platform in flight. In sum, we arrived at a 3-3-3 formula

transect in the 3-3-3 configuration as identified in the controlled trials.

for UAV-based aeromagnetic acquisition: 3-m sensor elevation, 3-m

Raw magnetic data were parsed and de-striped with correct GPS time
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Figure 4. Magnetic intensity maps over controlled site, with small black dots indicating GPS tracks of the conducted north-south UAV flights in (A). Black letters indicate
the anomalies associated with simulated UXO objects (B).

markers (Figure 4A). A simple line-leveling technique was then applied

site. Specifically, we were presented with an opportunity to survey

to each of the flight lines for every individual flight. This removed

a small section of the Ukrainian Armed Services Honcharivs’ke

the directional interference in the data. Subsequently, the regional

MBRL proving grounds. Here, the operators of the grounds identi-

total magnetic field for the controlled site was removed. These values

fied an area where two MBRL rockets failed to explode on impact—a

were calculated using the International Geomagnetic Reference Field

220 mm BM-27 Uragan (Hurricane) projectile and a 122 mm BM-21

(IGRF) model. The residual total magnetic intensity was plotted using

Grad projectile.

the Kriging Interpolation to turn the values into rasters and create an

This area allowed safe access via a reinforced concrete road, which

image of the data. A low-pass convolution filter was then applied to

served as a staging and take-off area for the UAV. A survey of the live

remove image background noise, and the raster color scale and inver-

site was conducted using the same 3-3-3 parameters as previously

sion was adjusted to most effectively intensify the magnetic variation

defined, and the dataset was analyzed relying on the same processing

in the data, thus clarifying anomalies that represent UXO items. It was

and mapping protocols. The results from the blind test surveys of live,

then easier to observe magnetic anomalies with a higher confidence

unexploded 122 mm rockets are presented in Figure 5. In the magnetic

that detected UXO items were not false positive errors.

dataset, we observed two large magnetic anomalies (labeled as A and B

In the processed and mapped datasets, there were three well-

in Figure 5). In our initial assessment, informed by results of the con-

defined dipole anomalies: A, B, and C (Figure 4). Anomaly A was

trolled trials, we hypothesized that the weaker anomaly is associated

associated with the inert BM-21 rocket, anomaly B was associated

with the larger-caliber BM-27 rocket, which despite its larger size con-

with the SA-22 inert missile, and anomaly C was associated with the

tains more non-magnetic aluminum in its design. Consequently, we

inert metal-core 152 mm artillery projectile. What is immediately

hypothesized that the larger anomaly B is associated with the BM-21

obvious is that the largely metal BM-21 (Figure 4A) rocket has a con-

UXO. Our assessment and the geographical coordinates of the anoma-

siderably more-intense magnetic signature than a similar-sized and

lies were relayed to the operators of the testing site, who conducted a

shaped but largely non-magnetic SA-22 inert missile (Figure 4B).

visual survey in indicated areas. Anomaly A was immediately identi-

Conversely, the metal-core but much smaller 152 mm artillery pro-

fied as a BM-27 rocket, which was submerged at a relatively low angle

jectile generated a magnetic intensity anomaly of comparable size to

of impact (Figure 5B). As for anomaly B, the assessment took signifi-

the BM-21 (Figure 4A) rocket.

cantly longer, as there were no visible signs of the UXO at the surface;

This result was instructive and helped us calibrate our processing

however, upon closer inspection, the search revealed the tail section of

filters to the metal content and size of the BM-21. We also noted that

a 95 percent submerged BM-21 rocket, as seen in Figure 5. Critically,

in the presence of massive magnetic UXO items of smaller calibers,

the BM-21 rocket’s tail section was below ground level and would have

there may be false-flag alarms associated with the high magnetic

been impossible to identify in a wide-area visual survey conducted

intensity fields generated by such objects. We do note that the inert

without constraining the search area.

152 mm projectile was a solid metal core training projectile without
an explosive chamber, which represents a very atypical object to be
encountered in the field.

BLIND FIELD TRIALS
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CONCLUSION
Our results to date indicate that UAV-based high-precision lowaltitude aeromagnetic surveys can have a transformative impact
in wide-area assessment of regions impacted by MBRL-generated

Following successful detection of the inert BM-21 rocket in con-

UXO contamination. Having performed calibration experiments.

trolled trials, we had a unique opportunity to test the developed

controlled surveys, and live field trials, we arrived at a standardized

survey platform and processing/detection algorithms at a live test

methodology for wide-area surveying specifically targeting detection
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and successful identification of buried UXO. Perhaps most importantly,
impacted areas with vegetation over 10
m tall will force sensor elevation outside the effective range of the survey
system. Large, near-surface natural
and anthropogenic magnetic anomalies may cause constructive or destructive interference within the magnetic
datasets, complicating initial analysis.
Finally, highly-variable topography will
require additional consideration and
accurate terrain contouring by the UAV
to maintain constant sensor elevation
above ground level.
In the coming months, we hope to
conduct additional full-scale trials to
further analyze the optimal UAV platform configuration for data collection
in the presence of exploded munitions
and magnetic clutter. In a previous
study, Butler discussed the importance
of accounting for background noise
that may clutter the data and make the
anomalies less distinct in the study of
magnetic backgrounds in UXO detection.17 Our results have been consistent
with that of Butler when comparing the
noise in seeded and live site data at different heights. Additional inquiry into
how various altitudes in terms of distance between magnetic anomalies on
Figure 5. Total magnetic field data at blind test site, with two anomalies associated with UXO objects marked (A) and
(B). The concrete road can also clearly be seen to the south in the bottom of the magnetic map, likely because of a
large amount of rebar used in its construction.

the same site affect the optimal height
for data collection is also warranted.
Additional inquiries should also be

and identification of the most common 122 mm BM-21 MBRL UXO

focused on the effects of UXO orientation and impact site composition

items. Our blind field trials demonstrated the effectiveness of this

on detection efficiency.

system in terms of both assessment accuracy and speed. Critically,

In terms of future development of processing and mapping algo-

we were able to convert aeromagnetic survey datasets to actionable

rithms, we intend to incorporate additional methods of magnetic noise

anomaly maps with minimal processing conducted on field-deployed

filtering to improve the resolution of the magnetic dataset. Beyond

computer systems. Using the current settings of the survey equipment

IGRF, the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) Global

and derived survey air speed and altitude parameters, we can survey

Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) elevation data could be used to

27,000 line meters during a single 150 minutes flight of the hybrid

parse data, with additional reduction to the pole (RTP) filtering. This

UAV, allowing surveying of a 600 x 600 m area in approximately 11

workflow could produce a clearer image and extend the distance range

hours. If, in the future, the sampling rate of the GPS unit is raised to

at which discernable data is collected. Finally, as this research effort

match the sampling frequency of the magnetometer, the survey can

progresses, we anticipate using the large magnetic datasets to develop

be conducted at 10 m/s air speed, and the 600 x 600 m area could be

an automated algorithm that can be used in machine-assisted data

surveyed in 3.5 hours with the same level of accuracy and resulting

processing, mapping, and analysis similar to our previous research

interpretation confidence.

on scatterable landmine detection.18,19 Toward this end, all raw data

Successful application of this methodology may be limited in
the presence of tall vegetation and may be influenced by site condi-

from these field trials are openly available at the Open Repository of
Binghamton University. 20,21

tions, including host soil geology, presence of metallic debris, infra-

While our results to date are specific to the Cicada-M UAV platform

structure, and topography, all of which can impact the depth, angle,

equipped with the Geometrics MFAM sensor, it can be reasonably
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concluded that similar results can be achieved with other UAV and
sensor platforms with only slight recalibration of survey design and
data processing streams. With UAV platforms further improving in
reliability, and magnetometers dropping in size and cost, our study
demonstrates the potential for cost-efficient aeromagnetic surveys as a
key element in wide-area technical assessment of MBRL-generated

Andrii Puliaiev
Ukrainian Multirotor Technologies
Andrii Puliaiev is the Chief Executive Director at Ukrainian Multirotor Technologies
with extensive experience in UAV design
and adaptation in automated geophysical
surveys.

UXO contaminated areas.
See endnotes page 71
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TO WHAT EXTENT COULD THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN AIRBORNE
THERMAL-IMAGING DETECTION
SYSTEM CONTRIBUTE TO
ENHANCED DETECTION?
By Martin Jebens*, Hideyuki Sawada**, Ph.D., Junjie Shen**, and Erik Tollefsen*
*[ ICRC ] and **[ Waseda University, Tokyo ]

O

ver the past two decades, several initiatives that involved

function very well, but consequently separate intervention with dif-

research and development on sensor and detection sys-

ferent customized tools will be carried out in sequence, which often

tems have failed to successfully integrate with clearance

comes at the cost of safety, effectiveness, and cost-efficiency.3

operations and have not been able to help affected states overcome the

Ideally, survey and clearance activities should be evidence-based

humanitarian challenges caused by weapon contamination. Though

and directed by field assessments and information analyses of a spe-

initial tests were promising, when faced with the reality of the field, the

cific geographical area or a task such as a stretch of road or a com-

technology often indicates shortcomings.1

munity. New and developing technologies such as consumer market

The terrain, dense vegetation, metal clutter, or other obstacles

camera drones, affordable thermo-imaging cameras, and light detec-

encountered in humanitarian mine action (HMA) pose challenges

tion and ranging (LiDAR) systems can be alternatives to other active

often greater than reliable target detection. Therefore, understanding

or passive sensors and tools that can assist survey and clearance opera-

the inherent challenges of a task is paramount when discussing the

tors in establishing evidence of weapon contamination in a variety of

entry of new technologies into the field of HMA.2

scenarios. Such technologies could be elements in a toolbox approach

Today, most technologies employed in survey or clearance operations fill one function only. The technology performs the intended

Thermal image of a stockmine taken from app. 10 m height. The
FLIR Vue Pro sensors was used in an old mine field on the Danish
west coast. The same type (not identical) of sensor was used by
Nikulin et al. (2018) to detect landmines, and by Casana et al.
(2017) to detect archeological objects. Test objects was German
WWII stockmines. The beach environment was the same as when
the mines were placed in 1944. Stockmines can be found throughout northern Africa. All test objects could be detected with no false
alarm rate.

that could help expedite activities without adding costs or impacting
operator safety.
The FLIR Lepton thermal sensor was tested in Geneva, Switzerland.
This sensor is integrated in the Mavic 2 Enterprise drone. The resolution was 160 x 120. Many of the test objects could be identified
from a 10 m height using this configuration, though only as a footprint and not with clear identification.

Figure 2. Thermal image metal objects taken by FLIR Lepton thermal sensor.

Figure 1. Thermal image of stockmine taken by FLIR Vue Pro.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.

The InfReC Thermo FLEX F50 was used in a test in Japan. This
sensor has a resolution of 240 x 240. The test objects on this image
were a combination of wooden replicants of landmines, plastic, and
metal objects. In this test the objects were placed both on bare soil
and on vegetation. This dataset was used for deep learning (see
later paragraphs).
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discussed in this article is clearly not for all conditions,
and national authorities and operators should aim to

Conv 3*3/1

find the most permissible environment for each tool and
detector, metal and heat-sensing alike.

Maxpool 2*2/2

In order to bring a functional and affordable concept to
operators in the field, close cooperation between opera-

Conv 3*3/1

tors, research institutions, and manufacturers is vital. In
partnership with Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan, the

Maxpool 2*2/2

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been
developing a concept where a thermo-imaging camera

Conv 3*3/1

mounted on a consumer drone has been used in trials to
define a proof-of-concept for use in detection of explosive

Maxpool 2*2/2

remnants of war (ERW), and to improve the confidence
of detection by using deep learning. Two major Japanese

Conv 3*3/1

technology consortiums have shown interest in the testing
phase, and the test findings show promising results.

Maxpool 2*2/2

THERMAL SENSING

Conv 3*3/1

Remote sensing, the use of drones, and deep learning
are technologies that are included in the discussions on

Maxpool 2*2/2

how technology and innovation can improve humanitarian
action and international peacekeeping. The 2016 Agenda

Conv 3*3/1

Conv 1*1/1

Conv 1*1/1

for Humanity of the United Nations Secretary General

concat

states “that to deliver collective outcomes, the humanitarian sector must promote a strong focus on innovation.”4

Upsample

Conv 3*3/1

Conv 3*3/1

Conv 1*1/1

These three technologies all have the potential to improve
the capacity to assess needs and to monitor changes on
the ground. Remote sensing is a relatively inexpensive and

Conv 1*1/1

quick method to survey large areas of land on a variety of
themes, with a low risk for the operators. Due to its relatively
(depending on the platform chosen) low environmental

Output

Output

Figure 3. Architecture of tiny-YOLOV3.

footprint and impact on nature, remote-sensing applications support sustainable development and, therefore, are
in line with the recommendations included in the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) and the Sendai Framework for

The Gordian Knot in survey and clearance involves being able to

Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR). Remote-sensing data can be col-

reach sufficient confidence levels with the technologies and methods

lected using different platforms, e.g., satellites, airplanes, drones, or

employed. As a result, the gold standard of today’s operations remain

ground-based devices. This project focuses on using a drone-based

manual operators equipped with metal detectors.

solution even though combining satellite based and drone-based data

The paradox faced when introducing multi-sensor capability in
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can improve the quality of the result.

survey and clearance operations is that while likely to increase the

Thermal sensing is a type of remote sensing that has been tested

probability of detection (PoD), sensors—e.g., dual sensors combin-

and assessed as a method for detection of landmines (e.g., OZM-4 and

ing ground-penetrating radar (GPR) and an electromagnetic inter-

PMD-6) but with no concluding results.5,6,7 Compared to work done

ference (EMI) detector—will simultaneously raise the false alarm

in the 1990s and early 2000s, recent advances in the development of

rate (FAR). This causes operators to have a lack of confidence in the

sensors have identified a potential to use them for detection of small

reliability of the alarms observed. Simplified, this means that the

objects, as well as conventional (explosive) and chemical, biological,

increase in the PoD is improving the confidence, while the raised

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The size of the object will

FAR is reducing the confidence levels of a multi-detector system.

be a function of the resolution of the thermal sensor and the flight

It is, however, believed that recent developments in deep learning

height, hence a M42 explosive submunition can be identified from a

technologies have the potential of helping us overcome this phe-

flight height between 15 and 20 m.8-12 Through a joint project, Waseda

nomenon. By developing a learning algorithm in the sensor system

University and the ICRC wanted to better understand if recent tech-

(thermal-imaging camera), an operator could help reduce the sys-

nology developments in thermal sensing could contribute to enhanc-

tem’s FAR on a day-to-day basis. The thermo-imaging technology

ing operations in this sector and determine whether this technology
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objects, due to the potential differences in the soil composition
caused by the object itself or the rework of sediment. Using thermal sensors, it is possible to assess these differences in vegetation
density, and potentially detect patters from landmines.

TESTING
Several tests were performed in Denmark, Japan, and Switzerland.
Three different sensors were used during these tests, where the
objective was not only the detection of weapons but for a wider use
in the humanitarian sector, e.g., to detect human remains or mass
burial sites, or to screen for epidemics in refugee camps. In addition,
the sensors and drones chosen were commercial off-the-shelf products. Hence, if they can be used for non-technical surveys (NTS)
and detection of weapons, it could be a faster, safer, and more cost-

Figure 4. Drone with InfReC Thermo FLEX F50.

effective method. The sensors used included the FLIR Vue Pro, the

could eventually be applied to the broader humanitarian sector by

InfReC Thermo FLEX F50, and the FLIR Lepton thermal sensor. All

assessing the following objective: To what extent could the develop-

sensors were mounted on a drone, either a Phantom 3 Professional

ment of an airborne thermal-imaging detection system contribute to

or the Mavic 2 Enterprise. Whereas sensors are manufactured with

enhance the pace of detection and disposal of mines and ERW?

a wide range of technical specifications, the specific need should be

The challenge in the project was to secure operability between an

assessed before choosing the sensor. For example, a thermal sen-

aerial platform, camera unit, and GPS recorder and to develop a deep-

sor used for analyzing the transfer of heat energy in the oceans will

learning system capable of distinguishing patterns of landmines and

likely need a different configuration than the one used for detecting

weapons, including how to exclude homogenous and non-hazardous

weapons, e.g., different resolution or focal width.

materials (metal or plastic). The first phase has recently been described

A detailed plan of the flight mission is essential for acquiring high-

successfully by Nikulin et al.13 and DeSmet et al.,14 but using deep

quality airborne data sets. This is because the user does not have direct

learning to analyze the data will likely lower the FAR.

control of the sensor, as in ground-based sensing. The flight plan must

One major advantage in using thermal sensors compared to

be based on the technical configuration of the thermal sensor and the

some other sensors is that it is passive. Hence, it only relies on the

aim of the analysis (e.g., size of target or detonation craters). An initial

natural emission of heat energy from different objects. Therefore,

assessment of the area in which the thermal survey will take place is

thermal sensing is simply the process of converting heat energy

therefore necessary. The flight plan should relate to altitude, speed, fre-

into visible images. The principles behind thermal sensing of

quency of images taken, overlap of images, time of day, and the targets

weapons are relatively simple: due to differences in composition,

under investigation. Consideration of these factors ensures coverage

density, and moisture content, objects on and below the ground

of the entire area, creation of high-resolution images, and recording of

absorb, emit, transmit, and ref lect thermal-infrared radiation at

targets with a high enough number of pixels to be used for deep learn-

different rates.15 Thermal energy is largely a surface phenome-

ing. Drones normally have a GPS system with an accuracy of approxi-

non, and thermal cameras can’t “see through” anything. Thermal

mately 2 m, depending on the number of satellites available at the time.

sensing only measures the passive emission of heat energy from

A differential global positioning system can be used on some drones,

the surface of the nearest objects. However, an object’s emission

which could decrease the accuracy to less than 20 cm.

of heat energy can enable us to see buried objects if the soil is able
to transfer the energy by conductivity. This will depend on the
type of the soil, e.g., the size and shape of mineral grains, chemical composition, and water
content. If the object is warmer or colder than
the surrounding sediment, it can either cool or
heat up the sediment in which it’s placed. This

Place

Time

Drone

Camera

Data Export

Denmark: Danish West
Coast. Former WWII
minefield

October, November
and January
(2019/2020)

Phantom 3
Professional

FLIR Sensor
resolution: 640x480

16bit tiff

Japan: Tokyo

29 November 2019

Phantom 3
Professional

Nippon Avionics
InfReC Thermo FLEX
F5 Series Sensor
resolution: 240x240

16bit tiff

Schweiz: Versoix

7 January 2020

Mavic 2
Enterprise

FLIR
M2ED Thermal
Camera
Sensor resolution:
160x120

8bit

can potentially be seen on the soil surface and
be detected by the thermal sensor. Likewise, it
is possible to detect reworked sediment. In general, heavy vegetation will lower the detection
rate because the thermal sensor will receive the
passive emission of heat energy from the vegetation covering the objects. However, the vegetation density can change above hidden or buried

Table 1. Overview of the equipment used for testing in Japan, Switzerland, and Denmark.
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The convolution layer is the
core component of a convolutional
neural network. Its role is usually
to extract features from an input
image. By changing the size of the
kernel, the convolution layer can
output images with different sizes.
This provides researchers with
the different features included in
images, which in turn will be used
for training the neural network.17
The maxpool layer downsamples

Figure 5b. Ball object.
Figure 5a. Metal, box, short objects.
Figure 5. Different objects in thermal images.

the feature map. The function is to
filter the features in the receptive
field and extract the most representative features in the region, which
can effectively reduce the output
feature scale and then reduce the
amount of parameters required by
the model.18
The residual layer does not
change the size of the input and output. It is used to deepen the network
while controlling the propagation
of the gradient, avoiding problems
such as gradient dispersion and gradient explosion, and strengthening
the training speed.

Figure 6a. Prediction result.

Figure 6b. Prediction result.

The FLIR Vue Pro and the InfReC Thermo FLEX F50 series enables
users to capture raw, full-spectrum thermal imagery in 16-bit files that
can be used for more advanced analyses. For some thermal sensors it is
only possible to export data in 8-bit images. The 8-bit images do not offer
the same range of values whereas identification of weapons is difficult. In
addition, they do not contain information on the flight path. The FLIR
Lepton thermal sensor belongs to the latter category (8-bit) and is therefore less capable of detecting weapons and cannot be used for deep learning. However, it can be advantageous in other types of assessments.

DEEP LEARNING

IMAGE DATA

The requirement for sensors in this project was to produce images
having a high enough quality to be used for deep learning. The InfReC
Thermo FLEX F50 thermal sensor was chosen because of its superior
quality in providing thermal images. The drone system is shown in
Figure 4. By using this system, high-quality thermal images were taken
in Tokorozawa, Japan, and were used to train the neural network.
The experiment was mainly conducted on humid soil ground, using
objects with different shapes and materials as detection targets. These
included wooden objects in the shape of boxes and short sticks, plastic
objects in the shape of balls, and metal objects placed on the ground.
Two examples of thermal images taken by InfRec Thermo FLEX F50

Deep learning is a technology that can greatly improve HMA. As

are shown in Figure 5. The colors of particular materials are different

an important branch of deep learning, object detection algorithms

in thermal images, which potentially enable researchers to detect vari-

are constantly emerging. Tiny-YOLOV3, the abbreviation of “you

ous objects by using deep learning

only look once,” is a popular real-time object detection algorithm.
Compared with other objection detection algorithms (R-FCN, SSD), it

As mentioned previously, tiny-YOLOV3 is a popular object detection

tages, tiny-YOLOV3 is used for detecting the mines in this experiment.

algorithm with fast speed and high accuracy. This step can improve the

Tiny-YOLOV3 is a fully convolutional neural network, which

resolution of the images, which results in the improvement of the rec-

includes many residual layers, and can help the neural network iden-
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TRAIN AND PREDICTION OF TINY-YOLOV3

has a fast detection speed and high accuracy.16 Because of these advan-

ognition accuracy.

tify small objects. The tiny-YOLOv3 uses a total of 23 layers, which

The learning rate was set to 0.001 at first. When the number of train-

include the convolutional, maxpool, and residual layers. The archi-

ing iterations reached 400,000, the learning rate increased to 0.01. The

tecture of tiny-YOLOV3 is shown in Figure 3.

learning rate also changes to 0.1 when the iterations reaches 450,000.
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During the training process, each training batch is set to train 64
images. When the number of training batches reaches 500,200 the
training process is terminated, and another parameter is related to the
threshold. When the intersection over union (IOU) of the prediction
grounding box and the ground truth box exceeds 0.5, this prediction
value can be regarded as a good prediction. This can further improve
the accuracy of the prediction.
After training the IR images, the prediction of the neural network
is executed to extract objects. As shown in Figure 6, two metal objects,
one box object, and one short object are properly detected. Dummy
PMN-2 landmines were used as well. In this test, they were placed
above ground. For this reason, the FAR was 0. Currently, testing is taking place on the detection of buried landmines.

NEXT STEPS
The evidence suggests that the method is appropriate in some environments (arid and semi-arid areas that can be encountered on a large
scale, globally) and could improve NTS and detection of both buried
and non-buried weapons. In addition, the use of thermal sensing is
likely to benefit other humanitarian sectors. Several commercial companies in Japan, who also have identified this method as a worthwile
technological advancement, have shown interest in using these meth-
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ods in a wider humanitarian context. It is therefore the opinion of
Waseda University and the ICRC Weapon Contamination Unit that
the work should be taken into a second phase in which further testing
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should take place and also look into data fusion.
Data produced by remote sensors has, in the last decade, increased
intensely. To cope with this collection of big-data, deep learning has
been further developed.19 Known types of remote sensing in HMA
include GPR, gravimetry, electromagnetism, magnetism, etc. These
individual data sets contain important information; however, combining the data sets from multiple sources via data fusion can improve the
potential value and interpretation.20,21 Ultimately, data fusion integrates the different information gathered from different sensors
mounted on drones, satellites, or ground platforms hereby producing
more detailed information. There are many applications for data
fusion. Having been applied in sectors like defense and security, it is
worth mentioning that data fusion can be used to further improve
object detection, recognition, and identification.22,23
See endnotes page 71
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Whither HMA Policy? Linking HMA and Development Assistance by Rasmussen [ from page 4 ]
1. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Executive Summary,” Landmine Monitor: Toward
a Mine-Free World, (1999): 5.
2. The U.S. State Department credits The HALO Trust with coining the term “humanitarian
demining” in 1988 as it differentiated military demining in Afghanistan from efforts designed
specifically to reduce the ongoing threat to civilians, livelihoods, communities, and public
infrastructure in terms of post-war reconstruction. The U.S. later established an inter-agency
Humanitarian Demining Program in 1993 (consolidating under one policy roof such programs
as Afghanistan 1988, Cambodia 1991, Kuwait 1991, Northern Iraq 1992, Somalia 1991, El
Salvador 1993, and Mozambique 1993); in 1997, the United States designated a Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining; and in
1998 the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs was established in the State Department
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs as the lead for HMA, see https://bit.ly/39gYIZg.
3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, p. 12.
4. “Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),” MDGS.un.org, accessed 25 March 2020, https://
bit.ly/2y2URSs.
5. John McArthur, Krista Rasmussen, “How successful were the Millennium Development
Goals?” 11 January 2017, https://brook.gs/2zoXbEw.
6. As Stanley Brown, Acting U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs, noted recently: “From a global perspective, the United States has provided over [$3.7]
billion in CWD assistance to more than 100 countries since 1993. Over those 26 years, how
we prioritized those funds has changed based on foreign policy priorities, the context of
international security and post-conflict recovery, and our application of programmatic tools
to achieve those objectives,” (See “Evolving Funding Models and Donors Remarks.” Remarks
at Wilton Park Conference, Magaliesburg, South Africa, November 6, 2019. https://www.
state.gov/evolving-funding-models-and-donors/). (NB: The figure of $3.7B reflects an upward
adjustment based on more current data as reported on page 5 of To Walk the Earth In Safety
2019: the prior quote used $3.4 billion).
The tension and need to balance between the moral and political imperatives has long been
present, going back, for example, to the first U.S. government interagency strategic plan for
humanitarian demining, which was prepared at the Directive of President Clinton back in
January 1996 in continuation of President Bush’s September 1993 National Security Council
directive to establish such a body (see https://bit.ly/3auDh88). The plan states that “the
purpose of the U.S. Government (USG) humanitarian demining program is to assist selected
countries to relieve human suffering and develop an indigenous demining capability while
promoting U.S. interests. To achieve program goals, the USG must balance its political,
military, technological and economic capabilities with available resources.” The point is, how
governments fund spending is a political decision around political priorities, and currently the
politics suggest greater fiduciary oversight for development assistance and HMA, especially
in the face of seemingly competing priorities within and across foreign and domestic policy
fronts. Return on investment matters: Evidence matters.
7. According to the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. budget for 2019 was just under $200
million, per planned allocations. It should also be noted that the total amount of U.S. assistance also includes additional munitions related spending of roughly $10.2 million in Defense
Department spending as well as $12.2 million from USAID in 2018, and planned amounts
for 2019 of approximately $20 million and $12.5 million, respectively. See To Walk the Earth
in Safety, 19th Edition, 02 April 2020 https://www.state.gov/reports/to-walk-the-earth-insafety-2020/.
8. To Walk the Earth in Safety, 19th Edition, 02 April 2020.
9. It should be noted that these figures, while reported by the Monitor, may be off a little as
some funding was likely spent on minor small arms/light weapons activities and not all went
to HMA.
10. A review of the annual Landmine Monitor reports for the years 2015 – 2019 indicate that the
following six countries received roughly 52% of the total global mine action assistance: Iraq
($469.7M), Afghanistan ($273M), Syria ($191.5M), Lao PDR ($186.4), Cambodia ($121.8M),
and Colombia ($118.5M).
11. “Development aid drops in 2018, especially to neediest countries,” OECD.org, 10 April 2019,
accessed 25 March 2020, https://bit.ly/2xZRxYf (accessed 20 October 2019).
12. “Development aid rises again in 2016,” OECD.org, 11 April 2017, accessed 25 March 2020,
https://bit.ly/2WGHJN7.
13. Landmine Monitor 2019, p. 84, November 2019, https://bit.ly/304Bmoy, accessed 2 June
2020.
14. Other issues have certainly had a positive impact in terms of generating support, such as the
ethical argument that mines are indiscriminate weapons, disproportionately affect the poor,
have long shelf-lives, and the causal devastation carries generational impact for families and
communities. However, casualty and victim reduction results have tended to lead the way.
15. Landmine Monitor 2019, p. 32.
16. Landmine Monitor 2019, p. 54.
17. The 2019 Report states that in 2018 “at least 3,059 people were killed, and another 3,837
people were injured.” This notwithstanding, earlier mine related casualty data from the 2017
Landline Monitor is used in order enable a comparison across a similar time frame with data
reflecting typical causes and rates of death in the developing world inasmuch as global health
reporting typically has a much longer lag time.
18. The UN’s Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation reported the median of under five
child mortality for Sub-Saharan Africa was 82.2 per 1000 live births and 46.4 for South Asia.
In contrast, the North American rate was 6.6, while Western Europe was 4.9. See https://
childmortality.org/.
19. Lucia Hug, David Sharrow, and Danzhen You, “Levels & Trends in Child Mortality Report
2017,” UNICEF, 2017, https://uni.cf/3cMWEKh.
20. Lucia Hug, David Sharrow, and Danzhen You, 2017.
21. WHO, “World malaria report 2017,” November 2017, https://bit.ly/3fg7E4t.
22. WHO, “Diarrhoeal disease,” 2 May 2017, https://bit.ly/2AlgXkA.
23. Michela Sonego, Maria Chiara Pellegrin, Genevieve Becker, and Marzia Lazzerini, “Risk Factors
for Mortality from Acute Lower Respiratory Infections (ALRI) in Children under Five Years of
Age in Low and Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Observational Studies,” PLOS One 10, no. 1, (2015), https://bit.ly/2BXr3sF.
24. WHO suggests $1,000 per capita on health care is the needed global average to dramatically improve health-based quality of life. This is, however, well beyond the means of many
underdeveloped countries, as half the world’s countries spend less than $350 per capita per
annum.
25. Without even modeling potential effects, the HMA community can do a better job of breaking down and communicating the impact clearing the aforementioned 149 sq kilometers had
on human and community security and well-being, and do so with attention to sustainability,
i.e., longitudinal results. For example, a development oriented HMA key performance indicator might include sustainability, measured by an impact assessment at 1 and 3 year intervals
of critical but situationally tailored sub-indicators.
26. Fortunately, there is a body of work on which to draw. Two 2004 PRIO publications provide a
sufficient base, Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine action in support of peacebuilding, and
the joint publication with UNDP, Reclaiming the Fields of War: Mainstreaming mine action
in development. Other representative efforts include the 2008 GICHD report, Linking Mine
Action and Development, the 2014 DfID publication Clearing a Path to Development, and the
2016 UNDP report, Mine Action for Sustainable Development. The DFiD publication includes
a well thought out theory of change, however, Itad—the firm hired in 2019 to evaluate DfID’s
Global Mine Action Programme (2018–2021)—stated they struggled to find good empirical
research on the causal connections. Itad noted this is partially due to the lack of policy and
operational orientations guiding inquiry into the linkage, especially in terms of longitudinal
impact. (See https://www.itad.com/article/linking-mine-action-to-development-the-needfor-generating-evidence-of-longer-term-change/.) Clearly more work needs to be done by
both the development assistance community and the mine action community, each working
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toward new, but common middle ground.
Toward that end, two other documents explore both policy and operational considerations
in terms of linking mine action and development—the 2017 joint publication by GICHD and
UNDP, Leaving No One Behind: Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals, and
the latest United Nations Mine Action Strategy 2019–2023. The former maps and explains
major direct and indirect linkages between the six primary HMA tasks (land release, victim
assistance, gender mainstreaming, risk education, physical security and stockpile management, capacity building, and partnerships) and the 17 SDGs. The UN strategy guideline states
clearly that, “Mine action has become a nexus between humanitarian action, peace and
security, and development as well as a cornerstone for conflict prevention.” The strategy also
articulates “the strategic objectives and commitments of the United Nations to address the
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papers

Editorial: Empowering Local Capacity in Mine Action
With explosive hazards contamination persisting in spite of dwindling funding opportunities, sustainable solutions are becoming increasingly more important. Similarly,
creating mine action programs and centers that can be relied upon to pick up the reigns
after foreign clearance organizations and contractors have left is of paramount importance. What lessons learned can the community share in regards to building national
capacity and employing locals to continue operations after projects have concluded?

HMA and COVID-19

Landmine clearance in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Photo courtesy of ITF.
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The world is facing an unprecedented global crisis caused by COVID-19. Already
struggling with nonexistent or insufficient essential services and infrastructure, unsanitary conditions, and vulnerable populations, post-conflict environments are at
risk of facing even greater challenges compounded by COVID-19. How have HMA
organizations responded to the pandemic and in what ways have they adapted their
operations both in and out of the field? In what ways have organizations leveraged
their in-country assets (or resources) to assist regional authorities and local communities? What does the future look like for HMA operations during a global pandemic,
what challenges does the sector anticipate facing, and how can we better adapt to
these new circumstances?

We are accepting submissions on this topic for the Fall edition of The Journal
through July 31.
Balkans
Organizations working in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro are encouraged to submit on their current programs, challenges, and successes.

Environmental Concerns of Explosives
War and conflict have obvious negative effects on the human communities in which
they occur, but the effects that ammunition and explosives can have on the environment are less evident. How does explosive contamination affect the environment,
how do explosive detonations affect the physical and chemical properties of ground
soils, and what measures can MA operators take to reduce these effects?

HMA and CWD in the Context of IDPs and Migration
How can HMA/CWD programs better adapt to the return of IDPs, and how are countries/organizations addressing migration as it occurs across mined borders and contaminated areas?

Demining in Dense Terrain
Freedom of movement remains restricted in some forest and jungle areas of the
Balkans, Ukraine, and Colombia, endangering human life, damaging the ecosystem, and increasing the risk of fires. The Journal seeks submissions from organizations operating in these areas.

Management Information Systems and/or On-Site Analytical Tools

The Journal editorial staff reserves the right to reject submissions that include text
copied from other sources in part or as a whole. Works that have been published previously and for which the author retains publishing rights may be submitted, but The
Journal requires the author provide notification of this when submitting the article
and give contact information for the original publisher so that reprint permission
may be verified. Reprint submissions for which this information is not provided may
be rejected. Please note that The Journal reserves all rights to content published and
requires notification and written approval before content is used again by another
source or publication.
Authors who submit articles to The Journal are expected to do so in good faith
and are solely responsible for the content therein, including the accuracy of all
information and correct attribution for quotations and citations.

Management information systems differ from information management systems in
that they are used for decision making as opposed to information storage. How are
organizations using decision-assisting technologies to analyze and interpret data and
efficiently allocating resources to the field?

Research and Development
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction seeks research and development
(R&D) articles. All technical articles on current equipment, technology, trends, and
developments in the field of mine action and CWD will be considered. Commercial
companies, NGOs, and researchers are encouraged to submit. R&D submissions
are reviewed by subject-matter experts in single blind peer reviews, where authors
receive reviewer feedback anonymously and articles undergo an iterative approval
process before being published. Reviewers approve articles for publication, suggest
revisions, or reject articles for publication.

